



EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE LISTED 







DEGREE AWARDED BY 






SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL 








Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study of the 




This dissertation is an examination of the incentives, opportunities and 
disincentives for earnings management. The research was conducted for the listed, 
commercial banks in Cyprus. The period examined includes the years 2002-2011, for 
which the required information was available. After having considered the literature 
review, the regulations that affect banks‟ financial reporting and the results from 
interviews conducted the research hypotheses were formulated and tested with 
regressions.  
 
The conclusions drawn from this empirical analysis were as follows. The 
existence of a cash bonus and leverage did not create incentives for earnings 
management through the use of discretionary accruals. This finding was observed 
because the net profit was not considered in cash bonus decisions. In addition, most of 
the banks‟ debt was in the form of deposits; deposit schemes do not include covenants 
that have to be met like other debt contracts. Discretionary accruals were therefore 
saved so that they could be used to manage earnings and increase regulatory capital. 
The evidence suggests that when the capital adequacy ratio was low, earnings were 
managed in order to artificially boost the capital base. The empirical results confirm that 




bank practices. Banks were then able to grow and to grant loans very generously. 
Recognition of more interest revenue helped to cover higher interest paid to depositors 
and also helped executives to earn their bonus. The evidence also suggests that when 
the CEO was also the chairman of the board, the quality of earnings deteriorated. 
However, when directors owned shares and as board independence increased, the 
quality of earnings was improved.   
 
 Considering the recent financial crisis and that one of the largest banks has 
collapsed, the results of this thesis should be of great importance to boards and their 
audit and remuneration committees, shareholders, depositors, auditors and the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate earnings management practices in 
the Cyprus banking sector. An empirical investigation of banks was of interest because 
of their systemic importance to the economy.  The most significant role that banks play 
in Cyprus is that of financial intermediation. Because businesses find it difficult to raise 
funds through the local stock exchange, banks are the best source of flexible funding. 
Individuals and households also secure lending for personal and housing needs via 
banks. Another characteristic of the Cyprus banking sector is that it relies mostly on 
deposits in order to raise funds and hence be able to lend individuals and businesses. 
The existence of no other alternative to transfer capital between savers and lenders 
proves how critical banks are for Cyprus.  
 
 As discussed in Chapter 5: “Theory of Methodology” this empirical study was 
classified under the critical realism philosophy. It is recommended that critical realists 
proceed with a critical evaluation of the literature of the phenomenon to be investigated, 
develop a conceptual framework and set the research objectives (Zachariadis and 
Scott, 2010). In line with this recommendation, after the phenomenon to be investigated 
was chosen (i.e. earnings management), the next step was to carry out a 






In the literature, earnings management is defined as a phenomenon that occurs 
when managers use their discretion to make accounting choices and estimates or to 
enter into transactions so as to increase or decrease reported net income at will 
(Copeland, 1968).   
 
Earnings management exists because, under the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), accounting options are given for presenting financial performance. It 
can therefore be inferred that, under the current accounting system, accountants should 
be able to calculate some “unmanaged” income figure and any deviation of reported 
profits from this benchmark is evidence of earnings management (Schipper, 1989).  
 
Depending on what type of accounting item is used, earnings management can 
be classified as real or cosmetic (Schipper, 1989). Real earnings management involves 
the timing of the recognition of events in the period that is most advantageous to 
management (Travers, 2002). Cosmetic earnings management involves the flexibility to 
choose from a set of accounting methods or to change accounting estimates. Given that 
the objective of financial reporting is to provide information that is not only reliable but 
relevant as well, managers can use their discretion to communicate their private 
information to capital markets (Healy and Palepu, 1995). However the “signalling” 






Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that managers are primarily motivated by 
self-interest. They predict that when managers are rewarded in terms of accounting-
based bonus systems, they will manage earnings upwards in order to secure their 
compensation.  They also hypothesize that where lending contracts include accounting 
based covenants, managers will try to income maximize in order to avoid covenant 
violations.  Finally, Watts and Zimmerman assume that managers of firms that are 
subject to political scrutiny from various external groups, such as government or 
employees, will try to manage income downwards in order to avoid regulatory 
intervention or combat labour demands.  
 
Unlike non-financial firms, under the political cost hypothesis, banks will be 
motivated to manage earnings upwards because banking institutions face regulatory 
monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting numbers. Banks are required to maintain a 
minimum capital adequacy ratio that equals regulatory capital divided by risk weighted 
assets and off balance sheet items. Regulatory capital includes accounting profits, so 
banks can artificially boost their ratio through profitability.   
 
Equity based compensation also provides managers with a motivation to income 
maximize in order to increase the stock price (Hall and Murphy, 2003). Behavioural 
finance proposes that investors may have the tendency to ignore the way accounting 
numbers are calculated, and most often fixate on the net profit (Stolowy and Breton, 
2004). One method of valuing a company‟s stock price is to discount the sum of its 




require (Gordon, 1959). Since dividends are paid out of earnings, expectations about 
future earnings can be formed, at least in part, on the basis of historical earnings.  
 
Similarly, job security concerns provide incentives for earnings management 
because profitability informs shareholders about the quality of managerial decisions 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).      
 
Under the transactions cost theory, firms that report higher profits can generally 
secure more favourable terms for their transactions (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). 
Therefore, implicit contracts with customers / suppliers create incentives for earnings 
management (Bowen, DuCharme and Schores, 1995).  
 
Finally, when book income is the same as taxable income, then firms have 
incentives to manage earnings downwards so as to reduce the tax to be paid (Klassen, 
1997). However, accounting profits are not equal to taxable profits. For tax purposes, 
the tax to be paid is calculated according to government regulations. Thus, when book 
income is uncoupled from taxable income, then firms have incentives to reduce the tax 
to be paid and use earnings management techniques that will increase book profits 
(Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009).   
 
In the literature, there is empirical evidence that corporate governance factors 




These governance variables include: the board of directors; audit committees; the 
quality of external audit; and corporate ownership.    
 
Board effectiveness can be ensured by independence, expertise, size and 
meetings.  The boards‟ monitoring role is improved when the proportion of outside, non-
executive directors is high (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Non- executive 
directors often have a financial background or frequently hold senior management 
positions in other large corporations; thus they have the ability to monitor the financial 
reporting process in order to detect earnings management as well (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Peasnell et al.,1999). Board size is another important element that may have an 
effect on earnings management. Smaller boards, between four to six members might be 
more effective since they are able to make timely strategic decisions (Goodstein et al., 
1994). On the other hand, a larger board with a lot of members who have varied 
expertise could increase the synergistic monitoring of the board and reduce the 
incidence of earnings management (Xie et al., 2003). Finally, boards that meet 
frequently are more likely to perform their duties diligently (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
  
The audit committee‟s effectiveness can be improved by independence, 
expertise and activity.  Independent audit committees function effectively because they 
are free of influences from executives (Vicknair et al., 1993).  Outside directors are also 
likely to have relevant experience and be effective in reducing earnings management 
(Choi et al., 2004).  Finally, in order for the audit committee to be effective, it must not 




Earnings management is less likely in companies audited by a Big auditing firm 
because Big auditing firms are expected to be independent, experienced and provide a 
higher-quality audit (DeAngelo, 1981). A major concern about auditing is whether 
auditors‟ independence is compromised by tenure or by non- audit services offered to 
clients (Chen, Lin and Lin, 2008). It is argued that longer auditor tenure is associated 
with greater expertise in the sense that auditors have a better understanding of their 
customers‟ business affairs. On the other hand the close relationship developed 
between auditor and clients may lead to an impairment of independence and objectivity. 
The provision of substantial amounts of non-audit services to clients may also make it 
more likely that auditors concede to the wishes of their customers when difficult 
judgments are made (Patterson and Valencia, 2011).  
 
Block ownership is also an important external control mechanism to managers 
(Shleiffer and Vishny, 1997). A block shareholding creates more incentives to monitor 
the actions of managers because monitoring will produce a bigger share of benefits 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Inside ownership is viewed as a governance mechanism 
that can help reduce agency costs because it aligns the interests of the executives with 
those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
In summary, there are two theories that dominate the literature: the theory on 
incentives and the theory on disincentives for earnings management. The incentives to 
manage accounting profits include: compensation, lending and implicit contracts; 




earnings management include: board of directors; audit committees; the quality of 
external audit; and corporate ownership. Finally, under the GAAP, accounting options 
are given for presenting financial performance, thus creating opportunities for earnings 
management. Based on the conceptual framework developed from the literature review, 
the research objectives were formulated as follows:    
1. Why does earnings management take place i.e. the incentives 
2. How does regulation provide opportunities for earnings management and  
3. How corporate governance and regulation can help limit such practices.   
  
Besides the conceptual framework developed from the literature review, critical 
realists argue that the assessment of government reports and other sources can also 
help to develop an explanatory framework (Olsen, 2009) In critical realism research, it is 
assumed that an external reality exists, and this reality affects human activity and 
creates the phenomena we observe (Wikgren, 2005). Consistent with this suggestion, 
the next step in this study was to carry out a critical evaluation of the laws that affect 
banks‟ financial reporting and hence impact bank executives‟ decisions.  The relevant 
legal framework in Cyprus includes: the Company Law; the Tax Law; the Stock 
Exchange Rules and its Corporate Governance Code; the Regulations of the Central 
Bank and the International Financial Reporting Standards. The critical evaluation of the 
laws in Cyprus has revealed that the motivations to manage earnings are: to increase 
profitability so as to increase the capital base for regulatory and internal capital adequacy 
purposes; attract and maintain shareholders and affect the stock price; compensation 




The opportunities to manage bank earnings relate to: loan loss provisions, loan restructuring 
and loan classification as non performing; sale of assets; adequacy of insurance liabilities; 
depreciation and amortization; revaluation of investment properties; defined benefit plan 
costs and stock based compensation; impairment of assets; unrealized gains losses of 
investments and derivatives (Level 3 inputs); and reduction of deferred tax asset. Finally, the 
disincentives for earnings management arise from: the penalties that can be imposed as 
per the Cyprus Stock Exchange and Company Laws; effective boards, effective audit 
committees, inside ownership; active engagement and dialogue by shareholders; the quality 
of the audit and the relationship of auditors with the Central Bank and; supervision and 
inspection by the Central Bank.  
 
The next stage in critical realism research is to collect primary data that can 
confirm or disconfirm the conceptual frameworks developed in the previous stages 
(Sobh and Perry, 2009). In addition, interviews can be used to help reduce the data 
from the conceptual framework and contribute to the development of hypotheses 
(Wikgren, 2005). Interviews are needed with individuals that are actively involved in the 
events (Yin 2003, p8.) Consequently, since this study is about earnings management 
and the quality of financial reporting, interviews were conducted with either a CEO or a 
CFO from each of the twelve commercial banks that operate in Cyprus and one bank 
auditor. This choice was made because, in any organisation, the individuals ultimately 
responsible for the true and fair view of financial statements are the CEOs and the 
CFOs. The auditor was also selected, because, he is working for a Big accounting firm 




operate in the country; this fact suggests experience in banking matters. The interview 
results revealed that, during the period for which the research was carried out, the most 
significant incentives for earnings management were the capital adequacy ratio and 
executive compensation. Bank boards were viewed as the most important disincentive for 
earnings management. Finally, it was strongly accepted that the tools used to manage 
earnings were the loan loss provisions and the real gains or losses from the sale of 
investments.  
 
In the last stage of critical realism research, if the demi-regularities observed 
from interviews can be quantified, regressions may be used to test hypotheses 
(Olsen, 2009). In line with this argument, after conducting the interviews, the 
research hypotheses were formulated and regressions were estimated in order to 
test for earnings management.  
 
More specifically, it was hypothesized that bank managers will manage 
earnings upwards in order to: secure their cash bonus; increase the stock price 
where their compensation includes stock options; and increase the bank‟s capital 
adequacy ratio.  
 
It was also hypothesized that earnings management will be constrained when: 
boards include a high proportion of independent directors; the CEO is not the 
chairman of the board; the CEO does not sit in the nomination committee; the board 




Other bank specific variables that could provide explanatory variations in 
earnings management were also considered.  Hence, it was also hypothesized that 
bank managers will manage earnings upwards in order to meet accounting based 
covenants included in lending contracts. It was also assumed that large and growing 
banks are more likely to attract the attention of regulators, and as a result earnings 
management will be constrained. The natural logarithm of total assets was used as a 
proxy for bank size and the market to book value of equity was used as a proxy for 
growth.    
 
One of the many approaches that can be used to detect earnings management 
is the specific accrual approach that focuses on an industry in which a single accrual 
is of material size and requires substantial judgment (Sun and Rath, 2010). This 
argument is consistent with the interview results; loan loss provisions is a bank 
specific accrual that is subject to a lot of managerial discretion and can be used to 
manage earnings. In banking, managers can choose when to sell their investment 
securities since it may be difficult to detect earnings management through real 
actions, because there is no benchmark to determine whether managers have 
made the right decision or not (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). This argument is 
also consistent with the answers provided by interviewees.   
 
Hence, the first metric for earnings management was based on loan loss 
provisions (LLP‟s) and realized securities gains and losses (RSGL‟s). Following 




estimated in order to calculate the discretionary part of LLP‟s and RSGL‟s. Earnings 
management (EM) was then measured as the difference between discretionary real 
securities gains and losses (DRSGL‟s) and discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP‟s).  
Lower levels of DLLP‟s and higher levels of DRSGL‟s correspond to higher levels of 
earnings management, which increase income.  
 
Another approach that may be used to detect earnings management is the total accrual 
approach (Sun and Rath, 2010). Total accruals can measure earnings management in a 
more comprehensive manner because, most of the time, managers tend to exercise 
discretion over various items to accomplish a specific goal. Therefore, the likelihood 
of detecting earnings management through the use of accruals is increased. 
Considering the financial crisis, it was also decided to use a second metric of 
earnings management, the discretionary accruals (DACCR). Following Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos (2012), the discretionary portion of bank's total accruals was estimated.   
 
After having derived the two measures of earnings management, two broad sets of 
regressions were estimated. The first regression treats EM as the dependent variable 
whereas the second regression treats (DACCR) as the dependent variable. Both 
regressions have the same explanatory variables which are: cash bonus, board 
ownership, board independence, CEO duality, whether the CEO sits in the nominating 
committee, board meetings, capital adequacy ratio, market to book value (a measure for 





The remainder of this research study is organised as follows: Chapter 2 includes 
a review of the earnings management literature; Chapter 3 provides a brief description 
of the Cyprus banking sector; Chapter 4 includes the evaluation of the Cyprus 
regulatory framework; Chapter 5 explains the nature, the paradigms and the 
methodology of the research; Chapter 6 presents the results from interviews; Chapter 7 
includes the research hypotheses, the regressions estimated in order to develop the 
measures of earnings management, the regressions estimated to test for earnings 



















Chapter 2: A Review of the Earnings Management Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 There are two theories that dominate the earnings management literature: the 
theory on incentives and the theory on disincentives for earnings management.  
  
 According to the “incentives for earnings management theory”, managers are 
primarily driven by self-interest. Thus, managers will use the discretion provided under 
the GAAP in order to increase, decrease or smooth accounting profits. There is 
empirical evidence that, where accounting alternatives exist, managers have an 
incentive to manage earnings so as to: secure a bonus which depends on accounting 
numbers; avoid accounting based debt covenant violations; and avoid political scrutiny 
from external groups such as the government, employees, environmental groups and so 
on (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). In addition to these motivations, other incentives to 
manage accounting reported profits arise from job security concerns (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1995), the effect on stock price (Hall and Murphy, 2003), implicit contracts 
(Bowen et al. 1995) and taxation considerations (Klassen, 1997). 
 
 According to the “disincentives for earnings management theory”, strong 
corporate governance mechanisms can control the incidence of earnings management 
(Coffee, 2005). There is empirical evidence that, the corporate the governance 
mechanisms which can limit opportunistic behaviour include: effective board of 




corporate ownership. Board effectiveness can be ensured by independence, expertise, 
size and meetings. Audit committee effectiveness can be ensured by independence, 
expertise and activity. Audit quality is improved when auditors are independent and 
experienced. Block ownership of a firm‟s stock provides owners with more incentives to 
monitor managerial actions, because monitoring will produce a bigger share of benefits; 
and finally, inside ownership helps to align the interests of managers and shareholders, 
thereby reducing the incentives to manage earnings.  
  
 This chapter includes a review of the earnings management literature and it is 
organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a definition of earnings management; 
Section 2.3 explains the classification of earnings management practices; Section 2.4 
clarifies the objectives of earnings management; Section 2.5 includes the earnings 
management dimensions; Section 2.6 explains why earnings management exists; 
Section 2.7 includes the incentives for earnings management together with empirical 
studies; and Section 2.8 includes the disincentives for earnings management along with 
supporting evidence.  
 
2.2 Definition of Earnings Management 
 Earnings management is the intentional increase or decrease or smoothing of 
net income, and it occurs when managers use their discretion to make accounting 





Earnings management is intimately related to the accrual accounting system 
(Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Under a cash accounting system, revenues would be 
recorded in the books when received and expenses would be recognized when paid. 
Under the accrual system, some items are recognized before cash is received or paid 
(i.e. credit sales and purchases). In order to achieve matching of revenues with 
expenses, in the period of a credit sale a related bad debt estimate must be recorded. 
Similarly, the cost of a fixed asset is recognised through periodic depreciation charges 
in order to match the benefits produced from the use of the asset with its cost (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2006, p. 387). 
 
Under the GAAP, accounting options are given for presenting financial 
performance. Thus, the application of the accrual system can be a subjective rather 
than an objective process, and depending upon the choices made, many different 
earnings figures can be achieved (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 387). Hence, while 
the conceptual framework supports objectivity and neutrality, the potential influences of 
management‟s discretion can make objectivity questionable.  
 
It can therefore be inferred that, under the current accounting system, 
accountants should be able to calculate some “unmanaged” income figure and any 
deviation of reported profits from this benchmark is evidence that an intentional 






2.3 Classification of Earnings Management Practices 
Earnings management practices can be classified into two categories: practices 
that fall within the GAAP and practices that fall outside the GAAP (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000).  
 
Accounting practices that are outside the GAAP constitute fraud (Stolowy and 
Breton, 2004). Examples of fraudulent activities would be fabricating false invoices, 
falsifying or altering documents, deleting transactions from records, recording forged 
transactions or concealing significant information (Merchant, 1987). For example, over 
the period of 1997 through 2002, reporting of false information resulted in a hyperbolic 
increase of financial statement restatements in the USA (Coffee, 2005). The main 
reason for these restatements was recognition of revenues that did not exist.  
 
Accounting practices that fall within the GAAP are considered to be legal if 
managers can provide reasonable economic justification for their accounting choices 
(Merchant, 1987). They may be erroneous but never fraudulent (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000). Compliance with accounting standards however does not guarantee that a firm‟s 
financial statements will present the true and fair. Vague accounting standards provide 
managers with the opportunity to make creative accounting choices and consequently 
provide misleading information (Tweedie and Whittington, 1990). Creative accounting 
choices remain within the limits of the law while bending its spirit. Alternatively, it can be 




rather could be the result of aggressive interpretations of accounting standards, which 
are becoming complex, difficult and costly to implement (Travers, 2002).   
 
2.4 Objectives of Earnings Management 
Managers exercise their discretion over accounting choices or when structuring 
transactions in order to maximize, minimize or smooth reported profits (Peasnell, Pope 
and Young, 2000). The objective of income smoothing is to reduce the variance of 
accounting profits over time and produce a steadily growing stream of earnings. This 
helps to give the appearance of high earnings quality and earnings persistence.  
 
The significant difference between the objectives of earnings management is the 
underlying motivation to manage the accounts (Moore, 1973). Income “maximizers” or 
income “”minimizers” do not behave like smoothers, therefore the attempt to modify 
accounting numbers will depend on the circumstances (Copeland, 1968). Regardless of 
the result, manipulations have a common characteristic: they are all based on the 
assumption that accounting is used as a tool for pursuing the general strategy of the 
firm or its management (Stolowy and Breton, 2004).  
 
2.5 Earnings Management Dimensions 
Depending on what type of accounting item is used, earnings management can 





Real earnings management involves the timing of the occurrence or recognition 
of events in the period that is most advantageous to management (Travers, 2002). 
Managers may sell an asset in the current year in order to recognise an immediate 
profit; they also have the flexibility to choose the level of reported expenses such as 
research and development. This type of earnings management is visible because 
outsiders, including auditors, may observe it in the year that it takes place. 
 
Cosmetic earnings management involves the choice from a set of accounting 
methods or the flexibility to change estimates that are required to apply these methods. 
This type of earnings management may be harder for an outsider to observe. In addition 
the effects of accounting method changes or changes in the way that methods are 
applied are very hard to estimate in the years subsequent to the year of the change 
(Schipper, 1989).   
 
2.6 Why Does Earnings Management Exist? 
Granted that, under the current GAAP, managers have the flexibility to manage 
earnings, one could argue that opportunities for such behaviour should be eliminated 
(Schipper, 1989). If managers do not manipulate earnings in order to bring about 
desired short-term results, the earnings quality will be improved since the earnings 
figure will be more reliable (Akers, 2007). However, according to the conceptual 
framework, the major objective of financial reporting is to provide investors and creditors 




reflect the firm's true earnings and help predict future earnings. Thus, the concept of 
earnings management is related to the concept of earnings quality (Akers, 2007).  
 
Earnings management therefore exists because it can be used as a vehicle of 
communicating managers‟ private information to capital markets (Healy and Palepu, 
1995). Even though the users of financial statements can evaluate a firm‟s financial 
position and performance using a variety of information sources that are publicly 
available, including information provided in the financial statements and supplementary 
disclosures, this does not eliminate the possibility that insiders will know more than 
outsiders about the current and future potential of the firm (Beaver, 1991). For example, 
firms that have different patterns of use in relation to fixed assets will adopt different 
depreciation policies; estimates of uncollectible receivables can be viewed as a means 
of providing information about default risk that is not publicly known from other sources 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 220). The potential for communicating inside 
information through earnings management is referred to as the “efficiency perspective”. 
Viewed from this perspective, the investors have a benefit so earnings management 
may be considered to have a “good side” (Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2000). 
 
However, the “efficiency perspective” does not consider that some financial 
statement preparers may be creative when preparing financial reports. Particular 
accounting methods may be selected driven by self-interest (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978). This “opportunistic perspective” explains the practice of creative accounting, 




select accounting methods that provide the result desired by the preparers (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2006, p. 43). For example, a manager may opportunistically choose to 
change the depreciation method for property, plant and equipment; or a manager may 
understate the provision for bad debts; a manager can also choose to change the 
inventory valuation method. And this can be done at a time when the organization is 
close to breaching accounting based agreements negotiated with external parties, such 
as loan agreements, which have a specified minimum interest coverage ratio, below 
which particular assets of the reporting entity may be seized. 
 
In summary, managerial judgment in financial reporting has both benefits and 
costs. The benefits include the potential to communicate management‟s private 
information to external stakeholders. The costs are potential misallocation of resources. 
In reality it is often difficult to conclude that an accounting choice was driven solely by 
an efficiency or an opportunistic motivation (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 220). For 
example, managers may choose accounting methods in self-interested attempts to 
increase the stock price prior to the sale of stock options they hold. On the other hand, 
the same accounting choices may be motivated by managers' objective assessment 
that the current stock price is undervalued relative to their private information (Deegan 








2.7 Incentives for Earnings Management 
There is a body of literature that suggests that those responsible for preparing 
financial statements are driven by self-interest and select accounting methods that lead 
to favourable outcomes for their own personal wealth.  
 
In 1990, Watts and Zimmerman published an article that considered ten years of 
development of Positive Accounting Theory. In their theory they assume that managers 
are primarily motivated by self-interest (tied to wealth maximization), and that the 
particular accounting method selected (where alternatives are available) will depend on 
the following: 
 whether the managers are rewarded in terms of accounting-based bonus 
systems (bonus plan hypothesis); 
 whether the firm that managers work for is close to violating accounting-based 
debt covenants (debt hypothesis); and  
 whether the firm that managers work for is subject to political scrutiny from 
external groups, such as government, employees or environmental groups 
(political cost hypothesis). 
 
In addition to the motivations considered in the Watts and Zimmerman study, 
other incentives to manage reported profits may arise from job security concerns 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995), the effect on stock price (Beaver, 1991), implicit 
contracts (Bowen, DuCharme and Schores, 1995) and taxation considerations 




Explanations on the motivations for earnings management with supporting 
evidence are provided next.  
 
2.7.1 Contractual Motivations  
In large organizations with dispersed ownership, the stockholders are not 
involved in the decision process because it may be costly for all of them to do so or 
because they may not be qualified to participate in this procedure. Thus they delegate 
their decision control rights to other agents, the managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
 
The delegation of decision making from stockholders (principals) to managers 
(agents) is referred to as an agency relationship. When the owner (principal) delegates 
decision-making authority to a manager (agent), it is possible that the manager may not 
work as hard as the owner would, given that the manager might not share directly in the 
results of the organization (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 207).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) considered the relationships and conflicts between 
agents and principals and how various contractual mechanisms can assist in minimizing 
the agency cost. In the agency theory literature, the firm is considered to be a nexus of 
contracts that are put in place with the intention of ensuring that all parties, acting in 
their own self-interest, are at the same time motivated towards maximizing the value of 
the organization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Firms enter into many contracts with 
their employees (including managers), capital providers (including lenders), 




Explicit contracts include written commands that specify the duties and rights of 
agents, the performance criteria on which agents are evaluated and their payoffs, both 
fixed and incentive. Usually contracts are based on observable accounting variables 
that are used to reward or punish the agents‟ behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If 
agents have the discretion to choose from an “accepted” set of accounting methods, 
they will chose those methods that affect the accounting reported figures based on 
which the agents will be evaluated. Thus contracts create motivations to manage 
accounting reported figures. Examples of such contracts are the compensation and 
lending contracts.  
 
Under the transactions cost theory, firms that report higher profits can generally 
secure more favourable terms for their transactions (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). 
Therefore, implicit contracts with customers / suppliers create incentives for earnings 
management (Bowen, DuCharme and Schores, 1995).  
 
2.7.1.1 Compensation Contracts 
 An employment contract is an explicitly written contract between a firm‟s owners 
and its managers that specifies the compensation of the latter. If managers are 
rewarded on a fixed basis, that is, receive a set salary, then assuming self-interest, 
managers would not want to take great risks as they would not share in any potential 
gains (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 225). It thus becomes necessary to put in place 




to the performance of the firm (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 225). This will be in the 
interest of the manager, as that manager will potentially receive greater rewards.   
 
For this reason, cash bonus schemes can be put in place in order to align the 
interests of the owners and the managers. If the firm performs well, both parties have a 
benefit. Accounting earnings are often used to calculate the manager's payoff (Healy, 
1985) because it is a more efficient measure of the manager's performance than other 
measures such as stock prices and realised cash flows. There are two reasons for this. 
First, stock prices are influenced more by market factors that are outside the control of 
management and, hence, are less effective in isolating that part of performance that 
results from the manager's actions (Sloan, 1993). Second, realised cash flows do not 
take into account the manager's actions at the time those actions are put in place to 
increase the value of the firm. Hence, realised cash flows do not provide a timely 
measure of the effect of the manager's actions on firm performance (Dechow, 1994). 
Since accounting earnings are efficient in measuring firm performance, they play an 
important role in determining the reward and punishment of performance.  
 
Positive Accounting Theory assumes that if a manager is rewarded on the basis 
of accounting numbers, then the manager will be more likely to use accounting methods 
that increase current period reported income. Such selection will presumably increase 
the bonus, especially if the compensation committee does not adjust for the method 
chosen. In contrast, if the manager is risk-averse, he/she could be expected to make 




bonus streams over time (Scott, 2003, p. 275). The studies presented next provide 
empirical evidence on the bonus hypothesis and earnings management.   
 
Haggerman (1979) has provided evidence which suggests that, managers were 
influenced by economic reasoning when making accounting choices. Managers made 
choices between depreciation and inventory methods, amortization of past service costs 
for defined benefit plans and investment tax credits to manage profits in order to earn a 
bonus. 
  
Healy (1985) found evidence that, when the firms‟ net incomes were below the 
lower bound or above the upper bound required to earn the bonus, managers used 
more income decreasing accruals since the bonus would not be paid anyway. The 
probability of receiving a bonus in the following year was then increased, since 
current write-offs would reduce future charges. Only when the net incomes were in the 
inside area the managers were motivated to adopt accounting policies to increase 
reported net income. For firms where the bonus scheme had only a lower bound, Healy 
found that the average accruals were significantly less negative for the above the lower 
bound observations. Healy also tested whether managers made accounting policy 
changes when bonus plans were amended. Accounting policy changes are highly 
visible and the standard of consistency does not allow such changes often. If 
managers are going to change accounting policies, a good time to do it is just after 
the introduction or the amendment of a bonus plan. The author found that, that in 
nine of the twelve years tested, firms with bonus plan changes did in fact have more 




Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987), have found that US managers approaching 
retirement were less likely to undertake research and development expenditure if their 
rewards were based on accounting profits. This result is as expected because, under 
the GAAP, research and development has to be written off as incurred, and hence 
profits are reduced. Although the research and development expenditure would be 
expected to lead to benefits in subsequent years, the retiring managers would not be 
there to share in the gains.  
 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) found that, for US firms with high level of 
receivables, the provision for bad debts was significantly income reducing for firm years 
that were very unprofitable (likely to be below the lower bound of a bonus plan) and 
very profitable (likely to be above the upper bound of the bonus plan). For firm years 
that were between these extremes, provision for bad debts was income increasing.  
 
Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991) examined managerial motivation to increase profits 
for compensation purposes through the settlement of over-funded defined benefit 
pension plans. According to the GAAP, firms that hold plan assets in excess of their 
defined pension benefit liability can engage in a settlement transaction and recognize 
this excess as a gain in current income. The results suggest that settlement firms were 
found to have a smaller distance below the lower bound as compared with that of the 
pair-matched firms. The settlement gains increased the distance by 19% above the 





Skinner (1993) has documented that firms with bonus plans were more likely to 
select income-increasing depreciation and goodwill methods when bonuses were tied to 
accounting earnings.  
 
Clinch and Magliolo (1993) have found that, for a sample of US banks, managers 
used discretionary cash flow transactions in order to affect reported income and their 
compensation.  Discretionary cash flow earnings include items such as sales of 
investment securities, sales of fixed assets, sales of subsidiaries, loan securitizations, 
sales of credit-card portfolios, restructuring or termination programs, gains or losses 
from early debt retirements, and income from pension settlements. There is no evidence 
that managers used discretionary non cash-flow earnings, such as depreciation or loan 
loss provisions, to secure cash compensation.  
    
Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) also document that, when earnings before 
discretionary accruals fell below the lower bound, managers selected income-increasing 
discretionary accruals and vice versa. The results suggest that managers tried to 
smooth income around the bound necessary to earn a bonus. 
 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) also provide evidence that managers used 
discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses were 
above the upper bound. The authors found no evidence that managers manipulated 
earnings downwards when earnings were below the minimum necessary to receive any 
bonus. Additional tests for manipulation did not provide evidence that real investment 






Results provided by Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) are also consistent with 
managers manipulating earnings with accruals and more strongly through the choice of 
inventory valuation method. The findings reveal that managers in the MID portfolio 
made more income-increasing discretionary accruals relative to those in the UPP and 
LOW portfolios.   
 
Keating, Zimmerman and Simon (1999) hypothesized that firms would choose to 
manage earnings by applying depreciation method changes to all assets if they 
exhibited worse financial performance relative to firms applying the method changes 
only to new assets. The results indicate that firms that made income-increasing method 
changes for all their assets had significantly lower sales, lower return on assets and 
higher leverage than firms that changed methods for new assets only or firms that 
changed estimates. The evidence is consistent with earnings management to increase 
executive compensation.   
 
Gao and Shrieves (2002) have also found evidence that discretionary accruals 
were positively related to bonuses and the intensity of earnings management was 
conditional on whether pre-managed earnings were close to specified targets.  
 
Shuto (2007) has shown that, in Japan, managers receiving no bonus adopted 
income-decreasing accruals and negative extraordinary items. For firms that had bonus 




increased executive compensation. These results suggest that Japanese executives 
were rewarded for taking the persistence of earnings into consideration.  
 
Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010) tested whether gains from asset 
securitizations were considered for bonus purposes. Securitization offers discretion both 
in terms of timing the asset sale as well as from fair-valuing the retained interest. When 
receivables are sold to an SPE, the firm derecognizes receivables, records the cash 
received, and creates a „„retained interest‟‟ asset for the amount of the receivables that 
are not sold. This asset must be fair valued, and managers have considerable discretion 
over the estimates of the future cash flows, default rates and the choice of the discount 
rate. Any difference between the assets received and the carrying value of the 
derecognized assets is recorded as a securitization gain or loss in the income 
statement. The authors have found that CEO compensation in the form of a bonus was 
sensitive to the reported securitization gains and that the gains appeared to be treated 
as a regular earnings component. This suggests that CEOs, on average, were rewarded 
for the gains they reported.  
 
Table 1 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 




Table 1: Results of Empirical Studies on the Cash Bonus Hypothesis and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors Results 
Haggerman (1979) Managers make choices between depreciation and inventory methods, amortization of past service costs for 
defined benefit plans and investment tax credits to manage profits in order to earn a bonus. 
Healy (1985) When the firms‟ net incomes are below the lower or above the upper bound required to earn the bonus, 
managers use income decreasing accruals. When the net incomes are in the inside area, managers adopt 
accounting policies to increase reported net income. For firms with only a lower bound, the average accruals 
are significantly less negative for the above the lower bound observations. Firms with bonus plan changes have 
more accounting policy changes.  
Lewellen, Loderer 
and Martin (1987) 
Managers approaching retirement are less likely to undertake research and development expenditure if their 
rewards are based on accounting profits.  
McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) 
For firms with high level of receivables, the provision for bad debts is significantly income reducing for years that 
are very unprofitable (likely to be below the lower bound of a bonus plan) and very profitable (likely to be 
above the upper bound of the bonus plan). For firm years that were between these extremes, provision for 
bad debts is income increasing.  
Haw, Jung and 
Lilien (1991) 
Managers use settlement gains of over-funded defined benefit pension plans in order to increase the distance of 
pre-managed profits from the lower bound, thereby enabling managers to earn a bonus.  
Skinner (1993) Firms with bonus plans are more likely to select income-increasing depreciation and goodwill procedures when 





Clinch and Magliolo 
(1993) 
Bank managers use discretionary cash flow transactions, such as sales of fixed assets, sales of credit card 
portfolios and early debt retirements, in order to affect reported income and their compensation.  
Gaver, Gaver and 
Austin (1995) 
When earnings before discretionary accruals are below the lower bound, managers select income-increasing 
discretionary accruals and vice versa, suggesting that managers try to smooth income around the bound 
necessary to earn a bonus. 
Holthausen, 
Larcker and Sloan 
(1995) 
Managers use discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their 
maximum but no manipulation is observed when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any 
bonus. Real investment decisions and the timing of asset sales are not influenced by the annual bonus 
compensation. 
Guidry, Leone and 
Rock (1999) 
Managers manipulate earnings with accruals and more strongly with the choice of inventory valuation method, 




Firms that make income-increasing depreciation method changes for all their assets have significantly lower 
sales, lower return on assets and higher leverage than firms that change methods for new assets only or firms 
that change estimates. This evidence supports earnings management to increase executive compensation.   
Gao and Shrieves 
(2002) 
Discretionary accruals are positively related to bonuses and the intensity of earnings management is conditional 
on whether pre-managed earnings are close to specified targets.  
Shuto (2007) Firm managers receiving no bonus adopt income-decreasing accruals and negative extraordinary items. For 





Dechow, Myers and 
Shakespeare 
(2010) 
Securitization gains are treated as a regular component of earnings and managers use these gains in order to 




 Granted that accounting numbers may be manipulated for cash bonus purposes, 
several compensation experts have advocated the inclusion of stock options in 
compensation contracts (Rappaport, 1990).  
 
The use of equity compensation is way to align executive and shareholder 
incentives by giving the executive an ownership stake in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In a system of dispersed ownership, stock based compensation is probably the 
most important tool by which to align managerial interests with those of shareholders 
(Weber, 2006).  
 
The considerable increase in the use of equity based compensation has resulted 
in substantial CEO equity holdings (Hall and Murphy, 2003). The growth in equity 
holdings makes executive wealth sensitive to stock price. The increased sensitivity of 
managers‟ wealth to stock prices creates strong incentives to manage earnings so as to 
maintain and increase stock values (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Equity based 
compensation could motivate either income increasing earnings management or income 
smoothing. A risk-averse CEO for example will be inclined to sell his / her shares in the 
short term. Therefore, prior to an anticipated sale, a CEO is likely to make income 
increasing choices in order to increase the current stock price.  Alternatively, a CEO 
may be motivated to smooth first, in order to minimize wealth variability, while 
maintaining the option to income increase and sell shares at favourable prices in the 
future. The studies presented below provide evidence that managers engage in earnings 




Gao and Shrieves (2002) have documented that discretionary accruals were 
positively related to stock options and the intensity of earnings management was 
conditional on whether pre-managed earnings were close to specified targets.  
 
Baker, Collins and Reitenga (2003) provide evidence that the grant/accruals 
relation was stronger only when post-earnings announcement grants occurred 
infrequently, and the options were a large part of the executive pay package. In 
contrast, there is no evidence that managers engaged in earnings management using 
accruals when the firm followed a predictable granting schedule. This result suggests 
that, managers behaved as if they believed that investors would discount earnings 
announcements before option grants if the firm followed a predictable schedule. 
 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) have documented that corporate managers with high 
equity incentives sold more shares in subsequent periods, and therefore were more 
likely to report earnings that just met or exceeded analysts' forecasts and more 
frequently engaged in other forms of earnings management. As stock options increased 
the managers' equity ownership, they also increased their need to diversify the high risk 
associated with such ownership and this produced both more efforts to inflate earnings 
to prevent a stock price decline and increased sales by managers in advance of any 
earnings decline.   
 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) also provide evidence that the use of 




where the CEO‟s compensation was more closely tied to the value of stock options. The 
authors document that, during years of high accruals, CEO‟s exercised unusually large 
numbers of options and they sold large quantities of shares. 
 
Ronen et al. (2006) found that, when outside directors‟ incentive packages 
included shares and options, they conspired with managers to engage in opportunistic 
earnings management.  
 
The findings of Balachandran, Chalmers and Haman (2008) support the 
proposition that earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals is a 
mechanism used to „drive up‟ share prices in order to increase the cash received 
from sales of share options.   
 
Cullinan, Du and Wright (2008) compared a sample of US firms that 
misstated their revenue to a sample of non-misstatement firms. The authors found 
that companies whose independent directors did not receive stock options were less 
likely to misstate revenues. The results suggest that compensating outside directors 
with stock options may weaken their independent oversight. 
 
Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010) have also found evidence that CEO 
compensation in the form of stock options was sensitive to the timing of asset 
securitizations and the level of gains recorded on the income statement as a result of 





Table 2 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 









Discretionary accruals are positively related to stock options and the intensity of earnings management depends on 




The option grants and accruals relation is stronger only when post-earnings announcement grants occur infrequently and 
the options are a large part of the executive pay package. There is no evidence of earnings management using accruals 




Managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods, and therefore are more likely to report 
earnings that just meet or exceed analysts' forecasts and more frequently engage in other forms of earnings 




The use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced for firms where the CEO‟s 















Earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals is a mechanism used to „drive up‟ share prices in 




Companies whose independent directors do not receive stock options are less likely to misstate revenues, 





CEO compensation in the form of stock options is sensitive to the timing of asset securitizations and the level of gains 





After having considered how variable compensation (in the form of cash bonus or 
stock options) can create incentives for earnings management, the relationship between 
debt-holders and managers is addressed next.    
 
2.7.1.2 Lending Contracts 
A lending contract is an explicitly written contract between a firm and its lenders. 
The relationship between managers and lenders is also an agency relationship. Similar 
to shareholders, lenders wish to ensure that managers will make decisions that will 
protect the lenders‟ interests. When a party lends funds to another organization, the 
borrower may undertake activities that reduce the probability that the funds will be 
repaid i.e. pay excessive dividends or invest in very high risk projects (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2006, p. 237).  
 
For this reason, lending contracts typically contain provisions that are based on 
observable accounting variables, such as a minimum level of debt-to-equity, interest 
coverage, working capital, and shareholders' equity. If such covenants are violated, the 
debt agreement may impose penalties, like constraints on dividends or additional 
borrowing (Scott, 2003, p. 275). Clearly, the prospect of covenant violation constrains 
management's actions in running the firm.  Given that the covenant violation has a 
cost, the debt hypothesis of Positive Accounting Theory predicts that managers are 
expected to manage earnings in order to reduce the probability of debt covenant 
violations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The following studies provide empirical 




Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991) examined managerial motivation to increase profits 
in order to avoid debt covenant violations through the settlement of over-funded defined 
benefit pension plans. Firms that hold plan assets in excess of their defined pension 
benefit liability can engage in a settlement transaction and recognize this excess as a 
gain in current income. The evidence supports that settlement firms had more binding 
debt covenant constraints than the control firms and that they were closer to these 
constraints as evidenced by their leverage ratios. As a result they entered into 
settlement transactions in order to avoid debt covenant violations.  
 
Sweeney (1994) compared a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms that had 
violated their debt covenants for the first time to a control sample of firms that did not 
have such violations. The evidence suggests that the defaulting firms made, on 
average, significantly more income-increasing accounting policy changes than the 
control sample firms, and that the impact on reported net income of these changes 
was significantly greater for the defaulting firms. Income increasing accounting changes 
included changes in pension plan assumptions, pension terminations and adoption of 
FIFO inventory method. The author also provides evidence that managers “timed” their 
first time adoption of new accounting requirements in order to manage earnings. When 
new accounting standards are issued there is typically a transition period (which could 
be a number of years) during which organizations can voluntarily implement a new 
accounting requirement. Sweeney has found that organizations that defaulted on their 
debt agreements tended to adopt income-increasing requirements early, and deferred 




DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) also found evidence of the use of discretionary 
accruals to increase reported income in the year prior to and, to a lesser extent, in the 
year of the covenant violation.  
 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) studied a sample of large firms that 
had three or more consecutive years of losses and reduced dividends. For twenty 
nine of these firms, the reduction in dividends was forced by debt covenant constraints. 
There is no evidence that these firms used accruals to manage earnings upward in 
years prior to the cut in dividends, relative to the remaining sample firms that did not 
face debt covenant constraints. Rather, all the sample firms exhibited large earnings 
reducing accruals extending for at least three years beyond the year of the dividend 
cut. The authors argue that probably these firms were trying to inform lenders, 
shareholders, unions, and others that the firms were facing up to its troubles, and to 
prepare the ground for subsequent contract renegotiations that frequently took place. It 
thus seems that when troubles are serious, earnings management becomes part of the 
firm's overall strategy for survival.  
 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) compared a sample of firms that had, on 
average, significantly higher levels of leverage and significantly more debt covenant 
violations than a control sample. The authors found that their highly leveraged firms 
were heavy users of earnings management and most of the times they engaged in 





Miller and Skinner (1998) investigated whether managers use their discretion 
when setting the tax valuation allowance account in order to avoid violating debt 
covenants. Accounting for income tax requires that, if based on available evidence it is 
more than likely that the deferred tax asset will not be realized, then firms must reduce 
this asset through the creation of a valuation allowance account. The amount needed to 
bring the allowance account to its desired balance is taken to the income statement and 
therefore affects profits. There is little evidence that managers used the valuation 
allowance in order to avoid violation of lending contract provisions. The authors argue 
that, the results of the study might not be powerful because their primary interest was to 
examine whether managers comply with the provisions of SFAS No. 109:”Accounting 
for Income Tax”; for this reason the firms in the sample were chosen based on the 
magnitude of their deferred tax assets rather than on their leverage or performance. 
Therefore, managers of these firms probably did not have incentives to manage 
reported profits in order to avoid debt covenant violation.  
 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) examined firms that had bank loans with a either a 
minimum current ratio covenant or a minimum net worth covenant. The results provide 
strong evidence that managers did engage in earnings management to avoid an initial 
debt covenant violation. The unusually large number of firms that just met or beat the 
covenant threshold shows that debt covenants were relatively tight and that firms that 
violated the covenants were not financially distressed. This indicates that private 
lenders used violations as a screening device, and frequently waived violations or reset 




authors also found evidence that the incentive to manage earnings after the first 
violation weakened.  
 
Jaggi and Lee (2002) provide results which suggest that, managers of less 
financially distressed firms used income-increasing discretionary accruals in order to 
obtain waivers for debt covenant violations. For more financially distressed firms, 
managers used income-decreasing discretionary accruals where a debt restructuring or 
renegotiation took place. These findings thus provide support that the choice of income-
increasing or decreasing discretionary accruals is influenced by the severity of financial 
distress.   
 
Beatty and Weber (2003) argue that, performance pricing gives managers an  
incentive to make income increasing accounting method changes. This is because, 
under performance pricing, the interest rate charged by a bank does not remain fixed 
over the length of the loan, but varies inversely with financial performance. Beatty and 
Weber also argue that, debt contracts often prohibit borrowers from making accounting 
method changes to affect contract calculations. As predicted, the evidence shows that 
75 out of the 125 borrowing corporations had at least one contract that allowed 
accounting method changes to affect contract calculations. The results reveal that 
borrowers that changed their accounting methods were more likely to make income 






Jung, Soderstrom and Yang (2013) hypothesized that, since credit rating 
agencies consider earnings volatility as an indicator of credit risk, firms would have an 
incentive to smooth earnings via the use of accruals. The results provide evidence that, 
earnings smoothing activity indeed increased the likelihood of a subsequent rating 
upgrade. The evidence suggests that bond issuers engaged in earnings management in 
an attempt to impact the cost of future borrowing.  
 
Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki and Penn Jr. (2013) examined whether firms that 
deviated from an empirically modeled („„expected‟‟) credit rating engaged in earnings 
management activities, measured by abnormal accruals and real activities. The authors 
provide evidence that firms used income increasing (decreasing) earnings management 
activities when they were below (above) their expected ratings. The evidence suggests 
that firms considered their credit ratings as a signal of overall quality, which helped to 
avoid rating-based covenants or increased scrutiny from market participants.   
 
In contrast to the debt hypothesis being an incentive for earnings management to 
avoid debt covenant violations, there is an argument that lending can be a motivation for 
accounting conservatism. In the debt contracting process, lenders have an informational 
disadvantage. Assuming opportunism on behalf of borrowers, lenders will either refuse 
to lend or require a high rate of return. Accounting conservatism is a mechanism that 





Choi (2007) hypothesized that banks prefer accounting conservatism to secure 
their loans and reduce credit risk. As a consequence, banks will provide borrowers with 
incentives to maintain a high level of income statement conservatism. The results are 
consistent with this prediction. The evidence showed that the timeliness of economic 
loss recognition was increasing with a firm‟s bank dependence.  
 
Zhang (2008) provides evidence which suggests that more conservative 
borrowers used more asset write downs and restructuring charges. As a result these 
borrowers were more likely to violate debt covenants but the benefit was that lenders 
charged lower interest rates to conservative borrowers. The evidence suggests that 
conservatism benefits lenders ex post through the timely signaling of default risk and 
benefits borrowers ex ante through lower interest rates.  
 
Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) examined the relation between conservatism in 
financial reports and conservative adjustments made to accounting numbers used in 
debt covenants. The authors found that, in certain settings, accounting conservatism 
and conservative adjustments to debt covenants were substitutes whereas in other 
settings they were complementary. More specifically, for the portion of financial 
reporting conservatism associated with the litigation, tax, and equity shareholders‟ 
demands, the evidence suggests that higher reporting conservatism was a substitute for 
conservative covenant modifications. Therefore, in the presence of additional demands 
for conservatism, contracting over GAAP is relatively less costly than making covenant 




conservative debt covenant modifications as complements. This suggests that there are 
limitations on the extent to which a borrower‟s financial reports can be prepared 
conservatively and there are costs associated with designing covenants that achieve 
the same effects as financial reporting conservatism. These constraints made it optimal 
to use financial reporting conservatism together with contractual modifications to meet 
lenders‟ demands.  
 
Tan (2013) found that firms‟ financial reporting became more conservative after 
covenant violations. The conservatism effect was more pronounced where creditors 
possessed greater bargaining power and for firms with more operating volatility. 
Conservatism was also observed for firms where the creditors put chief restructuring 
officers in place. The evidence suggests that more scrutiny by lenders leads to 
accounting conservatism.   
 
Table 3 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 





Table 3: Results of Empirical Studies on the Debt Hypothesis and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors Results 
Haw, Jung and 
Lilien (1991) 
Firms that are closer to restrictive debt covenant constraints use settlement gains of over-funded defined benefit 
pension plans in order to avoid debt covenant violation.  
Sweeney (1994) Firms that violate their debt covenants make significantly more voluntary income-increasing accounting policy 
changes, such as changes in pension plan assumptions, pension terminations and adoption of FIFO inventory 
valuation method. Organizations that default on their debt agreements tend to adopt income-increasing new 





Firms use discretionary accruals to increase reported income in the year prior to and to a lesser extent in the year 




For firms with a dividend cut forced by binding debt covenant constraints, there is no evidence that accruals are used 
to manage earnings upward in years prior to the cut in dividends, relative to firms that did not face such debt 
covenant constraints. The accruals are income decreasing suggesting that when troubles are serious earnings 




Highly leveraged firms are heavy users of earnings management and most of the times they engage in such 








There is little evidence that managers of sample firms use the deferred tax asset valuation allowance in order to 
avoid violation of lending contract provisions.   
Dichev and 
Skinner (2002) 
There is strong evidence that managers engage in earnings management to avoid an initial debt covenant violation. 
Lenders set tight debt covenants and use violations as a screening device, and frequently waive violations or reset 
covenants without imposing serious consequences on borrowing firms. As a result, there is evidence that the 
incentive to manage earnings after the first violation weakens.  
Jaggi and Lee 
(2002) 
Managers of less financially distressed firms use income-increasing discretionary accruals in order to obtain 
waivers for debt covenant violations. For more financially distressed firms, managers use income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals where waivers are denied and a debt restructuring or renegotiation takes place.   
Beatty and 
Weber (2003) 
Borrowers that change their accounting methods are more likely to make income increasing accounting changes if 
their bank loan contracts include accounting-based performance pricing. 
Choi (2007) Banks prefer accounting conservatism to secure their loans and reduce credit risk. The timeliness of economic loss 
recognition is increasing with a firm‟s bank dependence.  
Beatty, Weber 
and Yu (2008) 
For the portion of financial reporting conservatism associated with litigation, tax, and equity shareholders‟ demands, 
higher reporting conservatism is a substitute for conservative covenant modifications. In other settings, lenders use 
conservative accounting and conservative debt covenant modifications as complements. There are limitations on 
the extent to which a borrower‟s financial reports can be prepared conservatively and these constraints make it 





Zhang (2008) More conservative borrowers use more asset write downs and restructuring charges and, as a result are more likely 
to violate debt covenants. Conservatism benefits lenders ex post through the timely signalling of default risk and 
benefits borrowers ex ante through lower interest rates. 
Jung, Trom and 
Yang (2013) 
Earnings smoothing activity increases the likelihood of a subsequent credit rating upgrade. Bond issuers engage in 
earnings management in an attempt to change the perception of credit rating agencies.   
Alissa, Bonsall, 
Koharki and 
Penn Jr. (2013) 
Firms are able to move toward expected credit ratings through the use of directional earnings management. Firms 
consider their credit ratings as a signal of overall quality which helps to avoid rating-based covenants or increased 
scrutiny from market participants.   
Tan (2013) Firms‟ financial reporting becomes more conservative after covenant violations. The conservatism effect is more 
pronounced where creditors possess greater bargaining power and where creditors put chief restructuring officers 




After having considered how lending can create incentives or disincentives for 
earnings management, the relationship between stakeholders and managers is 
addressed next.    
 
2.7.1.3 Implicit Contracts  
Implicit contracts represent implied commitments that a firm will fulfil its 
obligations towards its stakeholders (Bowen, DuCharme and Schores, 1995).  A major 
role of management is to assess the importance of meeting stakeholder demands in 
order to achieve the strategic objectives of the firm (Freeman, 1984, cited in Deegan 
and Unerman, p. 290). An organisation is successful if it satisfies the demands of the 
various stakeholder groups, particularly those interest groups upon which the 
organisation depends. The more critical the stakeholder resources are to the continued 
viability and success of the organization, the greater the expectation that stakeholder 
demands will be addressed (Ullman, 1985). 
 
Under the transactions cost theory, firms that report higher profits can generally 
secure more favourable terms for their transactions (Bowen et al., 1995). Customers for 
example may be willing to pay a higher price for goods since they may expect that the 
firm will be more likely to honour warranty and service commitments. Suppliers offer 
better terms as they trust that the firm will make payments on time and probably 
continue to make larger purchases in the future. Therefore, implicit contracts create 






The evidence provided by Bowen DuCharme and Schores (1995) suggests 
that, the need to influence a firm‟s perceived reputation by customers, suppliers and 
short-term creditors explained accounting method choice. Almost half of the firms in the 
sample chose the FIFO inventory valuation method (income increasing). Similarly 
68.7% of the sample firms used the income-increasing depreciation method (straight-
line).    
 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) also provide results which indicate that, firms 
frequently managed earnings decreases and losses away so as to avoid higher 
transactions costs with stakeholders. The evidence suggests that firms with small 
earnings exercised discretion to report earnings increases and firms with slightly 
negative earnings exercised discretion to report positive earnings.   
 
Matsumoto (2002) documents evidence which supports that accruals were used 
to manage earnings upwards. The results suggest that customers and suppliers were 
users of a firm‟s accounting information and when judging the firm‟s performance, these 
stakeholders were more likely to react to earnings announcements rather than to 
analysts‟ forecasts.   
 
Raman and Shahrur (2008) argue that, when a firm has relationship specific 
investments with suppliers or customers, the perception of stakeholders about the 
business prospects affects their decision to undertake such investments. This is 




and the expected losses due to liquidation or financial distress are lower when dealing 
with a profitable firm. Overall the evidence suggests that earnings were managed 
opportunistically to influence the perception of suppliers and customers about the firm‟s 
prospects. However, the results showed that earnings management adversely affected 
the duration of customer-supplier relationship.  
 
Hui, Klasa and Yeung (2012) hypothesized that managers will make more 
conservative choices if suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over the 
firm, such that it allows them to dictate the terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. 
Bargaining advantage was measured by size i.e. a customer accounts for a large 
fraction of a firm‟s sales or a supplier sells to a firm a large fraction of its supplies. The 
authors found evidence that when a firm‟s suppliers or customers had greater 
bargaining power, firms recognized losses more quickly.  
 
Similarly, Costello (2013) argues that, suppliers and customers may expect 
managerial opportunism. Therefore, both parties have incentives to design contracts 
which include covenants that could limit such behaviour.  The author provides evidence 
that when long-term contracts facilitated the exchange of specific assets and there was 
high information asymmetry, the contract included financial covenant restrictions to limit 
opportunistic behaviour. Finally, the author shows that, where private firms‟ financial 
statements were considered to be less reliable, buyers and suppliers were less likely to 




Dou, Hope and Thomas (2013) argue that in countries where enforceability of 
explicit contracts is weak, firms will have an incentive to smooth income and thereby 
signal their willingness to fulfil implicit claims and maintain long term relationships. The 
authors found that, firms which operated in countries with weak contract enforceability 
and with more relationship specific investments, smoothed income. A further breakdown 
of income smoothing into its “signalling” and “opportunistic” components showed that 
the results were driven by the informational component of income smoothing.   
 
Table 4 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 




Table 4: Results of Empirical Studies on Implicit Contracts and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 





Implicit claims variables, which are used as proxies for customers, suppliers and short-term creditors, 
explain accounting method choice. Firms use FIFO inventory valuation method (income increasing) and 
straight line method of depreciation (income-increasing) in order to manage earnings and affect the 
perception of stakeholders.   
Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) 
Firms with small earnings exercise discretion to report earnings increases. Firms with slightly negative 
earnings exercise discretion to report positive earnings.  
Matsumoto 
(2002) 
Customers and suppliers use a firm‟s accounting information in order to judge its performance. Hence firms 
manage earnings with discretionary accruals in order to affect the perception of these stakeholders.  
Raman and 
Shahrur (2008) 
Earnings are managed opportunistically to influence the perception of suppliers and customers about the 
firm‟s prospects. Earnings management adversely affects the duration of customer-supplier relationship.  
Hui, Klasa and 
Yeung (2012) 
Managers make more conservative choices when suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over 
the firm, such that it allows them to dictate the terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. When a firm‟s 
suppliers or customers have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly.  
Dou, Hope and 
Thomas (2013) 
In countries where enforceability of explicit contracts is weak, firms signal their willingness to fulfil implicit 







Costello (2013) Since suppliers and customers may expect opportunism on behalf of managers, long-term contracts are 
used that include financial covenant restrictions, which limit opportunistic behaviour. Where private firms‟ 
financial statements are considered to be less reliable, buyers and suppliers are less likely to use financial 




After having considered how implicit contracts can create incentives or 
disincentives for earnings management, the political cost hypothesis is addressed next.    
 
2.7.2 Political Motivations  
  Firms, particularly larger ones, are sometimes under scrutiny by various 
groups, such as government, employees, consumers, environmental lobby groups and 
so on (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Large firms are considered to be politically visible 
because they have activities that affect a large number of people and firm size is often 
used as an indication of market power.  
 
In order to reduce the possibility of adverse political attention and any associated 
costs (i.e. increased taxes or increased wage claims), the political cost hypothesis 
assumes that politically sensitive firms will adopt accounting methods that lead to a 
reduction in reported profits (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).   
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) attempted to explain the lobbying positions taken 
by managers in relation to the FASB's 1974 Discussion Memorandum on general price 
level adjustments. General price level accounting makes adjustments to historical cost 
profits by considering the effects of changing prices. In times of inflation, this typically 
has the effect of decreasing income. The results of the study revealed that, larger firms 
(which were deemed to be subject to higher political scrutiny), tended to support the 
Discussion Memorandum. By presenting lower adjusted profits, these firms would avoid 




transfer wealth away from the firm (perhaps in the form of increased taxes, higher 
wages, etc.).  
  
 Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), found that firm size, measured by volume of 
sales, total assets or market value of equity was positively associated with 
management's choice of income decreasing accounting methods.  
 
Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) report evidence that managers adopted income 
decreasing accounting methods when involved in on-going labour negotiations to 
combat demands of unionized employees for higher wages and benefits.  
  
Wong (1988) found that New Zealand companies that had adopted current cost 
accounting, had higher effective tax rates and larger market concentration ratios, both 
variables being suggestive of political visibility.  
 
Sutton (1988) investigated lobbying submissions made in the UK in relation to a 
proposed accounting standard that recommended the disclosure of current cost 
accounting information. Sutton found support that, organizations which considered they 
would benefit from the requirement tended to support it. Those expected to benefit were 
capital intensive firms because, the adoption of current cost accounting would lead to 
decreased profits (due to higher depreciation). Politically sensitive firms also supported 





  Jones (1991) considered the behaviour of US firms that were the subject to 
government import-related investigations. These government investigations sought to 
determine whether the domestic firms were under threat from foreign competition. 
Where this threat was deemed to be unfair, the government would grant relief by 
devices such as tariff protection. In making its decision the government relied upon a 
number of factors, including economic measures such as profits and sales. The results 
of the study show that in the year of the investigations the sample companies made 
accounting choices that led to a decrease in profits. Such behaviour was not evidenced 
in the year before or the year after the government investigation.  
 
 Cahan (1992) found that a sample of firms investigated for monopolistic  
practices by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
used more income-decreasing accruals during investigation years relative to other 
years in the sample period.  
 
Bowen DuCharme and Schores (1995) document findings which are consistent 
with managers adopting income decreasing accounting methods when involved in on-
going labour negotiations to combat demands of unionized employees for higher wages 
and benefits.    
 
Bens and Johnston (2009) assumed that restructurings are a means of earnings 
management , because restructurings may be ignored by investors as they are non-




restructurings, lead the FASB to issue a new regulation, whereby more specific 
accounting guidance was given about these special charges as opposed to few codified 
rules that existed before. The results indicate that, the new accounting rule combined 
with more SEC monitoring, limited excess restructuring charges by an average of 2.8% 
of assets.    
 
Chaney, Faccio and Parsley (2011) provide evidence that firms with political 
connections systematically reported accounting information which was of poor quality, 
as opposed to firms that were not politically connected. Poor accounting quality was 
measured by the volatility of accounting accruals; politically connected firms were those 
firms that had a large shareholder, or CEO or chairman being sitting in the parliament or 
being a minister or having tight relations to a political party. The hypothesis was that, 
since politically connected firms have protection arising from litigation or higher cost of 
capital, they will devote less time and care to the quality of accounting information. The 
authors provide evidence that lower quality reported earnings was associated with a 
lower cost of debt only for the politically connected firms in the sample. That is, 
companies that had political connections apparently faced little negative consequences 
for their lower quality disclosures. 
 
He, Wong and Young (2012) investigated Chinese firms and their incentive to 
manage earnings in order to keep their listing. In China, public firms that report losses 
for three consecutive years lose their listing status. The authors found that when firms 




available for sale securities at a gain in order to offset the negative impact. This result 
indicates that firms used earnings management in order to avoid regulatory violations. 
Finally, the study provides evidence that fair value induced earnings management 
activities were more pronounced in firms with weak corporate governance and with 
politically connected managers. 
 
Bova (2013) provides evidence that unionized firms were more likely to miss 
analysts‟ forecasts as compared to a non- unionized control group. The likelihood of 
missing the forecasts was increasing with the ratio of unionized-to-total employees.  
These results are consistent with the prediction that firms will prefer to project a 
negative outlook as the union‟s negotiation leverage increases.   
 
Cohen, Dey and Lys (2013) also provide evidence that regulatory intervention 
can limit earnings management practices for opportunistic reasons. They document that 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 has led to a decline in incentive based 
compensation and risky investments. This result suggests that CEO‟s and directors 
turned down more risky investments, even though they may have been more profitable, 
because of the expanded personal liability after the passage of the Act.   
 
Table 5 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 





Table 5: Results of Empirical Studies on the Political Cost Hypothesis and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors  Results 
Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) 
Larger firms tend to support the Discussion Memorandum on general price level adjustments. By presenting 
lower adjusted profits, these firms will attract less political attention, in the form of increased taxes, less tariff 
protection, higher wages, etc.  
Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979) 




Managers adopt income decreasing accounting methods when involved in on-going labour negotiations to 
combat demands of unionized employees for higher wages and benefits.  
Wong (1988) Companies that adopt current cost accounting also have higher effective tax rates and larger market 
concentration ratios, both variables being suggestive of political visibility.  
Sutton (1988) Politically sensitive companies are more likely to lobby in favour of current cost accounting, which leads to 
reporting decreased profits.  
Jones (1991) Firms subject to government import-related investigations select income decreasing accounting strategies. Such 
behaviour is not evidenced in the year before or the year after the government investigation.  
Cahan (1992) Firms investigated for monopolistic practices use more income-decreasing accruals during investigation 
years relative to other years in the sample period. 
Bowen DuCharme 
and Schores (1995) 
Firms use income decreasing accounting methods when involved in on-going labour negotiations to combat 





Bens and Johnston 
(2009) 
The use of excessive restructurings as a means for earnings management has lead the FASB to interfere with a 
change in the accounting regulation, thus limiting excess restructuring charges.    
Chaney, Faccio and 
Parsley (2011) 
Firms with political connections systematically report accounting information which is of poor quality. Politically 
connected firms have protection arising from litigation or higher cost of capital.  
Wong and Young 
(2012) 
Firms that report an unrealized loss on trading securities are more likely to sell available for sale securities at a 
gain in order to offset the negative impact and to avoid regulatory violations.  
Bova (2013) Firms will prefer to project a negative outlook as the union‟s negotiation leverage increases.  
Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2013) 
CEO‟s and directors turn down more risky investments, even though they may be more profitable, because of 




Unlike non-financial firms, under the political cost hypothesis, bank managers will 
be motivated to manage earnings upwards because banking institutions face regulatory 
monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting numbers.  
 
The maintenance of a minimum capital adequacy ratio became a requirement for 
banks in the United States in 1981 when the Federal Reserve and the Office of the 
Comptroller adopted capital adequacy ratio definitions and guidelines (Moyer, 1990). 
The regulations applied to individual banks and bank holding companies with over $150 
million in net assets.  Depending on the size of their net assets, banks were classified 
into three categories: multinational, regional and community. Over the period of 1981 –
1985 the capital adequacy ratio minimum was different for each category. As of 1985 
the requirements for all banks became equal (Moyer, 1990).     
 
In 1985, the US Federal Reserve officially announced minimum risk-based 
capital standards whereby banks were requested to maintain a minimum capital 
adequacy ratio, which was broadly defined as equity divided by total risk weighted 
assets. During the years 1985-1989 (the old capital regime), regulators required banks 
to hold primary capital and total capital equal to 5.5% and 6% of total assets 
respectively1. Although the minimum primary and total capital ratio was 5.5% and 
6.0% respectively, the Federal Reserve regulations indicated that banks should 
generally operate above the minimums in order to avoid supervisory action.  
                                                 
1
 Primary capital included book value of equity, loan loss reserves, perpetual preferred stock and 
mandatory convertible debt. Total capital was defined as primary capital plus limited life preferred stock 





In January 1987, the Central Bank of England issued a joint statement of intent to 
establish minimum risk based capital requirements. In 1988 when the Basel Accord was 
signed, the G-10 countries implemented the capital requirements that are now been 
applied by countries worldwide. The major rational behind this proposal was that the 
proposed standards would be more closely related to failure risks and provide 
convergence between supervisory policies on the adequacy of capital among countries 
with major banking centres. From the viewpoint of regulators, capital serves as a 
cushion to absorb unexpected operating losses. Great variability of earnings means that 
interest and non-interest expenses are more likely to exceed bank revenues and that 
capital will be used to absorb losses. Furthermore, if actual loan losses exceed the loan 
loss reserves the excess is charged against capital. According to Basel Accord I, banks 
must maintain a capital ratio of at least 8%.  
 
The capital adequacy ratio equals regulatory capital divided by risk weighted 
assets and off balance sheet items, with asset weights specified by the capital 
standards. Regulatory capital is divided into Tier I and Tier II capital. Tier I capital must 
be equal to at least 4%2.  
 
To ensure satisfaction of the minimum capital standards, regulators impose costs 
to a non-complying bank that are increasingly restrictive as the institution‟s capital 
                                                 
2 Tier I capital includes ordinary share capital, retained earnings, perpetual preferred stock, and minority 
interest in subsidiaries less goodwill and intangible assets. Tier II capital is the sum of loan loss reserves 
(up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets), perpetual preferred stock not included in Tier I capital, perpetual 
debt, mandatory convertible debt securities, subordinate debt and intermediate preferred stock. The total 
deductions from Tier I and Tier II capital include investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, reciprocal 





declines (Moyer, 1990). A non-complying bank may be: asked to submit plans regarding 
how capital will be increased; be examined more often; be denied a merger or the 
opening of new branches and expansion of its services; be required to terminate risky 
activities; be required to replace directors or officers; or be imposed dividend 
restrictions. Finally, the regulators can close the bank.  
 
In order to avoid costly penalties that result from failing to meet the minimum 
capital requirements bank managers will be motivated to manage their capital adequacy 
ratio. The ratio can be managed if a bank changes the numerator, the denominator or 
both. For example, banks may pursue capital strengthening through the management of 
risk weighted assets or the increase in share capital.  But since retained earnings are 
part of the numerator, the capital base may also increase with profitability.  
 
Another element of the capital base, which is also part of calculating accounting 
profits, is the loan loss reserves. In the old capital regime, if managers increased their 
loan loss provisions, the profits would go down by 1 – tax rate, whereas the capital base 
would increase by the amount of the loan loss reserves which was included in primary 
capital. The loan loss reserves could also be increased if loan write off‟‟s were 
understated. The net effect would be an increase of the capital base and hence an 
increase in the capital adequacy ratio. Therefore, political costs, in the form of 
regulatory intervention, provide bank managers with incentives to maximize income, 




provide empirical evidence on the capital management hypothesis and earnings 
management.    
 
Hill and Ingram (1989) document that, in order to provide relief to financially 
troubled Savings and Loans, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board allowed the adoption 
of regulatory accounting principles (RAP) instead of the GAAP in 1981. Under the RAP, 
losses from the sales of loans could be amortized over the remaining expected life of 
the loans sold. In addition, the minimum net worth requirement was reduced to 3%. The 
authors found that, Savings and Loans close to their regulatory minimums and with 
larger benefit from selling low yield loans adopted the RAP. Finally, Savings and Loans 
that chose the RAP did not face major auditor resistance, suggesting that auditors were 
also concerned about the existence of their clients.   
 
Moyer (1990) found that, securities gains were used for capital management in 
1981 and 1985 only. A possible explanation for this finding is that regulators first 
adopted capital guidelines in 1981 and they increased the minimum guidelines for 
regional and multinational banks to equal those of the community banks in 1985. 
Therefore, if before reporting for 1981 and for 1985, other policies were not easy to 
change at the very last minute, the use of the securities gains was relatively stronger. 
The author also found that loan loss provisions were used to raise the capital adequacy 
ratio whereas loan charge-offs were adjusted to reflect the quality of the loan portfolio 




1985 when managers were expected to use loan charge-offs more in order to manage 
capital.  
 
Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990) provide evidence that realized securities 
gains were high when regulatory capital was low. The coefficient on the loan loss 
provision showed that when this item was high, securities gains were high to offset the 
effect of the bad debt on net income, which is consistent with income smoothing.  
 
Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991) examined managerial motivation to increase profits 
in order to increase regulatory capital through the settlement of over-funded defined 
benefit pension plans. Under the GAAP, firms that hold plan assets in excess of their 
defined pension benefit liability can engage in a settlement transaction and recognize 
this excess as a gain in current income. The results indicate that settlement gains were 
used as substitutes for securities gains in order to smooth the negative effect of loan 
loss provisions on earnings. The loan loss provisions were higher for settlement as 
compared to non-settlement banks.    
 
Warfield and Linsmeier (1992) predicted that when regulatory capital and income 
before securities transactions is relatively high (low), the reported level of securities 
gains will be relatively low (high). They tested their hypothesis using bank quarterly 
earnings. The hypothesis was supported for the last quarter only. The authors argue 
that these results were expected because banks were more likely to use loan loss 




marginal adjustments near the year-end. The loan loss provision is probably a 
preferred smoothing device because it is typically much larger than securities gains 
and losses and it includes a large discretionary component. Furthermore a change in 
the loan loss provision has no direct effect on future cash flows, whereas a sale of 
investment securities may result in lost future investment returns.   
 
Clinch and Magliolo (1993) provide evidence which suggests that, cash-flow 
discretionary earnings were stronger for firms that had more non-performing loans, 
which were used as a proxy for anticipated low capital levels. This suggests that banks 
with low capital instructed their managers to increase net profits through management 
of discretionary earnings components.  
 
Collins, Schakelford and Wahlen (1995) examined banks‟ decisions to manage a 
combination of capital raising options. They found that loan loss provisions were not 
used to smooth earnings. When non-discretionary earnings were low, loan loss 
provisions were low, consistent with managers smoothing earnings over time. For 
growth banks, the strongest relation between capital ratios and any other capital raising 
option was common stock. Preferred stock issues were greater for banks with low 
regulatory capital. The results also showed that banks in need of capital, reported lower 
loan charge-offs, consistent with its increasing effect on the capital ratio formula. 
Financially distressed banks reduced their dividend payments when their capital ratio 
was low. The authors argue that if financial distress was generated from large credit 




Financial distress therefore affected bank‟s cost of capital and its ability to issue new 
securities. Consequently, an alternative mechanism to increase regulatory capital was 
to reduce dividends.  
 
Bernard, Merton and Palepu (1995) found that low capitalised Danish banks 
actually recorded more loan loss provisions than medium or high capitalised banks, 
consistent with the hypothesis that loan loss provisions are manipulated to avoid capital 
violations. For the six largest banks in the sample, the evidence was that loan loss 
provisions were managed to smooth earnings. Given the subjective estimates of loan 
loss provisions and the fact that adjustments in fair value of investments were 
determined by gains or losses on publicly traded bonds, a likely explanation is that loan 
loss provisions were managed by banks to off-set the impact on income and regulatory 
capital.  
 
Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) examined the incentive to meet the 
minimum regulatory capital and earnings goals by exercising simultaneous discretion 
over loan loss provisions, loan charge-off‟s, pension settlement transactions, gains and 
losses from physical assets or securities and issuance of new securities. The authors 
found that, loan charge-offs, loan loss provisions and securities gains and losses were 
used interchangeably to manage capital. When charge-offs were high (regulatory capital 
decreases) the changes in external funds were high (regulatory capital increases) and 
vice versa. Firms chose to realize smaller miscellaneous gains (earnings and regulatory 




amount of equity, capital notes and preferred stock issuance were high (regulatory 
capital increases), then miscellaneous gains and loan loss provisions were low 
(regulatory capital decreases). The results indicate that, pension settlement gains and 
losses were used to offset the negative effect of the loan loss provision on earnings.  
 
Kim and Kross (1998) investigated whether the change in capital standards 
caused a change in estimates of the loan loss provisions and loan write-offs. Prior to 
1989, banks could increase regulatory capital by increasing loan loss provisions and by 
decreasing loan write-offs. After 1989 (when the Basel Accord was signed), the loan 
loss reserves are included in the regulatory capital only up to 1.25% of risk-weighted 
assets. Thus, the new regulations reduce the incentive to exercise discretion over loan 
loss provisions and write-off‟s for purposes of capital management. It was found that, 
for low capital banks, loan loss provisions were higher before the change in 
regulations than after. As predicted, the change in the capital standards had no 
apparent effect on the loan loss provision of banks with high capital ratios. The results 
of the study also indicated that managers of both low and high capital banks increased 
write-offs under the new capital standards, but this was attributed to the recession of 
1988-89. Even so, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers of low 
capital banks increased write-offs under the new capital standards. 
 
Ahmed, Takeda, and Shawn (1998) also found that, in the new capital regime the 
negative relation between loan loss provisions and capital was significantly diminished, 




relationship was also less negative for banks that had exceeded the 1.25% limit in loan 
loss reserves.  
  
Kato, Kunimura and Yoshida (2001) investigated the effect that the Dividend 
Guideline had on accounting choices of Japanese banks. Prior to 1992, banks in Japan 
were required to a dividend payment of 40% of their current net income. To keep the 
dividend ratio within the range required, bank managers could choose either to manage 
earnings upwards or reduce dividends. Reducing dividends would not be a preferred 
choice because this would probably be interpreted as a sign of financial difficulties. 
Therefore the dividend guideline, as a form of capital regulation, provided a motivation 
for earnings management. In Japan bank managers could not exercise discretion over 
write-off‟s and loan loss provisions because these items should be recorded in 
accordance with the tax law. Hence, the authors examined the use of other accruals 
and securities gains and losses to manage earnings. Overall, the empirical findings 
indicate that accruals and securities gains and losses were used to manage earnings 
upwards in order to meet the Dividend Guideline limit.  
 
Ramesh and Revsine (2001) examined banks' treatment of accounting for other 
postretirement benefits. According to the relevant accounting standard, firms are 
allowed to recognize other post-employment benefit liabilities at once or amortize them 
over future years. The authors hypothesized that poorly capitalized banks would choose 
the amortization method. The results showed that almost 70% of the banks in the 




capital.    
 
Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) investigated the impact of a new regulation 
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2001, because officials were 
concerned that some banks were using loan loss provisions to smooth income over 
time. The authors found that strong and profitable banks used loan write offs more as a 
basis for making loss predictions. Thus understatement of the reserve account was 
constrained. This evidence suggests that government intervention can influence 
earnings management practices so that accounting quality is improved. However, for 
weaker and less profitable banks the informativeness of the reserve account declined. 
This result suggests that, since the new regulation does not show any preference for the 
basis of making loan reserve estimates, it did not constrain the ability of less profitable 
banks to manage earnings by delaying loss provisioning in order to increase their 
regulatory capital base.   
 
Table 6 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 




Table 6: Results of Empirical Studies on the Political Cost Hypothesis and Banks‟ Earnings Management (in chronological 
order) 
Authors  Results 
Hill and Ingram 
(1989) 
Financially troubled Savings and Loans choose to use regulatory accounting principles than GAAP. Under the 
regulatory principles any losses from the sale of low yield loans can be amortized over the average remaining life of 
the loans sold and the minimum net worth requirement of 3% can be met. 
Moyer (1990) Securities gains are used for capital management only when other policies are not easy to change at the very last 
minute. Loan loss provisions are used to raise the capital adequacy ratio but loan charge-offs reflect the quality of the 
loan portfolio.    
Scholes, Wilson 
and Wolfson (1990) 
Realized securities gains are high when regulatory capital is low. When the loan loss provision is high, securities 
gains are high to offset the effect of the bad debt on net income.  
Haw, Jung and 
Lilien (1991) 
Settlement gains of over-funded defined benefit pension plans are substitutes of securities gains, and are used to 
offset the negative income effect of loan loss provisions.  
Warfield and 
Linsmeier (1992) 
Banks use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings throughout the fiscal year and use securities gains only for 
adjustments near the fiscal year-end.   
Clinch and Magliolo 
(1993) 
Banks with more non-performing loans, a proxy for anticipated low capital levels have more cash-flow discretionary 
earnings.   
Collins, Schakelford 
and Wahlen (1995) 







and Wahlen (1995) 
Preferred stock issues are greater for banks with low regulatory capital. Banks in need of capital report lower loan 
charge-offs. Financially distressed banks reduce their dividend payments when their capital ratio is low. 
Bernard, Merton 
and Palepu (1995) 
Low capitalised Danish banks use loan loss provisions more than medium or high capitalised banks in order to avoid 
capital violations. For the six largest banks in the sample, loan loss provisions are used to offset the negative impact 




When loan charge-offs are high (regulatory capital decreases) the changes in external funds are high (regulatory 
capital increases) and vice versa. Firms chose to realize smaller miscellaneous gains (regulatory capital decrease) in 
periods of low loan charge-offs (regulatory capital increases). When equity issues are high (regulatory capital 
increases), then miscellaneous gains and loan loss provisions are low (regulatory capital decreases). Pension 
settlement gains and losses are used to offset the negative effect of the loan loss provision on earnings.  
Kim and Kross 
(1998) 
For low capital banks, loan loss provisions are higher before 1989 than after, consistent with the new regulation 
reducing the incentive to exercise discretion over loan loss provisions and write-offs for purposes of capital ratio 
management. The change in the capital standards has no apparent effect on the loan loss provision of banks with 
high capital ratios.  
Ahmed, Takeda, 
and Shawn (1998) 
In the new capital regime the negative relation between loan loss provisions and capital is significantly diminished 
which is consistent with the reduction in the capital management incentives. This relationship is also less negative for 






Kato, Kunimura and 
Yoshida (2001) 
Banks use accruals and securities gains and losses to manage earnings in order to meet the Dividend Guideline limit, 
which is set at 40% of their current net income.   
Ramesh and 
Revsine (2001) 
Banks choose to amortize other post-employment benefit liability rather than recognizing all of it in the current year, in 




Strong and profitable banks use loan write off‟s as a basis for setting their loan loss provisions. Weaker and less 




After having considered how political costs can create incentives or disincentives 
for earnings management, the tax motivation is addressed next.  
 
2.7.3 Taxation Motivations  
When book income is the same as taxable income, then firms have incentives to 
manage earnings downwards so as to reduce the tax to be paid. According to the 
GAAP, accounting profits are not equal to taxable profits. For financial reporting 
purposes, income tax expense equals the accounting profit times the tax rate. For tax 
purposes, the tax to be paid is calculated according to government regulations. Thus, 
when book income is uncoupled from taxable income, firms will have incentives to 
reduce the tax to be paid and use earnings management techniques that will increase 
book profits. The following studies provide support for this argument.   
 
Keating, Zimmerman and Simon (1999) examined the use of depreciation 
method changes and depreciation estimates in order to manage earnings and minimize 
taxes. In the US, depreciation for financial reporting was uncoupled from depreciation 
for tax purposes in 1981. Hence, the authors predicted that firms would make more 
depreciation revision estimates and apply depreciation method changes on new assets 
only in order to manage their earnings. The results provide evidence that revisions of 
estimates increased after 1981 since they provided managers with the flexibility to 
manage accounting earnings without an effect on their tax liability. Depreciation method 




minimizing the impact on profits due to the recognition of the cumulative effect of 
accounting change on the income statement.  
 
Goncharov and Zimmermann (2006) investigated the incentives for tax 
management in Russian firms, before and after 2002. As of 2002, Russia changed its 
tax accounting and accounting income was uncoupled from taxable income. The 
authors found evidence that, in the post 2002 period, public firms engaged in less 
earnings management via accruals or by incomplete reporting. This result suggests that 
when book income is uncoupled from tax income, the quality of accounting information 
can actually improve.  
 
Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) developed a measure of tax reporting 
aggressiveness that detects tax shelter and used discretionary accruals as a measure 
of financial reporting aggressiveness. The results suggest that non conformity between 
financial reporting standards and tax law allowed firms to manage book income 
upwards and taxable income downwards in the same reporting period.   
 
Accounting for income taxes includes deferred tax liabilities and deferred tax 
assets that arise from temporary differences i.e. different treatment of depreciation or 
provision for bad debts by the tax authorities.  According to the GAAP, when it is more 
than likely that the deferred tax asset will not be recovered, it should be reduced 
through a tax valuation allowance account. When the valuation allowance account is 




determination of the valuation allowance involves managerial discretion and can 
therefore be understated so as to increase book profits. In this way, the tax expense 
becomes an opportunity to manage accounting earnings. The following studies provide 
evidence for this argument.  
 
 Bruce et al. (1998) found that four sources of income were significant 
determinants of the valuation allowance balance i.e. future reversals of existing taxable 
temporary differences, future taxable income, taxable income in carry-back periods, and 
the existence of tax-planning strategies. However, the income sources explained less 
than half of the variation in the account, suggesting that discretion was exercised when 
setting the account balance.  
 
Miller and Skinner (1998) hypothesized that firms with greater expected future 
taxable income are more likely to realize their deferred tax assets and thus should have 
smaller valuation allowance balances. They also hypothesized that firms with larger 
carry-forwards should be less likely to realize their deferred tax assets and thus should 
have larger valuation allowance balances. The authors found a strong association 
between the valuation allowance and the amount of the deferred tax assets attributable 
to carry-forwards. They also tested whether the valuation allowance account could be 
used to smooth earnings. To test for smoothing, they studied firms that took large other 
post-employment benefit charges. The authors failed to detect earnings management 
and attributed this to the small sample size, which included data for only two years of 




Income Taxes.  
 
Bauman et al. (2001) found evidence that firms overstated their valuation 
allowance when they had losses from other operations.  This finding implies that firms 
overstate the valuation allowance in periods of large losses so that they can understate 
it in future periods and increase earnings. The study fails to provide evidence that firms 
reported a change in valuation allowance to meet positive earnings or prior earnings. 
However, there is some evidence that managers used the valuation allowance to meet 
analysts‟ forecasts. 
 
For a sample of commercial banks, Schrand and Wong (2003) hypothesized that, 
if bank capital adequacy was low, banks would be less likely to decrease current 
income by increasing the valuation allowance, in their effort to create hidden reserves 
for the future. The authors found evidence consistent with banks managing their 
earnings in order to boost the capital adequacy position. The results suggest that banks 
used changes in the valuation allowance to meet both prior earnings targets and 
analysts‟ forecast targets, though the latter result is weaker. 
 
Frank and Rego (2006) predicted that firms would overstate (understate) the 
valuation allowance if pre-managed earnings were higher (lower) than the target. The 
authors found no evidence that the valuation allowance account was used to avoid 
losses or to meet earnings targets based on prior earnings. They did, however, find 




forecasts.   
 
Christensen et al. (2008) examined the valuation allowance for a sample of firms 
that reported large write-offs and a control sample of firms that did not. The results are 
mixed regarding whether the firms believed to be big-bath firms used the valuation 
allowance to decrease their income even more in the write-off year. 
 
In widely-held firms, where there is separation between ownership and control, 
managerial actions are unobservable by external owners and other capital providers. 
Therefore, managers may wish to report increasing accounting profits in order to 
provide information about their performance. When there is little separation between 
owners and managers, managers can inform shareholders of the firms' value through 
communication channels other than audited financial statements. The following studies 
provide support for this argument.  
 
Klassen (1997) investigated whether managers of firms with high tax rates chose 
to sell major asset groups at larger realized losses or smaller realized gains losses in 
order to decrease taxes. The author hypothesized that managers would make 
accounting choices depending on their informational environment. The author found 
that, for firms with higher tax rates and more concentrated ownership, managers took 
larger losses or smaller gains as opposed to widely held firms.  Therefore managers of 
concentrated firms are more likely to undertake transactions that reduce both reported 




Goncharov and Zimmermann (2006) provide evidence that, private firms in 
Russia were more likely to reduce taxable reported profits so as to manage taxation. 
This is consistent with the argument that, a firm's performance is assessed through 
private communication channels rather than the analysis of accounting information, 
when ownership is concentrated.  
 
Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2013) hypothesized that when ownership and 
decision making is concentrated, the owners- managers will be more risk averse, and 
will not have an incentive to avoid tax because such avoidance is a risky activity. They 
provide evidence that firms with more concentrated ownership engaged in less tax 
planning, consistent with the prediction that managers wish to reduce the significant 
costs associated with tax avoidance such as fees paid to tax experts, time devoted to 
the resolution of tax audits, reputational penalties, and penalties paid to tax authorities.    
 
When firms take uncertain tax positions on their tax return, there is a possibility 
that they will be required to pay more taxes in the future, after the tax authorities have 
examined their tax returns. If the probability of paying such taxes is high, firms are 
required to record a contingent tax liability that also increases the tax expense. Since 
the contingent tax liability is an estimate, it is subjective and it provides an opportunity 
for manipulation. By understating or not recognising a contingent liability, the reported 
profits go up. In this way, the tax expense becomes an opportunity to manage 





Gupta and Laux (2008) examined whether companies reduced their tax 
contingent liability in order to increase profits and meet or beat prior earnings and 
analysts‟ forecasts. For a random sample of 100 companies, they identified firm-
quarters during which reversals in the tax contingency were reported. A reversal of the 
tax contingency results in an increase in income. The authors found that firms managed 
the contingency account to beat analysts‟ forecasts. 
 
Cazier et al. (2010) found that, when earnings observations were below the 
consensus forecast, the tax contingent liability was used to manage income and meet 
the forecast. The authors also found that firms with earnings above the consensus 
analyst forecast were more likely to increase their contingency balances and thus create 
reserves for future years. 
 
Book income differs from tax income not only because of temporary differences 
but due to permanent differences as well. Permanent differences, such as tax exempt 
interest received from government bonds, do no give rise to deferred tax items. Tax 
exempt items are included in book income, but no tax expense is recorded. Permanent 
differences cause effective tax rates (income tax expense divided by pre-tax income) to 
differ from the tax rates. Therefore, tax planning provides an opportunity for earnings 
management. The following studies include tests on this argument.  
 
Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990) found that banks chose to sacrifice tax 




positions. Presumably, banks would be more inclined to take actions that would reduce 
their taxes, if the effect on the reported income and regulatory capital was small and the 
potential tax benefits large.  
 
Warfield and Linsmeier (1992) argue that, for tax-paying banks, the optimal strat-
egy would be to sell investment securities that result in losses and to delay the sale of 
investment securities that result in gains. Non-taxpaying banks, with carry-forward 
benefits from net operating losses or investment tax credit should recognise security 
transaction gains and defer recognition of losses. The authors tested their hypothesis 
on bank quarterly earnings. Their tax-planning hypothesis was supported for the first 
three quarters but was limited in the last quarter by earnings and regulatory capital 
management. This evidence suggests that banks are likely to recognise securities 
gains in order to improve their capital positions despite the tax benefits lost.  
 
Clinch and Magliolo (1993) predicted that banks with high marginal tax rates 
would want managers to reduce reported income through management of taxable 
earnings components. The authors failed to find evidence of tax management. A 
possible explanation is that, the banks included in the study had a lot of non- performing 
loans in their loan portfolios. Non-performing loans could eventually be written off, which 
would result in a decrease of the loan loss reserve and regulatory capital. Consequently 
bank managers may have been instructed by their banks to disregard tax effects in view 





 Collins, Schakelford and Wahlen (1995) and Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo 
(1995) also found evidence that banks were willing to incur greater tax costs in order to 
avoid a reduction of regulatory capital. The authors found that banks reported lower 
loan write off‟s, which are tax deductible, and recognised more securities gains, which 
are taxable.  
  
The findings of Dhaliwal et al. (2004) are consistent with managers manipulating 
tax expense down (thus, increasing net income and decreasing the effective tax rates) 
when the pre-managed earnings fell short of the forecasted earnings.  
   
Gleason and Mills (2008) also provide evidence that firms managed their tax 
expense in order to beat the analysts‟ forecasts. They document a weak market 
reaction to the manipulated unexpected earnings, which they interpret as evidence that 
the market sees through managerial manipulation of the tax expense account.  
 
Cook et al. (2008) tested whether tax expense can be used as a last chance to 
manage earnings after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They found that 
earnings management was greater for firms that paid higher tax-related fees to their 
auditors and that this result did not change after passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. They also 
found that among firms that paid no tax-related fees to their auditors, those that would 
miss their earnings forecasts, utilized this form of earnings management more than for 
those that would not miss their forecasts. This result does not hold after the Sarbanes-




In the U.S. managers are allowed to choose between a permanent or a 
temporary treatment of foreign subsidiaries‟ earnings. More specifically, U.S. foreign 
subsidiaries pay income tax in the jurisdictions where they operate. Their parent 
companies pay no U.S. taxes until the profits are repatriated in the form of dividends. If 
the temporary difference treatment is chosen, the parent company estimates the tax 
that will be paid in the future and records a deferred tax liability, thus reducing current 
after-tax book income. If the permanent difference option is chosen, the foreign profits 
are designated as permanently reinvested and hence no tax is reported.   
 
Krull (2004) examined whether firms managed their earnings by choosing to 
designate foreign earnings as permanently reinvested. Consistent with her predictions,  
she shows that year-to-year changes in the amounts of permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings were positively related to the difference between analysts‟ forecasts and pre-
managed earnings. Thus, firms are more likely to defer recognition of residual taxes if 
deferral enables them to meet analysts‟ forecasts. 
 
Klassen and Laplante (2012) also investigated US multinational companies and 
their propensity to shift income from the US to foreign jurisdictions. The authors found 
evidence that suggests that firms with low foreign tax rates relative to domestic tax rates 
shifted significantly more income out of the US. They also document that those firms 
that reported lower tax expense, by designating earnings outside the US as 





Table 7 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 




Table 7: Results of Empirical Studies on Taxation and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 




Banks chose to sacrifice tax benefits, by recognising securities gains, in order to improve their capital positions.   
Warfield and 
Linsmeier (1992)  
Banks are likely to recognise securities gains in order to improve their capital positions despite the tax benefits 
lost.  
Clinch and 
Magliolo (1993)  





Banks report lower loan write off‟s, which are tax deductible, and recognise more securities gains, which are 






Banks are willing to incur greater tax costs in order to avoid a reduction of regulatory capital.   
  
 
Klassen (1997) For firms with higher tax rates and more concentrated ownership, managers take larger losses or smaller gains as 
opposed to widely held firms.  Managers of concentrated firms are more likely to undertake transactions that 





Bruce et al. 
(1998) 
The determinants of the valuation allowance balance explain less than half of the variation in the account, 
suggesting that discretion is exercised when setting the account balance.  
Miller and 
Skinner (1998) 
Firms with greater expected future taxable income are more likely to realize their deferred tax assets and have 
smaller valuation allowance balances. Firms with larger carry-forwards are less likely to realize their deferred tax 
assets and have larger valuation allowance balances. The tax valuation allowance is not used to smooth the 




When depreciation for financial reporting is uncoupled from tax depreciation, depreciation estimate revisions 
increase. Depreciation method changes are applied mostly to new assets only, thereby minimizing the impact on 
profits due to the recognition of the cumulative effect of accounting change on the income statement.  
Bauman et al. 
(2001) 
Firms overstate the valuation allowance in periods of large losses from other operations so that they can 
understate it in future periods and increase earnings.  
Schrand and 
Wong (2003) 
Banks use changes in the valuation allowance to manage regulatory capital and to a lesser extent, to meet both 
prior earnings targets and analysts‟ forecast targets.  
Dhaliwal et al. 
(2004) 
Managers manipulate the tax expense down (thus, increasing net income and decreasing the effective tax rates) 
when the pre-managed earnings fall short of the forecasted earnings.  
Krull (2004) Firms choose to designate their earnings as permanently reinvested in order to manage their reported profitability.  
Frank and Rego 
(2006) 
There is no evidence that the valuation allowance account is used to avoid losses or to meet prior earnings 








When book income is uncoupled from tax income, the quality of accounting information improves. Private firms 
with more concentrated ownership reduce taxable reported profits so as to manage taxation.   
Christensen et 
al. (2008) 
The results are mixed regarding whether the firms believed to be big-bath firms use the valuation allowance to 
decrease their income even more in the write-off year. 
Gupta and Laux 
(2008)  
Firms report reversal of tax contingent liability in order to increase profits and meet or beat prior earnings and 
analysts‟ forecasts.  
Gleason and 
Mills (2008) 
Firms manage their tax expense in order to beat the analysts‟ forecasts. The market sees through managerial 
manipulation of the tax expense account.  
Cook et al. 
(2008) 
Firms that pay higher tax-related fees to their auditors use the tax expense as a last chance to manage earnings. 
Among firms that pay no tax-related fees to their auditors, those that would miss their earnings forecasts utilize 
this form of earnings management more.    
Frank, Lynch 
and Rego (2009)  
Non conformity between financial reporting standards and tax law allows firms to manage book income upwards 
and taxable income downwards in the same reporting period.   
Cazier et al. 
(2010) 
When earnings are below the consensus analyst forecasts, firms use their contingent tax liability to meet these 
forecasts. Firms with earnings above the consensus analyst forecast use their contingency balances to create 








Firms with low foreign tax rates relative to domestic tax rates, shift significantly more income out of the United 
States when foreign reinvestment-related incentives are high. Firms that report lower tax expense by designating 
earnings as permanently reinvested are more aggressive in their financial reporting activities.   
Badertscher, 
Katz and Rego 
(2013) 
Firms with more concentrated ownership engage in less tax planning, consistent with the prediction that managers 




2.7.4 Job Security Concerns  
Managers are concerned about profitability not only because of profit sharing 
plans, but because profitability informs shareholders about the quality of their decisions. 
Profitability increases the shareholders‟ wealth. Entrusted by the owners to achieve this 
at any cost, the management of the company has to ensure that their decisions are in 
accordance with the target fixed by the owners. The CEO and other senior managers 
can be removed from office, if they have caused damages from breach of any contract 
between them and the company. Shareholders can also remove executive board 
members at the annual general meeting. Empirical evidence on job security concerns 
and earnings management is presented next.  
 
The evidence provided by Moore (1973) suggests that the proportion of income-
reducing accounting decisions was significantly greater for companies with man-
agement changes than for companies with no management turnover. This result is 
consistent with managerial incentives to manage earnings upwards for job security 
reasons. Incoming CEO‟s managed earnings downwards when this could be blamed to 
their predecessors and thus, save earnings for the future for which they take the credit.  
 
Elliot and Shaw (1988) document that, in 39% of the sample firms, a material 
write-off was recognised in the year that there was a change of the CEO or president or 
CFO. This evidence suggests that new managers can benefit because the reported low 




DeAngelo (1988) found evidence that when individuals faced a contest for their 
positions as managers, prior to the contest, they adopted accounting methods that led 
to an increase in reported profits, thereby bolstering their case for re-election. DeAngelo 
also shows that where the existing managers were unsuccessful in retaining their 
positions, the newly appointed managers were inclined to recognize many expenses as 
soon as they took office, in an attempt to highlight the `poor state of affairs' they had 
inherited and save earnings for the future.  
 
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) also found that for a sample of poorly 
performing firms, the CEOs did not income maximize for job security reasons but it was 
observed that these individuals subsequently left the firm. It was also observed that 
incoming CEOs of these firms income minimized. This result is consistent with 
managerial incentives to save earnings for the future, driven by job security concerns.  
 
Similarly, Pourciau (1993) found evidence that the incoming executive adopted 
income-decreasing policies in the first year in order to better increase earnings in the 
following years. Many of the changes examined took place in situations where there 
were few forewarnings of an unexpected resignation.  
 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) report that bank managers were motivated to 
smooth earnings driven by job security considerations. When current performance was 
poor, as compared to other banks, managers understated total and discretionary loan 




Alternatively, when future relative performance was expected to be poor, managers 
shifted current earnings to the future, by increasing current total and discretionary loan 
loss provisions to reduce the likelihood of poor future performance and the associated 
threat of interference.  
 
Managers may face the threat of being fired when current earnings are poor, 
regardless of past earnings performance. Consequently, income smoothing to avoid 
reporting poor earnings improves job security. DeFond and Park (1997) report evidence 
that managers used discretionary accruals to "borrow" earnings from future periods 
when future earnings were expected to be good as compared to current earnings. 
Similarly, managers appear to have saved current earnings when future earnings were 
expected to be poor relative to current earnings.   
 
DeFond and Park (1999) provide evidence that, in high competition industries, 
replacement decisions were based on relative performance evaluation, measured by 
industry relative earnings, stock return volatility, and analysts forecasts errors. In low 
competition industries CEO dismissal decisions were taken based on firm specific 
accounting measures such as specific earnings targets. Therefore, since replacement 
decisions take into consideration accounting profits, the results suggest that managers 






Wells (2002) also provides support that incoming CEO‟s engaged in income 
decreasing earnings management in the year of the CEO change. Thus, the incoming 
CEO would not be associated with past decisions and could not be criticized for 
downwards earnings management. Future earnings were saved for which the new CEO 
could take the credit.   
 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Mathieu (2003) report results which suggest that, when 
current bank performance was poor, as compared to other banks, bank managers 
reduced their loan loss provisions in order to increase profits. When earnings needed to 
be saved for the future, besides understating loans loss provisions, the authors also 
found that securities gains were low, but the significance was weak.   
 
Engel, Hayes and Wang (2003) document that accounting information appears to 
receive greater weight in turnover decisions when accounting-based measures are 
more precise and when the market-based performance measures are more volatile. In 
particular, the authors found that when accounting information was more informative 
about managerial performance, boards of directors relied more heavily on accounting 
profits when making decisions about continuation of CEO employment. Hence, turnover 
probability increased faster with reductions in accounting returns, suggesting that 
earnings management was a way to avoid dismissal.   
 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) have found different results. They investigated 
how both compensation and management change policies can be used by a firm‟s 




provide evidence that, by linking compensation to the firm‟s abnormal stock returns, 
managerial interests were aligned with those of shareholders, since good management 
is ultimately reflected in the stock price. The second finding was that, CEO replacement 
decisions were based on stock price. Since good management is reflected in the stock 
price, this result suggests that managerial interests were aligned with those of the firm's 
owners, thereby limiting incentives to engage in opportunistic earnings management.  
 
Menon and Williams (2008) provide evidence that CEO replacements took place 
when financial reporting quality was poor. They found a high incidence of CEO and 
CFO changes following auditor resignations. A principal reason for auditors to resign is 
the desire to limit exposure to litigation risk, because auditors have private information 
with respect to financial reporting credibility. The results suggest that directors held 
managers responsible for the failure to satisfy auditors and viewed disagreements as a 
sign of poor managerial performance. This evidence implies that managers might avoid 
opportunistic earnings management, fearing auditors‟ disputes and subsequent 
dismissal.   
 
Table 8 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 





Table 8: Results of Empirical Studies on Job Security Concerns and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors  Results 
Moore (1973) The proportion of income-reducing discretionary accounting decisions is significantly greater for companies with 
management turnover. Incoming CEO‟s manage earnings downwards when this can be blamed to their 
predecessors and save earnings for the future for which they take the credit.  
Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985) 
CEO replacement decisions are based on stock price. Since good management is reflected in the stock price, 
managerial interests are aligned with those of the firm's owners, thereby limiting incentives for opportunistic 
earnings management. 
Elliot and Shaw 
(1988) 
For 39% of the sample firms, there is a change of the chief executive officer or president or chief financial officer 
during the year of material write-offs or reorganisation provisions. New managers benefit because the reported low 
earnings may be blamed on the old management, and earnings are saved for the future.  
DeAngelo 
(1988) 
Managers that face a contest for their positions, adopt income increasing accounting methods thereby bolstering 
their case for re-election. If existing managers are unsuccessful in retaining their positions, the newly appointed 
managers recognize many expenses to highlight the `poor state of affairs' they have inherited and save earnings 




For a sample of poorly performing firms, the chief executive officers do not income maximize for job security 
reasons, but it is observed that these individuals subsequently left the firm. The incoming chief executives 
income-minimize in order to save earnings for the future.  




Authors  Results 
Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1995) 
Bank managers use total and discretionary loan loss provisions so as to smooth profits over time and reduce the 
possibility of dismissal.   
DeFond and 
Park (1997) 




In high competition industries, replacement decisions are based on relative performance evaluation. In low 
competition industries CEO dismissal decisions are based on firm specific accounting measures, thus providing 
managers with incentives to manage earnings in order to avoid dismissal.  
Wells 2002   Incoming CEO‟s engage in income decreasing earnings management in the year of the CEO change, thus saving 









When accounting information is more informative about managerial performance, boards of directors rely more 
heavily on accounting profits when making decisions about continuation of CEO employment. Hence, earnings 
management is a way to avoid dismissal.   
Menon and 
Williams (2008) 
There is a high incidence of CEO and CFO changes following auditor resignations. Directors hold managers 




After having considered how job security concerns can impact earnings 
management, the stock price effect is addressed next.  
 
2.7.5 Stock Price Effect 
Behavioural finance proposes that investors may have the tendency to ignore the 
way accounting numbers are calculated, and often fixate on net profit only (Stolowy and 
Breton, 2004). One method of valuing a company‟s stock price is to discount the sum of 
all future dividends back to their present value, using a return that investors require 
(Gordon, 1959). Since dividends are paid out of earnings, expectations about future 
earnings can be formed, at least in part, on the basis of historical earnings. Besides 
historical earnings, other publicly available information such as, media releases, 
analysts' reports etc., are considered when predicting future earnings (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2006, p. 152). Since share prices reflect information from various sources, 
one could argue that managers cannot make less than truthful disclosures, which 
contradict other available information, because the market will question the integrity of 
the managers (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 210). However, there is empirical 
evidence that accounting profits or other information included in the financial statements 
do have an effect on stock prices.  
 
The relationship between accounting earnings and stock price also depends on 
whether the change in earnings is expected to be permanent or temporary. Permanent 
increases are expected to result in increased dividends, and therefore future cash flows. 




have the same impact on expected future dividends (Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). 
While some earnings changes such as those due to one-off restructuring charges are 
obviously temporary, it is more difficult to determine whether other earnings changes 
are likely to persist. The studies presented next provide empirical evidence earnings 
management and the stock price effect.   
 
Elliot and Shaw (1988) examined the impact on share prices of financially 
distressed firms that disclosed material write offs and reorganisation provisions. In view 
of financial difficulties, it could be argued that write offs should have been anticipated by 
the market, and perceived as a constructive response to existing problems. The results 
showed that investors reacted negatively to the restructuring. The decline in stock 
returns could suggest that the write-offs exceeded expectations or that the 
restructurings were not expected to solve financial problems as defended in the 
management announcement of the restructuring.  
 
Barth, Beaver and Wolfson (1990) studied whether investors assign more 
importance to bank earnings before securities gains and losses. Earnings before 
securities gains and losses are generated from the ongoing operating activities of a 
bank, and investors will consider these earnings components as recurring. In contrast, 
securities gains may be viewed as transitory and most likely they can be timed in an 
effort to manage earnings.  The results indicate that when earnings before securities 
gains and losses were low, securities gains and losses were high, which is consistent 




gains and losses to be value relevant, because they believed that these earnings 
components were used by managers to smooth earnings.  
 
Liu and Ryan (1995) studied how banks' loan portfolio composition and the loan 
loss provisions affect share prices. A bank loan portfolio includes large, frequently 
renegotiated loans, like foreign and commercial loans, and small, infrequently 
renegotiated loans, like consumer loans. Due to the large size and possibility for 
renegotiation, bank managers evaluate the default risk of large loans on a loan by loan 
basis. For small loans the default risk is assessed using more mechanical procedures 
and it is based on historical data. Consequently, managerial discretion increases as the 
number of large and frequently renegotiated loans included in the portfolio increases. 
The authors hypothesized that if loan loss provisions for small or infrequently 
renegotiated loans are subject to less managerial discretion, then the market reaction 
should be negative because the provisions will signal bad news. The authors found that 
for banks with a high proportion of small loans in their loan portfolios the market reaction 
to loan loss provisions was negative. On the contrary, for banks that had a high 
proportion of large loans the market reaction was positive. However, the coefficient on 
the loan loss provision changed from positive to negative as well for the banks with 
relatively larger and more frequently renegotiated loans.   
 
Sloan (1996) predicted that, investors will simply `fixate' on reported earnings, 
without considering how those numbers have actually been determined. Sloan argues 




persistently high earnings, since the accruals reverse over time, thereby reducing future 
earnings. The share prices were found to act as if investors simply `fixate' on reported 
earnings, thereby failing to take account of the relative magnitudes of the cash and 
accrual components of earnings.    
 
Beaver and Engel (1996) examined whether the market assigns different prices 
to the discretionary and the nondiscretionary component of loan loss provisions. The 
nondiscretionary component was expected to be negatively priced because it would 
provide information about impairment of the loans. The discretionary component was 
predicted to be positively priced because it could convey managerial beliefs about the 
future earning power of the bank. The evidence found is consistent with these 
expectations.   
 
Subramanyam (1996) found that the market responded positively to discretionary 
accruals. This evidence may imply that managers were using earnings management 
responsibly to reveal inside information about future earning power, or the market 
responded naively to earnings management. In view of this the author conducted more 
tests that tend to support that the market responded efficiently to the discretionary 
accruals.  
 
 Liu, Ryan, and Whalen (1997) investigated the effect that the expected and 
unexpected quarterly bank loan loss provisions had on share prices. They found a 




with low regulatory capital suggesting that the market interpreted the managing of 
earnings downwards as a signal that banks were taking steps to improve their future 
performance. This reaction however was detected in the fourth quarter, which may be 
due to added reliability because of auditing. For banks with higher than the regulatory 
minimum capital, unexpected increases in the loan loss provisions influenced the 
market negatively. Apparently for banks not at risk, the market interpreted this 
information as bad news.   
 
Xie (2001) found that the stock price reaction was positive and significantly 
higher for discretionary accruals than for non-discretionary accruals. An efficient market 
should assign a lower earnings response coefficient to discretionary accruals because 
they are less persistent. The evidence suggests that the market appears to have been 
“fooled” by earnings management.  
 
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and Shelvin (2002) investigated whether stock prices 
reflect the effects of special items, given that special items are assumed to be largely 
transitory. The items investigated were results of discontinued operations, natural 
disaster losses, and profit or loss from the sale of assets and investments. The authors 
found that the effect of special items was underestimated, suggesting market 
inefficiency with respect to the pricing of special items.   
 
McVay (2006) examined classificatory earnings management. Classification 




periods or invite scrutiny from auditors and regulators. However, individual line items 
have different information content for future earnings and, correspondingly, for 
investors. The author examined classification shifting between core expenses and 
special items. The author found that classificatory earnings management was more 
pervasive when it allowed managers to meet the analyst forecasts. There is also some 
evidence that classification shifting was associated with negative returns in the 
subsequent year, suggesting that investors were negatively surprised when expenses 
that were excluded from core earnings in the previous period, were included in core 
expenses in the current year.   
 
Picconi (2006) explored whether investors and analysts fully process the 
earnings effects of changes in defined benefit plan assumptions. The author found that 
both prices and forecasts failed to reflect new pension information at the time it became 
publicly available, and that it was only gradually incorporated through its effects on 
quarterly earnings. These findings provide insight into how analysts form forecasts, and 
to what level they scrutinize disclosed information. The results suggest that analysts 
failed to incorporate the quantifiable earnings effects of relevant and economically 
significant information. 
 
Kerstein and Rai (2007) hypothesized that the market is more likely to suspect 
earnings management when firms report small increases in earnings with the help of 
large discretionary accruals because small discretionary accruals are more likely to 




predictions, the authors found that the market discounted unexpected earnings when 
there were small increases in earnings using negative large accruals (i.e., masking 
earnings variance or smoothing) or positive large accruals (i.e., masking lower earnings 
levels).  
 
Callen, Khan and Lu (2013) predicted that the processing of newly arriving value-
relevant information takes longer when accounting quality is poor, leading to delayed 
stock price adjustment. The authors found evidence that firms with poor accrual quality 
and large negative special items were associated with significantly higher price delay. 
The finding suggests that investors did process the accounting information and that this 
was properly reflected in stock prices.  
 
Initial public offerings (IPO‟s) are shares that are issued for the first time and 
therefore do not have an established market price. Financial accounting information 
included in the prospectus is a useful source of information to value the shares of such 
firms (Hughes, 1986).  
 
Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson, and Sefcik (1992) found evidence that the 
managers of firms going public managed the earnings reported in their prospectuses, 
in the hope of receiving a higher price for their shares. Apparently the market 






Friedlan (1994) also selected a sample of IPO firms and investigated whether 
these firms managed their earnings upward in the accounting period prior to the IPO, 
by using discretionary accruals. The author found that, IPO firms did manage their 
earnings upwards in the period prior to the IPO, relative to other periods. Of all the 
firms in the sample, accruals management seemed to be more significant in the poor-
performing firms and in the smaller firms.  
 
Jaggi, Chin, Lin, and Lee (2006) investigated earnings management practices for 
IPO firms in Taiwan. IPO firms are required to include annual earnings forecasts in their 
prospectuses and also disclose forecasts for two years subsequent to the issuance of 
IPO. Firms are allowed to revise their forecasts. The results show that the IPO forecasts 
as well as forecasts for two mandatory years after issuance of IPOs were more 
optimistic than conservative. Additionally, the results show that the forecasts errors 
were reduced more by using discretionary accruals, especially for optimistic forecasts, 
rather than revising the earnings forecasts.  
 
Similar evidence is reported by Chin et. al. (2006) who report that, issuing firms 
in Taiwan produced optimistic inaccurate forecasts in order to increase both the market 
value of the controlling owner's shareholdings and the firm's proceeds from the shares 
issued.   
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) compared UK financial data prepared when the firms 




showed that firms improved their financial reporting quality prior to an IPO, suggesting 
that firms responded to market demand for higher quality accounting information. The 
evidence is consistent with the argument that from the point that firms lose their private 
status, they consider reputation effects, cost of capital effects, and monitoring by 
internal and external auditors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, the press, litigators and 
other parties.  
 
Table 9 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 




Table 9: Results of Empirical Studies on the Stock Price Effect and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors  Results 
Elliot and Shaw 
(1988) 
Investors react negatively to restructurings suggesting that the write-offs exceed expectations or that the 
restructurings are not expected to solve financial problems.   
Barth, Beaver and 
Wolfson (1990) 
Investors do not find securities gains and losses to be value relevant because they believe that these bank 
earnings components are used by managers to smooth earnings.  
Clarkson, Dontoh, 
Richardson, and 
Sefcik (1992)  
Managers of firms going public manage the earnings reported in their prospectuses in order to receive a 




IPO firms use accruals more in order to manage their earnings upwards in the period prior to the issue, 
relative to other periods. For poor performing or smaller firms, earnings management is more pronounced.   
Liu and Ryan 
(1995)  
 
For banks with a high proportion of small loans, the market reaction to loan loss provisions is negative, 
consistent with signalling bad news. For banks with a high proportion of large loans, the market reaction is 
positive, despite the larger discretion when setting loan loss provisions for large and frequently renegotiated 
large loans.  
Sloan (1996)  
 
The share prices are found to act as if investors simply `fixate' on reported earnings, failing to take into 
account the relative magnitude of accruals. 
Beaver and Engel 
(1996)  
Investors react negatively to the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions because it signals bad 




Authors  Results 
Subramanyam 
(1996) 
The market responds efficiently to the discretionary accruals.  
Liu, Ryan, and 
Whalen (1997)  
There is a positive share price reaction to unexpected increases in loan loss provisions for banks with low 
regulatory capital, suggesting that investors consider it as a signal that banks are taking steps to improve 
their future performance. For banks with high regulatory capital, unexpected increases in the loan loss 
provisions are interpreted as bad news.   
Xie (2001) 
 
The earnings response coefficient is significantly higher for discretionary accruals than for non-discretionary 
accruals, even though discretionary accruals are less persistent. The market appears to be “fooled” by 
earnings management tactics.  
Burgstahler, 
Jiambalvo and 
Shelvin (2002)  
Investors underestimate the effect of special, transitory items, suggesting market inefficiency with respect to 
the pricing of special items similar to that observed for earnings as a whole.  
Chin et. al. (2006)  Taiwanese issuing firms produce optimistic inaccurate forecasts in order to increase both the market value of 
the controlling owner's shareholdings and the firm's proceeds from the shares issued.   
McVay (2006) Firms use classificatory earnings management to meet analyst forecasts. 
There is some evidence that investors react negatively to classificatory earnings management i.e. when 
expenses that are excluded from core earnings in a previous period, are included in core expenses in the 





Picconi (2006)  
 
Share prices and forecasts fail to reflect new pension information at the time it becomes publicly available and 
this information is gradually incorporated through its effects on quarterly earnings.  
Jaggi, Chin, Lin, 
and Lee (2006)  
For Taiwanese firms, IPO forecasts as well as forecasts for two mandatory years after issuance are very 
optimistic.   
Kerstein and Rai 
(2007)  
The market discounts unexpected earnings when there are small increases in earnings using large 
discretionary accruals. Small discretionary accruals are more likely to represent non-discretionary accruals or 
measurement errors.  
Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008)  
Firms improve their financial reporting quality prior to an IPO, suggesting that firms respond to market demand 
for higher quality accounting information.  
Callen, Khan and 
Lu (2013)  
Firms with poor accrual quality and large negative special items are associated with significantly higher price 




After having considered the incentives for earnings management, the 
disincentives for such practices are addressed in Section 2.8.    
  
2.8 Disincentives for Earnings Management 
The considerable attention that regulators have given to corporate governance 
indicates that stronger governance mechanisms increase the monitoring of 
management's actions and limit opportunistic behaviour (Ashbaugh et al, 2004). There 
is evidence that well governed companies have higher equity returns and their 
accounting statements show a better operating performance (La Porta et al., 2002; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2005).  
 
The corporate governance factors that are presumed to control managerial 
opportunistic behaviour and protect shareholders‟ interests are: the board of directors; 
audit committees; auditing; and corporate ownership. The effect of corporate 
governance on earnings management is explained next.  
 
2.8.1 Board of Directors   
In open corporations, shareholders have the right to approve the board 
members, to whom they delegate the internal control and other management functions. 
The board of directors is responsible for the overall business strategy, long-range 
planning, hiring and determining compensation terms of executives, and oversight, 
including audit overviews. The CEO and other senior executives are normally 




for board approval. The operating success rests on the CEO and his or her executive 
team. The CEO is central to the earnings management environment of the firm.  The 
board of directors has substantial control over the CEO‟s decisions. Thus, board 
effectiveness is a major signal of the monitoring potential. As explained next, board 
effectiveness can be ensured by independence, expertise, size and board meetings.      
 
It is argued that in order for the board to be an effective monitoring device it 
should include several executive directors who provide the board with information about 
their decisions and the decision and performance of other managers. Given that the 
board is to be composed of experts, its most influential members are inside executives 
since they have valuable specific information about the organization. Management is 
also more likely to cooperate with board members with whom they are better acquainted 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).  
 
A counter-argument is that boards of directors are believed to play an important 
role in monitoring top management especially if the proportion of outside, non-executive 
directors on the board is high (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994). Non- 
executive directors often have a financial background or frequently hold senior 
management positions in other large corporations. Thus they have the ability to monitor 
the financial reporting process in order to detect earnings management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Peasnell et al., 1999). In addition, outside directors have incentives to be 




value of their human capital depends primarily on their performance as internal decision 
managers in other organizations (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shivadasani, 1993).    
 
On the other hand, having a high proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board may have disadvantages such as stifling strategic actions (Goodstein et al., 
1994), excessive monitoring (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) and lack of business 
knowledge to be effective (Patton and Baker, 1987).  
 
Nevertheless, there has been pressure on firms to increase the number of non-
executive directors on firm boards (Davies, 2000). Therefore, a mix of both executive 
and non-executive directors, who have appropriate knowledge and experience, is 
believed to increase the likelihood that the board will achieve its control function and 
lowers the probability that top managers will collude with other board members against 
the shareholders‟ interests (Fama, 1980).    
 
Board size is another important element that may have an effect on earnings 
management. Smaller boards, between four to six members might be more effective 
since they are able to make timely strategic decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994). On the 
other hand, a larger board with a lot of members who have varied expertise could 
increase the synergistic monitoring of the board and reduce the incidence of earnings 





Boards that meet frequently are also more likely to perform their duties diligently 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Boards can react to poor performance and challenging 
business circumstances by increasing the frequency of meetings (Vafeas, 1999). This 
may stem from the notion that an active board that devotes time to rectify any 
immediate issues may deter earnings management. In contrast, Jensen (1993) argues 
that, board meetings are not necessarily useful because, given the directors‟ limited 
time, they cannot be used for meaningful exchange of ideas between directors 
managers.  
 
Evidence on board characteristics and their impact on earnings management is 
presented next.   
 
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000, 2005) have found that, when earnings were 
lower than the previous year's reported earnings, abnormal accruals were less income 
increasing when the proportion of outsiders on the board was relatively high. There is 
strong evidence that outside directors did not influence income decreasing earnings 
management. An explanation for this result may be that outside directors were more 
concerned with income overstatement due to litigation risks rather than income 
understatements.   
 
Klein (2000) hypothesized that the presence of non-executive directors can help 
reduce opportunities for earnings management. The author also considered whether the 




compensation committee. Boards are less likely to be effective if they know that the 
CEO is involved in their selection (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Furthermore, a 
CEO sitting on the board‟s compensation committee may be in a position to influence in 
favour of more earnings incentive bonuses. The author found no significant relationship 
between earnings management and whether the CEO sat on the board's nominating 
committee. However, a significantly positive association was found between earnings 
management and whether the CEO sat on the board's compensation committee. These 
results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO may be more 
effective in monitoring the financial accounting process.  
 
Xie et al. (2003) have also found that the number of board meetings was 
negatively associated with the level of earnings management, indicating that boards that 
meet regularly can be better monitors.  
 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) provide evidence that board independence 
and size was associated with lower debt financing costs. These findings suggest that 
creditors concerns were alleviated since larger and more independent boards could be 
more effective monitors of the financial reporting process.  
 
Vafeas (2005) studied the relationship between board independence and size 
with financial reporting quality. He provides evidence that these board characteristics 
improved the quality of accounting information, measured by small earnings increases 




For a sample of Canadian firms, Niu (2006) found that firms with more 
independent boards and more effective compensation policies had fewer discretionary 
accruals, suggesting that these factors are effective in monitoring managerial 
opportunism. To provide further evidence that governance matters for a firm's financial 
reporting quality, additional tests were conducted; the results showed that 
improvements in governance practice were generally associated with less discretionary 
accruals and more informative reported earnings.   
 
For a sample of Malaysian firms, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) failed to find 
evidence that a high proportion of non-executive directors could mitigate earnings 
management. A possible explanation for this result could be management dominance 
over board matters or the outside board members' relative lack of knowledge in 
company's affairs. Given that outside directors are busy with other activities, they may 
be more reliant on management for information. The results however show that board 
size had a significant impact on discretionary accruals. This evidence suggests that 
when board size is small, the directors are more focused in solving any issues that may 
arise.  
 
Wright, Shaw and Guan (2006) examined the incidence of earnings management 
in the US and the UK.  Considering the difference of corporate boards (US boards 
include mostly outsiders whereas UK boards include insiders), the authors examined 
whether managers income minimized prior to a management buyout. The results 




during the year before the management buyout tender offer was made. The results also 
show that managers of US firms managed earnings downward to a greater extent than 
their counterparts in the UK. These results suggest that, despite the greater proportion 
of outside directors sitting in US boards, earnings management was not limited.     
 
Ebrahim (2007) provides results which indicate that, the value of abnormal 
accruals was negatively related to the percentage of independent directors on the 
board. The author failed to find evidence between abnormal accruals and board activity. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that the number of board meetings is an 
indication of the board's reaction to urgent business matters rather than an indication of 
a monitoring function of the financial reporting process.  
 
Johnstone, Li and Rupley (2011) examined whether a firm that has gone 
through governance changes, subsequently remediates material internal control 
weaknesses that have led to a material negative event such as fraud or restatement. 
The results have shown that, improvements in board characteristics such as size, 
number of meetings, the duality of CEO and chairman, independence and 
competence were positively associated with the timeliness of remediation relating to 
control environment and information and communication weaknesses.   
 
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) document that, independent foreign directors, with 
international background and expertise, improved the advisory function of boards. 




evidence shows that firms with foreign directors paid their CEOs excessively high 
compensation, were more likely to engage in intentional financial misreporting, and 
were less responsive in replacing poorly performing CEOs. These results suggest that 
local directors are more active and can be better monitors of managerial behaviour.   
  
Table 10 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 





Table 10: Results of Empirical Studies on Board Characteristics and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 




When earnings are lower than the previous year's reported earnings, abnormal accruals are less income increasing when 
the proportion of outsiders on the board is high. Outside directors do not influence income decreasing earnings 
management, suggesting that they may be more concerned with income overstatement due to litigation risks.  
Klein (2000) There is no significant relationship between earnings management and whether the CEO sits on the board's nominating 
committee. There is a positive association between earnings management and whether the CEO sits on the board's 
compensation committee, suggesting that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO may be more effective 
monitors.   
Xie et al. (2003) Board meetings are negatively associated with the level of earnings management, indicating that boards that meet 




Board independence and size is associated with lower debt financing costs, suggesting that creditors believe that more 
independent boards can be more effective monitors of the financial reporting process.  
Vafeas (2005) Board independence and size improve the quality of accounting information, measured by small earnings increases and 
timely recognition of losses.   
Niu (2006) Firms with more independent boards and more effective compensation policies have fewer discretionary accruals.  
Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006) 
A high proportion of non-executive directors cannot mitigate earnings management, possibly due management 






and Ali (2006) 




For both the US and the UK, the discretionary accruals are income-decreasing during the year immediately preceding an 
MBO. Earnings management is more aggressive for U.S. firms, despite the greater proportion of outside directors sitting 
in US boards.  
Ebrahim (2007) Abnormal accruals are negatively related to the percentage of independent directors on the board. There is no evidence 




Improvements in board characteristics such as size, number of meetings, the duality of CEO and chairman, 
independence and competence are positively associated with the timely remediation of material internal control 
weaknesses that have led to a material negative event such as fraud or restatement.    
Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2012) 
Foreign independent directors have international background and expertise which improves the advisory function of 
boards. Foreign directors are more likely to miss board meetings, pay their CEOs excessively high compensation, are 





After having considered how board effectiveness can impact earnings 
management, the audit committee characteristics are addressed next.  
 
2.8.2 Audit Committee 
The financial reporting task of the board is delegated to the audit committee. The 
responsibility of the audit committee includes the appointment of the auditor, 
compensation and oversight, and approval of any non-audit services performed. The 
committee must meet regularly with the auditors to review financial statements and 
examine management judgments, accounting estimates or differences of opinion 
between management and outside auditors concerning the application of the GAAP.  
The committee is also responsible for the supervision of the internal control systems 
and the internal audit. Thus audit committee effectiveness is a signal of the quality of 
financial reports. As explained next, the committee‟s effectiveness can be achieved by 
independence, expertise and activity.   
 
Independent audit committees are those committees that are composed entirely 
of independent directors.  The independence of the audit committee actually depends 
on the board size. This is because large boards have more representation of 
independent directors and, therefore, it is more likely to have an audit committee 
composed of totally independent directors (Klein, 2000). In order for audit committees to 
function effectively they must be independent of management so that internal and 
external auditors remain free of undue influences from corporate executives (Vicknair et 




Since the primary function of an audit committee is to monitor the financial 
reporting process, there is a need to have competent and experienced directors, 
particularly in financial aspects. Outside directors who are financially competent, are 
effective as monitors in reducing earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Choi et al., 
2004). The percentage of audit committee members having expertise in accounting or 
financial management is positively related to the quality of financial reporting (Felo et 
al., 2003). Therefore an audit committee that is competent is more likely to be an 
effective monitor.    
 
Finally, in order for the audit committee to be effective, it must not only be 
independent but it must also be active (Menon and Williams, 1994).  
 
Studies on audit committee characteristics and their impact on earnings 
management are presented next.  
 
Menon and Williams (1994) found that, when audit committees did not meet or 
met infrequently, they were less likely to perform their monitoring function properly. 
They also report that as the proportion of outside directors on the board increased, firms 
had audit committees that were more active. 
 
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) provide evidence which suggests that, the 
mere presence of an audit committee did not appear to constrain earnings 




that controlled earnings management, possibly because audit committees often report 
to the full board thereby, facilitating outside director monitoring.   
   
The results of Klein (2000) suggest that when the majority of audit committee 
members were outside directors and when a non-managing large shareholder was on 
the board's audit committee, earnings management was mitigated. For firms that had 
audit committees which comprised of less than a majority of independent directors, 
earnings management was not more pronounced as compared to firms with wholly 
independent committees.  
 
Bedard et al.  (2004) used a sample of companies with extreme measures of 
earnings management but found no significant relation between earnings management 
and audit committee activity.  
 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) provide evidence that audit committee 
independence, size and activity were associated with lower debt financing costs. These 
findings suggest that debt holders considered that, larger and active audit committees 
could provide greater monitoring of the financial accounting process.  
 
Vafeas (2005) studied the relationship between audit committee independence, 
expertise and activity. He provides evidence that these audit committee characteristics 
improved the quality of accounting information, measured by small earnings increases 





For a sample of Canadian firms, Niu (2006) show that, firms that were ranked 
highly in terms of governance quality, including audit committees that were fully 
independent and experienced, had fewer abnormal accruals. However, the most 
important factor that influenced the corresponding improvement of earnings quality was 
board independence and shareholder engagement.  
 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) provide evidence that, on average, large 
Malaysian public companies managed their earnings and effective audit committees did 
not mitigate these practices.  
 
Ebrahim (2007) provides evidence that the value of abnormal accruals was 
negatively related to audit committee independence and activity.  
 
The results of Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) show that, audit committee 
members that were independent and with accounting expertise, had a positive impact 
on the quality of accruals. The evidence also shows that the job of the committee 
members was influenced by other finance experts, suggesting that the business and 
industry knowledge possessed by finance experts can complement the specific 
knowledge of accounting experts to promote accruals quality.  
 
Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011) examined the monitoring benefits of 
audit committee independence and expertise, conditional on whether the CEO is in the 
nomination committee. The authors found that when the CEO was involved in the 




results show that the monitoring benefits of independence and expertise were evident 
only when the CEO was not formally involved in selecting board members.  
   
Johnstone, Li and Rupley (2011) investigated whether a firm that has gone 
through governance changes, subsequently remediates material internal control 
weaknesses that have led to a material negative event such as fraud or restatement. 
The results have shown that improvements in audit committee independence and 
expertise were positively associated with prompt remediation relating to control activities 
and monitoring.  
 
Table 11 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 





Table 11: Results of Empirical Studies on Audit Committee Characteristics and Earnings Management (in chronological 
order) 
Authors  Results 
Menon and 
Williams (1994) 
Audit committees that do not meet or meet infrequently are less likely to perform their monitoring function properly. When 




The mere presence of an audit committee does not constrain earnings management. The interaction of the board 
composition and the audit committees controls earnings management because audit committees report to the full board, 
thereby facilitating outside director monitoring.   
Klein (2000) A majority of outside membership and presence of a non-managing large shareholder on the audit committee makes a 
difference on earnings manipulation. For firms with less than majority independent audit committees, earnings management 
is not more pronounced than for firms with wholly independent committees.  
Bedard et al.  
(2004) 




 Audit committee independence, size and activity are associated with lower debt financing costs. Debt holders consider that 
larger and active audit committees provide greater monitoring of the financial accounting process.  
Vafeas (2005) Audit committee independence, expertise and activity improve the quality of accounting information, measured by small 
earnings increases and timely recognition of losses.   





Niu (2006) The most important factor that influences earnings quality is board independence and shareholder engagement. 
Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006) 
Audit committee independence and competence does not mitigate earnings management as measured by discretionary 
accruals.   




Audit committee independence and expertise has a positive impact on the quality of accruals. The business and industry 
knowledge of other finance experts complements the accounting knowledge of audit committee members to promote 




When the CEO is involved in the director selection process, the audit committee independence is compromised. The 




Improvements in audit committee independence and expertise are positively associated with prompt remediation of material 




After having considered how audit committee characteristics can impact earnings 
management, the effect of auditing is addressed next 
 
2.8.3 Auditing 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the practice of providing audited financial 
statements leads to real cost savings. As a result of the audit, external parties have 
more reliable information about a firm, which enables the organization to attract funds at 
a lower cost than would otherwise be possible (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p. 221).  
 
External auditors are experts on financial accounting and reporting according to 
the GAAP. Audit quality reflects the auditors' ability to discover and report to the audit 
committee any significant discrepancies from the GAAP. The audit firm should work for 
the interests of the public, not the client. Earnings management is less likely in 
companies audited by a Big auditing firm, because Big auditing firms are expected to be 
more independent, more experienced and provide a higher-quality audit process 
(DeAngelo, 1981).  
 
Studies on the quality of the audit and its impact on earnings management are 
presented next.  
 
Becker et al. (1998) found that clients of non-Big Six auditing firms reported more 
income increasing discretionary accruals than the discretionary accruals reported by 




Chen et al. (2001) report that, Chinese companies engaging in earnings 
management in order to meet the regulatory requirements received modified audit 
opinions as opposed to other companies, suggesting that auditors did not site with 
customers.  
 
Gaver and Paterson (2001) examined the association between monitoring by 
auditors and actuaries, and earnings management in insurance companies. Their 
results indicate that under-reserving by weak insurers was essentially eliminated when 
the firms used auditors and actuaries that were both from Big Six accounting firms.  
 
Wright, Shaw and Guan (2006) investigated whether the audit function has an 
impact on earnings management practices, using US and UK companies. In the US 
auditors are appointed by the board of directors, whereas in the UK auditors are 
appointed by and report directly to the shareholders. The authors examined whether 
managers manage earnings downward prior to a management buyout. The results 
indicate that for both countries, the discretionary accruals were income-decreasing 
during the year preceding the management buyout, but these practices were more 
aggressive in the US. These results suggest that auditors cannot alleviate managerial 
behaviour driven by self-interest.     
 
Ebrahim (2007) found a positive relation between earnings quality and outside 
audit, consistent with the argument that Big auditing firms are expected to be more 




Chen, Chen, Lobo and Wang (2011) examined the effects of audit quality on 
earnings management for Chinese firms. Audit firm size was used as a proxy for audit 
quality and discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. They found 
significantly lower level of earnings management for firms audited by Top Eight versus 
non-Top Eight auditors.   
 
Boone, Khurana and Raman (2012) investigated whether the requirements under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to have only four large auditors greatly reduces auditors‟ 
effectiveness. The results suggest that higher concentration at the local level was 
associated with greater auditor tolerance for earnings management and that clients with 
earnings below the earnings target utilized more income-increasing discretionary 
accruals to meet or beat the earnings benchmark. The findings show that higher 
concentration is associated with lower audit quality.  
 
Francis, Michas and Seavey (2013) also document that, in countries where the 
Big Four have a greater market share, earnings quality is lower. More specifically, 
accruals were found to be larger, suggesting greater discretion to manage earnings, 
firms were more likely to report profits and less timely loss recognition. Thus it appears 
that market concentration within the dominant Big Four group is potentially harmful to 
earnings quality. 
 
Since large accounting firms have internal policies that attempt to achieve quality 
and consistency across offices, Francis, Michas and Yu (2013) hypothesized that office 




quality, the results indicate that small audit offices had more low quality audits than 
large offices, and this holds for both the Big Four firms and the largest non–Big Four 
firms which also have multi-office practices. The evidence implies that these firm-wide 
mechanisms do not fully achieve uniform audit quality, particularly for smaller offices.  
 
Another major concern about auditing is whether auditors‟ independence is 
compromised by tenure or by non- audit services offered to clients. It can be argued that 
longer auditor tenure is associated with greater acquired expertise, in the sense that 
auditors have a better understanding of their customers‟ business affairs. On the other 
hand, the close relationship developed between auditor and clients may lead to an 
impairment of independence and objectivity, in that auditors may satisfy the client‟s 
demands in order to continue to secure a stream of future audit fees. Furthermore, the 
provision of substantial amounts of non-audit services to clients may make it more likely 
that auditors concede to the wishes of the client when difficult judgments are made. 
Usually, independence is ensured by separating the duties between auditors and tax 
and consulting services experts.  
 
It is possible however, that auditors have incentives to provide high quality 
services in order to protect their reputational capital and avoid losses of future revenue 
streams. Therefore, retaining a single client is just not a reasonable incentive for 
violating independence standards.   
 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) found little evidence of a positive relation 




between non-audit fees and unexpected accruals but only for an 8.5% of the sample. It 
was also observed that these firms had weaker corporate governance relative to the 
remaining firms i.e. lower institutional holdings, fewer independent directors and higher 
insider holdings. Thus, corporate governance is a key factor for understanding accrual 
choices, as opposed to these choices simply being a function of fees paid to auditors. 
The results are therefore consistent with reputation concerns being the primary 
determinant of auditor behaviour with respect to limiting unusual accounting choices of 
client firms. 
 
Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality, Chen, Lin 
and Lin (2008) found that earnings quality was improved with audit partner 
tenure. These findings suggest that earnings quality is not impaired with audit 
partner tenure. They also found that discretionary accruals decreased 
significantly with audit firm tenure, again suggesting that firm rotation will not 
impair earnings quality. The results are generally consistent with the argument 
that requiring audit partner rotation or audit firm rotation in addition to partner 
rotation could have adverse effects on earnings quality. 
 
Basioudis, Papakonstantinou and Geiger (2008) found that, financially stressed 
companies with high audit fees were more likely to receive a going concern, modified 
audit opinion, whereas companies with high non-audit fees were less likely to receive a 
going-concern modified audit opinion. This evidence suggests that high non-audit fees 
have a detrimental effect on going-concern reporting judgments.   




Using abnormal accruals as proxies for audit quality, Chi, Huang, Liao and Xie 
(2009) found that, in Taiwan, the audit quality of companies subject to mandatory 
partner rotation was not significantly different from the audit quality of companies not 
subject to such requirement. In fact, the audit quality of companies subject to mandatory 
partner rotation under new audit partners was significantly lower than the audit quality of 
these same companies one year earlier under old audit partners. The findings, 
therefore, do not support the belief that mandatory audit partner rotation enhances audit 
quality. 
 
The results of Gul, Fung and Jaggi (2009) suggest that, the association between 
shorter auditor tenure and lower quality of reported earnings was weaker for firms 
audited by industry specialists. This evidence suggests that auditors with industry 
expertise are more likely to detect irregularities and misrepresentations and provide 
higher quality audits, even if auditors lack client-specific knowledge as a result of short 
auditor–client relationships.  
 
Lim and Tan (2010) hypothesized that audit quality is associated with two issues: 
auditor expertise and economic incentives. Using accrual quality as a measure of audit 
quality, the authors provide evidence that firms audited by specialists had higher audit 
quality with extended auditor tenure and that this relation was weakened by auditors‟ 
fee dependence on clients. The results suggest that focusing on either specialization or 
fee dependence provides a less complete picture of whether auditor tenure improves or 
impairs audit quality. 




Patterson and Valencia (2011) provide evidence that recurring tax services 
provided by the auditor were negatively related to restatements. These results suggest 
that better knowledge of the customers‟ business helps to improve the audit quality. In 
contrast, non-recurring tax engagements were positively related to restatements, 
showing that higher non audit fees have a larger net detrimental effect on auditor 
independence. 
 
The results of Markelevich and Rosner (2013) show that, firms which paid 
significantly higher non audit fees and total fees were more likely to be sanctioned for 
issuing materially misstated or fraudulent financial statements. The findings that firms 
sanctioned for fraud paid significantly higher non-audit and total fees suggest that 
economic bonds lead to impaired auditor independence.  
 
Table 12 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 




Table 12: Results of Empirical Studies on Auditing and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors  Results 
Becker et al. 
(1998) 
Clients of non-Big Six auditing firms report more income increasing discretionary accruals than the 
clients of Big Six auditing firms.  
Chen et al. (2001) Companies engaging in earnings management receive modified audit opinions, suggesting that 
auditors do not site with customers.  
Gaver and 
Paterson (2001) 
Under-reserving by weak insurers is eliminated when the firms use auditors and actuaries that are 




There is little evidence of a positive relation between audit fees and discretionary accruals. There is 
a positive association between non- audit fees and unexpected accruals but only for small 
percentage of the sample. Reputation concerns are the primary determinant of auditor behaviour.  
Wright, Shaw and 
Guan (2006) 
Both US and UK firms report income-decreasing discretionary during the year preceding an MBO, 
but these practices are more aggressive in the US. Auditors cannot alleviate managerial behaviour 
driven by self-interest.     
Ebrahim (2007) There is a positive relation between earnings quality and outside audit provided by Big auditing 
firms.   
Chen, Lin and Lin 
(2008) 
Discretionary accruals decrease significantly with audit partner tenure. Discretionary 
accruals also decrease significantly with audit firm tenure, suggesting that non-rotation will 









Financially stressed companies with high audit fees are more likely to receive a going concern,  
modified audit opinion as opposed to companies with high non-audit fees. High non-audit fees have 
a detrimental effect on going-concern reporting judgments.   
Chi, Huang, Liao 
and Xie (2009) 
The audit quality of companies subject to mandatory partner rotation is not significantly different 
from the audit quality of companies not subject to such requirement. The audit quality of companies 
that changed auditors is lower under the new audit partners. Audit quality increases with audit 
partner tenure.  
Gul, Fung and 
Jaggi (2009) 
The association between shorter auditor tenure and lower quality of reported earnings is weaker for 
firms audited by industry specialists. Auditors with industry expertise provide higher quality audits 
despite the lack client-specific knowledge.   
Lim and Tan 
(2010) 
Firms audited by specialists have relatively higher audit quality with extended auditor tenure and this 
relation is weakened by auditors‟ fee dependence on clients.  
Chen, Chen, 
Lobo and Wang 
(2011) 
For Chinese firms, earnings management is lower when these are audited by Top Eight versus non- 




Recurring tax services provided by the auditor are negatively related to restatements. Higher non-













In countries where the Big Four auditors have a greater market share, earnings quality is lower. 
Market concentration within the dominant Big Four group is potentially harmful to earnings quality. 
Francis, Michas 
and Yu (2013) 
Using restatements as a measure of audit quality, small audit offices have more low quality audits 
than large offices, and this holds for both the Big Four firms and the largest non–Big Four firms. 
Firm-wide mechanisms do not achieve uniform audit quality across offices, particularly smaller ones.  
Markelevich and 
Rosner (2013) 
Firms that pay significantly higher non-audit fess and total fees are more likely to be sanctioned for 
issuing materially misstated or fraudulent financial statements. Economic bonds lead to impaired 




After having considered the effect of auditing on earnings management, the issue 
of corporate ownership is addressed next.  
 
2.8.4 Corporate Ownership  
Corporate ownership systems can be can be classified into two categories: 
dispersed and concentrated ownership systems (Coffee, 2005). As explained next, 
ownership concentration, as well as inside ownership can act as a disincentive for 
earnings management.   
 
2.8.4.1 Ownership Concentration  
In concentrated ownership systems, provision of finance comes from families or 
other dominant providers of long-term finance such as banks or governments (Zysman, 
1983, cited in Deegan and Unerman, p.102). In family owned businesses, the owners 
have access to detailed internal management accounting information, so there is no 
need for financial accounts to provide information to aid investment decision making by 
shareholders. Banks may also develop closer relationships, such as having a 
representative on the board of companies to whom they are major lenders, and these 
representatives are provided with the detailed accounting information available to all 
board members. Given that the predominant providers of finance are effectively 
“insiders”, there is little pressure for financial accounting to provide information to aid 






In dispersed ownership systems, external shareholders are a significant source 
of finance. As these external shareholders are not involved in the management of the 
company, they need to be provided with financial accounting information to help them 
make their investment decisions.  
 
Outside shareholders that monitor managerial actions obtain a benefit depending 
on the percentage of shares owned but have to bear all the costs of monitoring. 
Therefore, the incentive for non-controlling shareholders to closely monitor 
management is small. However, outside, block-holders, who own at least 5% of a firm's 
outstanding voting stocks, have more incentives to monitor the actions of managers 
because monitoring will produce a bigger share of benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
 
The existence of outside block-holders may however put pressure on managers 
to manage earnings in order to report a favourable financial performance. This is 
because outside block-holders pose a bigger threat of intervention when management 
is perceived to be underperforming (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). Intervention may 
take the form of initiating or supporting proposals that restrict managements' decision 
rights, limit managers' ability to carry out policy and, at the extreme, dismiss 
management (Barclay and Holderness, 1991). Therefore, managers in firms with 
outside block-holders may feel more pressure to manage earnings especially when their 




Evidence on the effect of ownership concentration on earnings management is 
presented below.  
 
Klassen (1997) provides evidence which suggests that, for firms with higher tax 
rates and more concentrated ownership, managers took larger losses or smaller gains 
from the sale of major asset groups, as opposed to widely held firms. This is consistent 
with managers being able to communicate information about their performance via 
private channels rather than through reported profitability.   
 
Beatty and Petroni (1999) hypothesized that private banks will report small 
losses and small declines in earnings more frequently than small profits and small 
increases in earnings. Since in private banks managers are assumed to have fewer 
incentives to manage earnings, the reported profit streams of privately-held banks were 
the benchmark for comparison to public banks. The results of the study support that, 
private banks were significantly more likely to report losses or declines in earnings than 
public banks with similar performance. In public banks, managers were found to have a 
greater incentive to manage reported earnings via accruals.   
 
The evidence of Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) shows a strong negative 
relationship between external, unrelated block-holdings and the level of discretionary 
accruals. This is consistent with the role of a large shareholder acting as monitor, which 
suggests less opportunity for earnings management.  
 




affected by the ownership structure.  Profit efficiency was defined as the ratio of costs 
over revenues. The results show that, profit efficiency was responsive to the ownership 
structure of the firm. The evidence suggests that large institutional holders had 
favourable monitoring effects that reduced agency costs, although large individual 
investors did not.  
 
For a sample of Canadian firms, Niu (2006) found that, firms with powerful 
shareholders had fewer discretionary accruals, suggesting that this factor may be 
effective in monitoring managerial opportunism. Particularly, strong shareholder rights 
seemed to be the one of the most important factors in influencing the improvement of 
earnings quality, as the quality of governance effectiveness increased.  
 
For a sample of family owned Taiwanese firms, Chin et al. (2006) hypothesized 
that high ownership concentration provides controlling owners with incentives to 
manage mandatory earnings forecasts so as to mask their perquisite consumption and 
at the same time secure higher share prices for both the firm and themselves. The 
Taiwanese regulations require that earnings forecasts included in the prospectuses 
should not deviate from reported earnings by more than 20%. The empirical results 
showed that the mandatory earnings forecasts were more biased when the ownership 
concentration was high. Firms tended to produce optimistic forecasts in order to 
manage the perceptions of minority investors. These forecasts were however revised 




Similar evidence is reported by Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) who investigated 
whether ownership concentration is effective in controlling earnings management in 
family owned Malaysian public companies. The findings suggest that, these companies 
engaged in earnings management and the concentrated ownership did not restrain such 
practices, consistent with the argument that controlling owners may encourage profit 
manipulation to maximize their own wealth. 
 
Zhong et al. (2007) predicted that for firms with declining earnings, the existence 
of block-holders should provide incentives for earnings management. It was found that 
firms with declining earnings reported significantly income increasing discretionary 
accruals. It was also found that, the existence of outside block-holders did not 
significantly affect earnings management for the sample firms with zero or positive 
earnings. The results were different after 2001, when the Sarbanes Oxley Act was 
passed. The new regulations on corporate governance and financial reporting may have 
changed the cost and benefit structure of earnings management for both management 
and outside block-holders and consequently have weakened or changed the 
association between outside block-holders and earnings management for the sample 
periods of 2002 and 2003.    
 
Using discretionary accruals, earnings persistence and earnings response 
coefficient as measures of earnings quality, Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007) found 
that reported earnings were of better quality for family US firms as compared to non-
family US firms. This finding is consistent with less severe agency problems and hence 




that family firms were more likely to disclose bad news in a more timely manner through 
management earnings forecasts.  
 
Ayers, Ramalingegowda and Yeung (2011) predicted that the monitoring effect of 
institutional ownership on financial reporting will depend on the geographic distance 
between the firm and the monitoring institution. Consistent with expectations, the 
authors found a negative relationship between the magnitude of abnormal accruals and 
local monitoring institutional ownership. These results suggest that local monitoring 
institutions are more active and thus limit managerial flexibility for opportunistic financial 
reporting.  
 
Similar evidence is provided by Chhaochharia, Kumar and Niessen-Ruenzi 
(2012). These authors also provide evidence that local institutional investors were 
effective monitors of corporate behaviour. Firms with high local ownership had better 
internal governance, were more profitable and were less likely to manage their earnings 
aggressively via accruals.  
 
Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) also document that, higher ownership by 
monitoring institutions was associated with more conservative financial reporting. 
Financial reporting conservatism was defined as the timely recognition of losses. 
Conservatism reduced managers‟ incentive and ability to overstate earnings. 
 
Table 13 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 




Table 13: Results of Empirical Studies on Ownership Concentration and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors  Results 
Klassen (1997) Managers of firms with higher tax rates and more concentrated ownership take larger losses or smaller gains from 
sales of major assets.   
Beatty and 
Petroni (1999) 
Private banks, with earnings or changes in earnings near zero are more likely to report losses or declines in 
earnings than public banks with similar performance. In public banks, managers manage reported earnings via 
accruals.   
Yeo, Tan, Ho 
and Chen (2002) 
There is strong positive relationship between external, unrelated block-holdings and the informativeness of 




Banks‟ profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure. Large institutional holders have favourable 
monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, whereas large individual investors do not.  
Niu (2006) Firms with powerful shareholders have fewer discretionary accruals. Strong shareholder rights seemed to be the 
one of the most important factors in influencing earnings quality.  
Chin et al. (2006) Concentrated family ownership provides controlling owners with incentives to manage mandatory earnings forecasts 
so as to mask their perquisite consumption and at the same time secure higher share prices for both the firm and 
themselves.  
Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006) 
In large Malaysian public companies that are family owned or controlled, earnings management is not restrained, 




Authors  Results 
Zhong et al. 
(2007)  
 
Firms with declining earnings and block-owners report significantly income increasing discretionary accruals in the 
pre-SOX period. After 2001, the relationship between outside block-holders and earnings management is 
weakened.     
Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan 
(2007)  
Reported earnings are of better quality for family firms as compared to non-family firms. Family firms are more likely 





There is a negative relationship between the magnitude of abnormal accruals and local institutional ownership. 





Local institutional investors are effective monitors of corporate behaviour. Firms with high local ownership have 




and Yu (2012) 




After having considered the effect of ownership concentration on earnings 
management, the impact of inside ownership is addressed next.  
 
2.8.4.2 Inside Ownership 
Inside ownership is viewed as a governance mechanism that can help reduce 
agency costs. Managers with low firm ownership have greater incentives to manipulate 
accounting numbers in order to satisfy the requirements of their accounting based 
compensation contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, directors with little 
ownership in the firm cannot effectively monitor and discipline the managers (Jensen, 
1989). The use of equity compensation is a way to give an executive an ownership 
stake in the firm, thereby aligning executive and shareholder incentives (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Evidence on the effect of inside ownership on earnings management is 
presented next.  
  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesized that agency costs are higher for firms 
whose managers own none of the firm‟s equity and agency costs vary inversely with 
managerial ownership and ownership concentration. The authors investigated a sample 
of firms, including firms whose management owned 100% of equity and firms managed 
by outsiders with no equity stake. As predicted, the agency costs were found to be 
higher for firms that were not 100% owned by their managers, and these costs 





Dempsey et al. (1993) provide evidence which suggests that, large ownership by 
management was the underlying factor that reduced earnings management. The 
existence of outside block-holders did not seem to significantly affect earnings 
management.  
 
Warfield et al. (1995) also found a negative relation between managerial 
stockholdings and the value of abnormal accruals.  
 
Weber (2006) provides results which indicate that the sensitivity arising from 
stock holdings was associated with abnormal accrual usage and the relation between 
the two variables was consistent with income-smoothing. Since smoothed earnings are 
associated with higher stock valuations the findings suggest that wealth exposure 
arising from stock ownership may be effective in long-term alignment of the CEO‟s 
interests and shareholders.  
 
Niu (2006) examined the relationship between quality of earnings and inside 
ownership for Canadian firms. The author hypothesized that firms with a higher level of 
board (management) share ownership would have less abnormal accruals and more 
informative earnings. Mandatory shareholding by board and management was found to 
help produce more informative earnings.  
 
For a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, Yang, Lai and Tan (2008) found that 




results suggest that equity stake owned by top officers of a firm should be encouraged 
in order to reduce agency costs, thus enhancing information content of earnings.  
 
Banderlippe II (2009) documents evidence for the alignment hypothesis for a 
sample of listed companies in Philippines. The findings of this study support that 
independent directors‟ expertise coupled with managerial ownership were significant 
enough to limit earnings management.  
 
For a sample of Portuguese companies, Alves (2012) predicted that, a firm‟s 
ownership structure, including managerial ownership, may create an incentive or 
alleviate earnings management. The evidence shows that discretionary accruals were 
negatively related to managerial ownership. This result is consistent with the argument 
that when managers have an equity interest in the firm, their interests are aligned with 
those of shareholders.   
 
Lee and Hwang (2012) provide evidence that discretionary accruals were 
positively related to low insider ownership, but this relationship changed when the level 
of insider ownership was high. This result suggests that insider ownership, at its high 
levels, can mitigate managers‟ opportunistic earnings management behaviour.  
 
Fauzi and Locke (2012) examined the impact of ownership structures on firm 
performance in New Zealand's listed firms. Overall, the evidence shows that managerial 






Table 14 on the next page provides a summary of the results of the empirical 





Table 14: Results of Empirical Studies on Inside Ownership and Earnings Management (in chronological order) 
Authors  Results 
Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
The agency costs are higher for firms that are not 100% owned by their managers and these costs 
decrease with an increase in managerial ownership.  
Dempsey et al. 
(1993) 
Large ownership by management is the underlying factor that reduces earnings management.   
Warfield et al. (1995) There is a negative relation between managerial stockholdings and abnormal accruals.  
Weber (2006) Stock-based compensation provides managers with incentives to smooth income. Since smoothing is 
associated with higher stock valuations, inside stock ownership may be effective in long-term alignment 
of the CEO‟s interests and shareholders.  
Niu (2006) Inside shareholding by board and management helps to produce more informative earnings.  
Yang, Lai and Tan 
(2008) 
Discretionary accruals first increase and then decrease with executive ownership. Equity stake owned 
by top officers of a firm reduces the agency cost, thus enhancing quality of earnings.   
Banderlippe II (2009) Independent directors‟ expertise coupled with managerial ownership are significant enough to limit 
earnings management.  
Alvez (2012) Discretionary accruals are negatively related to managerial ownership. When managers have an equity 
interest in the firm, their interests are aligned with those of shareholders.   
Lee and Hwang 
(2012) 
When the level of insider ownership is high, it can mitigate managers‟ opportunistic earnings 




Authors  Results 
Fauzi and Locke 
(2012) 





Earnings management occurs when managers use their discretion so as to 
change the reported profits at will. Earnings management practices can be classified 
into two categories: practices that fall within the GAAP and practices that fall outside the 
GAAP. Accounting practices that fall outside the GAAP are fraudulent, whereas 
practices within the GAAP are legal, as long as managers can provide reasonable 
justification for their choices. The objective of earnings management is to maximize, 
minimize or smooth profits, and this depends on the underlying motivation to manage 
the accounts. Depending on what accounting item is used, earnings management can 
be classified as real or cosmetic. Real earnings management can be achieved by timing 
the recognition of events whereas cosmetic practices involve discretion over accounting 
method choices or accounting estimates. Earnings management has an efficiency 
perspective in the sense that it can be used as a vehicle of communicating managers‟ 
private information to outsiders. Alternatively, earnings management can be used for 
opportunistic reasons.  
 
 In the literature, there is empirical evidence that, where accounting alternatives 
exist, managers will have an incentive to manage earnings so as to: secure a cash 
bonus; avoid accounting based debt covenant violations; avoid political scrutiny from 
external groups such as the government, employees; job security concerns; stock price; 





 For firms with cash bonus schemes that are based on accounting reported 
profits, the empirical evidence suggests that, managers adopt income increasing 
practices in order to secure their variable compensation. The results of empirical studies 
on stock based compensation are mixed. Some studies provide evidence that when 
variable compensation is tied to a firm‟s shares, in the form of stock options, managers 
have incentives to income maximize so as to “drive up” the stock price and maximize 
their personal wealth. In contrast, other empirical results support that stock 
compensation is effective in aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders.  
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that firms engage in earnings management in 
order to avoid debt covenant violations that are based on accounting profits. There is 
however some evidence that lenders, particularly banks, may demand conservatism on 
behalf of lenders as a condition of providing funds at a lower cost.  
 
 There are empirical studies that support that managers engage in earnings 
management in order to manage the perceptions of suppliers or customers about the 
firm‟s prospects. There is also evidence that, where customers or suppliers are large so 
that they have bargaining power, they will demand a more timely recognition of losses. 
In addition, if customers or suppliers expect opportunism on behalf of the other party, 
they may design explicit contracts with limitations on opportunistic behavior.  
 
Empirical results also provide support that managers will income minimize in 




banks have an incentive to manage income upwards in order to meet the minimum 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio. Since accounting profits are included in the numerator 
of this ratio, one way to increase it is through profitability.  
 
When tax income is equal to book income, firms have a motive to reduce profits 
in order to reduce tax. Under the GAAP, taxable income is not determined based on 
book profits. Hence firms can minimize their tax liability and use discretion to increase 
accounting profits. The tax expense then becomes an opportunity to manage profits. 
This can be done by understating the deferred tax valuation allowance or the tax 
contingent liability. It can also be done through tax planning i.e. recognition of 
permanently tax deductible items for which no tax is recorded. As opposed to other 
firms, banks choose to sacrifice the tax benefits in order to meet the minimum 
regulatory capital levels. For firms with concentrated ownership, managers choose to 
reduce the profits so as to reduce the tax paid since their performance can be judged 
via other communication channels.  
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that managers manage earnings driven by job 
security concerns. Particularly, when there is a change in CEO, the incoming executive 
income minimizes so as to save earnings for the future and take the credit.  
 
The empirical results on earnings management and stock price effect are mixed. 




practices. Other studies show that the market responds inefficiently to unexpected 
earnings announcements.  
 
 In the literature, there is empirical evidence that, the corporate the governance 
mechanisms which can limit opportunistic behaviour and protect stakeholders‟ interests 
include: effective board of directors; effective audit committees; auditing; and the 
structure of corporate ownership.  
 
Board effectiveness can be ensured by independence, expertise, size and 
meetings. The evidence on board characteristics shows that the presence of 
independent directors can act as a controlling device on earnings management. There 
is also some support that board activity and size can help reduce such practices.  
 
Audit committee effectiveness can be ensured by independence, expertise and 
activity. For audit committees, the literature supports that the quality of accounting 
information is improved when the committee is independent and comprises of experts. 
Audit committee size and activity can also serve as a controlling mechanism. 
 
 Audit quality is improved when auditors are independent and experienced. The 
evidence indicates that Big accounting firms offer a higher quality of audit, thus 
improving the quality of accounting information. In countries where Big audit firms have 
a higher market share, tolerance for earnings managed is increased. Audit tenure does 




their customers‟ business affairs. High non-audit fees do impair the quality of auditing 
and the accounting information.  
 
Block ownership of a firm‟s stock provides owners with more incentives to 
monitor managerial actions, because monitoring will produce a bigger share of benefits. 
The empirical evidence suggests that, firms with more concentrated ownership or high 
institutional ownership are associated with more conservative accounting. There is also 
support that, where concentrated ownership is held by family members, earnings 
management is not constrained, and this creates an agency cost between controlling 
owners and minority shareholders.  
  
  Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that managers are utility maximizers,  
and for this reason they will behave opportunistically. Managers engage in earnings 
management in order to maximize their compensation and secure their jobs. But when 
earnings are managed upwards, the firm has a benefit as well; investors are satisfied, 
the debt covenants are met and the relations with suppliers and customers are good. 
Consequently, except for political costs, when managers use their discretion to 
increase reported profits in order to maximize their utility (manipulate against the firm) 
at the same time they produce benefits for the firm. For banks, maintenance of a 
minimum regulatory capital ratio also creates an incentive to manage earnings 
upwards. Hence, when bank managers manipulate for themselves, they also 
manipulate for the bank because violation of the capital requirements results in 




management is not used as a vehicle for communicating inside information, corporate 
governance variables can act as controlling mechanisms on opportunistic practices.  
 
In summary, there are two theories that dominate the literature: the theory on 
incentives and the theory on disincentives for earnings management. The incentives to 
manage accounting profits include: compensation, lending and implicit contracts; 
political costs; stock price effect; fear of dismissal; and taxation. The disincentives for 
earnings management include: the board of directors; audit committees; the quality of 
external audit; and corporate ownership. Finally, under the GAAP, accounting options 
are given for presenting financial performance, thus creating opportunities for earnings 
management.  
 
Based on the comprehensive review of the literature, the following gap has been 
identified: most of the empirical studies examine either the incentives or the 
disincentives for earnings management. The opportunities for earnings management 
include income statement variables over which managers can exercise discretion. In 
order to test for earnings management, authors usually use regressions where the 
independent variables are the incentives or the disincentives for earnings management; 
the dependent variable is the opportunity for earnings management. To the best of the 
researcher‟s knowledge, there are no studies that have examined both incentives and 






Table 15: Empirical Evidence on Incentives and Opportunities for Earnings 
Management  
Incentives for Earnings 
Management 
(independent variables) 




Secure a cash bonus Depreciation and amortization; defined 
benefit plans; investment tax credits; 
accruals; accounting policy changes; 
R & D; provision for bad debts; timing 
the sale of assets; early debt 
retirement; inventory valuation; 
extraordinary items 
Haggerman (1979); Healy (1985); 
Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987); 
McNichols and Wilson (1988); Haw, 
Jung and Lilien (1991); Skinner (1993); 
Clinch and Magliolo (1993); Gaver, 
Gaver and Austin (1993); Holthausen, 
Larcker and Sloan (1995); Guidry, Leone 
and Rock (1999); Keating, Zimmerman 
and Simon (1999); Gao and Shrieves 
(2002); Shuto (2007);  
Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010) 
Maximize stock based 
compensation 
Accruals; revenue misstatement; 
timing the sale of assets. 
Gao and Shrieves (2002); Baker, Collins 
and Reitenga (2003); Cheng and 
Warfield (2004); Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006); Ronen, Tzur and Yaari 
(2006); Balachandran, Chalmers and 
Haman (2008);  Cullinan, Du and Wright 
(2008);  
Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010) 
Avoid violations of 
covenants in debt 
contracts 
Defined pension plans; inventory 
valuation; accruals; deferred tax 
valuation allowance; accounting 
method changes; timely loss 
recognition; restructuring; asset write 
downs.  
Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991); Sweeney 
(1994); DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994);  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1994); Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 
(1996); Miller and Skinner (1998); Jaggi 
and Lee (2002; Dichev and Skinner 
(2002);   Beatty and Weber (2003); Choi 
(2007); Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) 
Zhang (2008); Tan (2013); Alissa, 
Bonsall, Koharki and Penn Jr. (2013); 




Incentives for Earnings 
Management 
(independent variables) 




Manage the perceptions 
of customers and 
suppliers  
inventory valuation; depreciation; 
accruals; timely loss recognition;  
Bowen DuCharme and Schores (1995); 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); 
Matsumoto (2002); Raman and Shahrur 
(2008);  Hui, Klasa and Yeung (2012); 
Dou, Hope and Thomas (2013); Costello 
(2013).  
Avoid regulatory 
attention and intervention  
Current cost accounting; changes in 
accounting methods; accruals 
restructurings; real investment 
decisions.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978); 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979); Liberty 
and Zimmerman (1986); Sutton (1988); 
Jones (1991); Cahan (1992); Bowen 
DuCharme and Schores (1995); Bens 
and Johnston (2009); Chaney, Faccio 
and Parsley (2011); Wong and Young 
(2012); Cohen, Dey and Lys (2013); 
Bova (2013).  
 
Increase the capital 
adequacy ratio (for 
banks).  
Real securities gains and losses; loan 
loss provisions; pension plans; timing 
the sale of assets; stock issues; loan 
charge off‟s; dividend reduction; 
accruals; tax valuation allowance.  
Moyer (1990); Scholes, Wilson and 
Wolfson (1990); Haw, Jung and Lilien 
(1991); Warfield and Linsmeier (1992); 
Clinch and Magliolo (1993); Collins, 
Schakelford and Wahlen (1995); 
Bernard, Merton and Palepu (1995);  
Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo 
(1995); Kim and Kross (1998); Ahmed, 
Takeda, and Shawn (1998); Kato, 
Kunimura and Yoshida (2001); Schrand 
and Wong (2003); Ramesh and Revsine 
(2011); Beck and Narayanamoorthy 
(2013).  
Job security concerns  Accruals; stock price; restructuring; 
choice of accounting methods; loan 
loss provisions; auditor resignations.  
Moore (1973); Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985); Elliot and Shaw (1988); 
DeAngelo (1988); Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993); Pourciau (1993); 




Incentives for Earnings 
Management 
(independent variables) 




Job security concerns Accruals; stock price; restructuring; 
choice of accounting methods; loan 
loss provisions; auditor resignations. 
DeFond and Park (1997); DeFond and 
Park (1999); Wells 2002; Kanagaretnam, 
Lobo and Mathieu (2003); Engel, Hayes 
and Wang (2003); Menon and Williams 
(2008). 
Stock price effect  Restructurings; real securities gains 
and losses; accruals; loan loss 
provisions; extraordinary items; 
earnings forecasts; classificatory 
earnings management; defined benefit 
plans; tax contingent liability; tax 
valuation allowance; tax expense.  
Elliot and Shaw (1988); Barth, Beaver 
and Wolfson (1990); Clarkson, Dontoh, 
Richardson, and Sefcik (1992) Friedlan 
(1994); Liu and Ryan (1995); Beaver and 
Engel (1996); Sloan (1996); 
Subramanyam (1996); Liu, Ryan, and 
Whalen (1997); Xie (2001); Burgstahler, 
Jiambalvo and Shelvin (2002); Dhaliwal 
et al. (2004) Chin et. al. (2006) Jaggi, 
Chin, Lin, and Lee (2006); McVay 
(2006); Picconi (2006); Frank and Rego 
(2006); Kerstein and Rai (2007); Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008); Gupta and Laux 
(2008); Gleason and Mills (2008); Cook 
et al. (2008); Cazier et al. (2010); Callen, 















Table 16: Empirical Evidence on Disincentives and Opportunities for earnings 
management  
Disincentives for Earnings 
Management  
(independent variables) 




Effective board of directors: 
independence; size; meetings; 
CEO sits in the nomination 
committee; CEO sits in the 
compensation committee; CEO 
duality;  
Accruals; timely recognition of 
losses; restatements, lower 
financing costs.  
 
Klein (2000); Peasnell, Pope and Young 
(2000, 2005); Xie et al. (2003); 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004); 
Vafeas (2005); Wright, Shaw and Guan 
(2006); Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006); 
Niu (2006); Ebrahim (2007); Johnstone, 
Li and Rupley (2011); Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2012).  
Effective audit committees: 
independence; size; expertise; 
meetings.  
Accruals; timely recognition of 
losses; restatements, lower 
financing costs.  
Menon and Williams (1994); Peasnell, 
Pope and Young (2000) Klein (2000); 
Bedard et al.  (2004); Anderson, Mansi 
and Reeb (2004) ; Vafeas (2005); Niu 
(2006) Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006); 
Ebrahim (2007); Dhaliwal, Naiker and 
Navissi (2010); Carcello, Neal, Palmrose 
and Scholz (2011); Johnstone, Li and 
Rupley (2011). 
Audit quality: independence; 
expertise; high audit and non-
audit fees; audit rotation 
Accruals; restatements; 
qualified audit opinions; 
adequacy of insurance 
liabilities.   
 
Becker et al. (1998); Chen et al. (2001); 
Gaver and Paterson (2001); Larcker and 
Richardson (2004); Wright, Shaw and 
Guan (2006); Ebrahim (2007); Chen, Lin 
and Lin (2008); Basioudis, 
Papakonstantinou and Geiger (2008); 
Chi, Huang, Liao and Xie (2009); Gul, 
Fung and Jaggi (2009); Gul, Fung and 
Jaggi (2009); Lim and Tan (2010);  
Chen, Chen, Lobo and Wang (2011); 
Boone, Khurana and Raman (2012); 
Francis, Michas and Seavey (2013); 




Disincentives for Earnings 
Management  
(independent variables) 




Audit quality: independence; 
expertise; high audit and non-
audit fees; audit rotation 
Accruals; restatements; 
qualified audit opinions; 
adequacy of insurance 
liabilities.   
 
Patterson and Valencia (2011); 
Markelevich and Rosner (2013). 
Ownership concentration Timing the sale of assets; 
accruals; cost efficiency ratio; 
earnings forecasts; timely loss 
recognition 
Klassen (1997); Beatty and Petroni 
(1999); Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002); 
Berger and Bonacorsi Di Patti (2003); 
Niu (2006); Abdul Rahman and Ali 
(2006); 
Chin et al. (2006); Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan (2007); Zhong et al. 
(2007); Ayers, Ramalingegowda and 
Yeung (2011); Chhaochharia, Kumar 
and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012); 
Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012).  
Inside ownership Accruals  Dempsey et al. (1993); Warfield et al. 
(1995); Weber (2006); Niu (2006); Yang, 
Lai and Tan (2008); Banderlippe II 
(2009); Alvez (2012); Lee and Hwang 





The important contribution of this study is that it provides a bridge to the gap in 
the literature, since it examines both incentives and disincentives for earnings 
management. More specifically, it was hypothesized that bank managers have an 
incentive to manage earnings in order to: secure their cash bonus; increase the 




bank‟s capital adequacy ratio. It was also hypothesized that earnings management 
will be constrained (i.e. disincentive) when: boards include a higher proportion of 
independent directors; the CEO is not the chairman of the board; the CEO does not 
sit in the nomination committee; the board meets frequently; and executive directors 
own bank shares.  
 
Furthermore, most of the empirical studies for banks use loan loss provisions and 
securities gains and losses as a measure of earnings management. However, under the 
GAAP, there are a lot accounting numbers over which managers can exercise 
discretion. For this reason, this empirical study includes an additional variable as a 
measure of earnings management, the discretionary accruals. Accruals are defined as 
the difference between net profit and cash flows from operations. Therefore they include 
depreciation, amortization, gains and losses from sale of assets, impairments of assets 













Chapter 3: The Banking Sector of Cyprus 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter includes a brief description of the Cyprus banking sector. Even 
though the purpose of this study is to investigate earnings management practices only 
for the four banks that are listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange, this short description 
will help the reader formulate a picture about the importance of Cyprus and the 
importance and structure of its banking system. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows: Section 3.2 explains the importance of the banking system and 
why this is worth investigating; Section 3.3 provides an overview of the Cyprus banking 
sector; Section 3.4 describes the geopolitical importance of Cyprus; and Section 3.5 
includes a brief history of the banks investigated in this thesis.   
 
3.2 Importance of the Cyprus Banking Sector 
An empirical investigation of the Cyprus banking system was of interest because of 
banks‟ systemic importance to the economy.   
 
The first and most significant role that banks play in Cyprus is that of financial 
intermediation.  Banks account for over 90% of the financial intermediation that takes place in the 
country, way above the Eurozone average of 50%3. This occurs because businesses find it 
difficult to raise capital through the local Stock Exchange, primarily due to investors‟ mistrust; 
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thus, banks are the best source of flexible funding.  Individuals and households also secure 
lending for personal and housing needs via banks.  
 
 Another characteristic of the Cyprus banking sector is that it relies mostly on deposits in 
order to raise funds and hence be able to lend to individuals and businesses. Due to competitive 
concerns, high interest rates are offered to depositors, and as a result the cost of lending is also 
high4. 
 
In March of 2013, the Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated between 
the newly elected government and the European Union. A condition for securing 
financing was that one of the oldest and largest banks (Laiki) should be separated into 
two parts, the “bad” bank and the “good bank”. The “bad bank” closed down and Bank 
of Cyprus absorbed the “good bank” together with the large debt provided by the 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance as of 2009. In order to increase its capital base, Bank 
of Cyprus had to proceed with a “bail in” of 47,5% of uninsured deposits. In view of this 
situation, shareholders have lost their faith in financial institutions. In addition, individuals 
and businesses are no longer willing to deposit large amounts of money in banks. Consequently, the 
availability of credit is low because of low liquidity. As a result, banks cannot perform their significant 
financial intermediation role, which contributes to the worsening of the financial crisis.  This situation 
confirms that, the Cyprus banking sector is of extreme importance due the high dependence 
on banks, particularly when there is no alternative to mediate capital between holders and users.  
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3.3 Overview of the Cyprus Banking Sector 
 
3.3.1 Central Bank of Cyprus 
The banking sector of Cyprus is headed by the Central Bank, which was 
established in 1963. One of the major roles of the Bank is to safeguard the stability of 
the financial system.  The Central Bank is also responsible for the oversight of the 
payment, clearing and settlement systems and, in exceptional circumstances, it acts as 
lender of last resort. In order to achieve its goals, the Central Bank cooperates with 
other competent authorities both domestically and internationally.   
 
3.3.1.1 Domestic Cooperation 
Cyprus has a National Financial Stability Committee that is chaired by the 
Central Bank. The Committee was set up in agreement between the Central Bank of 
Cyprus, the Authority for the Supervision and Development of Cooperative Societies, 
the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission, the Insurance Companies Control 
Service and the Ministry of Finance.   
  
The members of this committee cooperate and exchange information in order to 
maintain the financial stability both in normal times and in times of crisis. This is 
achieved through the conduct of micro and macro prudential supervision of banks.  
Macro-prudential supervision focuses on the monitoring of the stability of the financial 
system as a whole as well as the implementation of macro-prudential policy tools with 




3.3.1.2 International Cooperation 
Within the European Union, the Central Bank of Cyprus participates in the 
Advisory Technical Committee (ATC), which provides assistance on issues relevant to 
the work European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). It contributes to the regular review of 
financial stability conditions in the European Union, the review and development of 
macro-prudential policy instruments available to competent authorities of the Member 
states as well as outside the European Union.  
 
The Central Bank of Cyprus also participates in the Financial Stability Committee 
(FSC) of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The FSC provides assistance 
to the European Central Bank in the field of banks‟ prudential supervision and financial 
stability. It contributes to issues in the field of financial regulation, supervision and crisis 
management in the European Union and internationally.    
 
Moreover, the Central Bank of Cyprus participates in the Financial Stability Table 
(FST) of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) of the European Union, which 
reviews financial stability issues semi-annually. The EFC-FST is responsible for 
preparing the ECOFIN Council‟s discussions on financial stability matters.  
 
Finally, the Central Bank of Cyprus has signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation between the Financial Supervisory Authorities, Central 
Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on Cross-border Financial 




between the aforementioned authorities in order to preserve the stability of the financial 
system of individual member states and of the European Union as a whole. 
 
3.3.1.3 Regulations and Directives of the Central Bank of Cyprus 
The regulations, directives and notices issued by the Central Bank are in line with 
the EU directives and the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. The Banking Law of 1997, as amended, reflects the principles and rules of 
the EU directives on credit institutions.  
 
3.3.2 Structure of the Cyprus Banking Sector  
According to the Central Bank of Cyprus, the banks in the country are classified 
into three categories: local banks; branches of foreign banks (from EU and non- EU 
countries); and representative offices.  
 
 The local banks are further classified as: commercial banks listed in the Stock 
Exchange; commercial banks that are foreign subsidiaries (from EU and non- EU 










The Central Bank of Cyprus  
 
Local Banks   
 
Branches of Foreign Banks, from 
EU and Non EU Member States 
 
Representative Offices  
 
Commercial Banks 
Listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange  
1. Bank of Cyprus 
2. Hellenic Bank 
3. Laiki Bank 
4. Universal Savings Bank 
Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks, from 
EU and Non EU Member States 
  
Cooperative Societies   
Other Banks 
 Cyprus Development Bank 





3.3.2.1 Local Banks 
 The category “local banks‟ includes the commercial banks incorporated in Cyprus, 
the cooperative societies and other banks.  
 
3.3.2.1.1 Commercial Banks 
 The commercial banks in Cyprus include banks that are listed in the stock 
exchange and subsidiaries of foreign banks (from EU and non EU countries). One of the 




tax rate. Up to the period of the crisis the company tax rate was 10%, and it now has 
been raised to 12%.  
  
 The banks that are listed in the stock exchange are the four banks for which this 
empirical study is conducted i.e. Bank of Cyprus, Laiki Bank, Universal Savings Bank 
and Hellenic Bank. As per Central Bank, the foreign subsidiaries include five banks from 
EU countries and three subsidiaries from third countries.  
  
 The commercial banks offer conventional banking services as well as other 
services such as insurance, investment, factoring and consultancy. Up to the period of 
the crisis, the commercial banking business was heavily concentrated with Bank of 
Cyprus, Laiki Bank and Hellenic Bank.  
 
The commercial banks have been licenced by the Central Bank of Cyprus, and 
operate under its regulation and supervision. All commercial banks are required to 
submit to the Central Bank audited financial statements, four months form the end of the 
financial year. In addition, every bank must submit within fifteen days from the end of 
each month, a certified statement of its assets and liabilities. The Central Bank may also 
require any other information as it may feel proper, such as records or accounts and 
other documents on granting of loans and information on the financial position of 





For the supervision of EU foreign subsidiaries, the Central Bank collaborates 
closely with the competent supervisory authorities and provides them with information to 
help them discharge their consolidated supervision effectively. If the EU supervisory 
authority wishes to verify information, it may ask the Central Bank for its assistance, or 
appoint an approved auditor to do it (Banking Law, 1997). Finally, for foreign 
subsidiaries from third countries, the Central Bank must verify whether the bank is 
subject to consolidated supervision by the supervisory authority of the third country. For 
this purpose the Central Bank takes the guidance of the European Banking Committee 
as to whether the consolidated supervision arrangements of competent authorities in 
third countries are likely to achieve the objectives of consolidated supervision (Banking 
Law, 1997).  
 
3.3.2.1.2 Cooperative Societies 
 The Cooperative Societies were established in 1938, with the purpose to 
primarily accommodate the needs of the agricultural sector. Over the years, the 
number of the Cooperative Societies has increased steadily and, up to the period of the 
crisis, virtually every village in Cyprus had its own Cooperative Society. The 
Cooperative Movement has also expanded into towns and has attracted more 
prosperous classes of the population, and today, it provides a full range of services 
normally offered by commercial banks.  And, under the amendments of the Banking 
Law, a Cooperative Credit Institution may grant loans to non-members assuming they 




 The supervision of the Cooperative Societies is carried out by the Cooperative 
Societies Supervision and Development Agency. This Agency must submit, from time to 
time, to the Central Bank all the necessary data and information for the purposes of 
monetary and credit policy, monitoring the balance of payments and provision of 
information to the European Central Bank or international organizations in which the 
Republic participates.  The Central Bank may carry out, jointly with the Agency, on site 
verification of such information. The Banking Law does not apply to the Cooperative 
Societies.  
 
3.3.2.1.3 Other Banks 
 The category “Other Banks” includes the Cyprus Development Bank and the 
Housing Finance Corporation.  
  
 The Cyprus Development Bank was established by the government in 1963, and it 
is supervised by the Central Bank of Cyprus. The Bank‟s main goal is to provide 
medium and long term finance to the manufacturing and development sectors. As of 
2001, the bank obtained a banking license to carry out the full range of banking 
operations, but it deals only with corporate customers. The bank is also active in other 
areas such as: the provision of specialized IT services; education; consultancy and 
environmental impact studies; proposals on a national health scheme; the strengthening 
of Cyprus as a regional telecommunications centre; and the implementation of the 
planning, construction and commencement of the Larnaca and Paphos airports 




hands. Under the new ownership, the bank plans to expand operations in Russia and 
widen its banking activities in neighbouring countries with business potential.  
 
The Housing Finance Corporation was established by the government in 1980. It 
is managed by a board of seven directors, which is appointed by the Council of 
Ministers. The Corporation is supervised by the Central Bank, and the provisions of the 
Banking Law apply to it to the extent that these are not in conflict with the provisions of 
the Housing Finance Corporation Law.  
  
 The basic goal of the Housing Finance Corporation is to provide long-term loans 
for housing purposes. The Corporation accepts deposits from the public, for a minimum 
period of six years, and it then grants loans that can be up to a maximum of four 
times the deposits. In order to attract deposits, 40% of the interest earned by 
depositors is tax deductible. The corporation also accepts deposits from the 
government, to which it grants loans in order to help groups of the population with 
special needs such as families residing in remote areas or families with more than three 
children.   
 
3.3.2.2 Branches of Foreign Banks 
According to the Banking Law (1997) branches of foreign banks are involved in 
banking business only. Banking business includes the acceptance of funds from the 
public, in the form of deposits, securities or other evidence; and these funds are then 




foreign banks in Cyprus. Eleven are branches of banks form EU member states 
whereas the remaining are branches from third countries.  
 
For statistical purposes, branches of foreign banks in Cyprus may be required to 
report periodically to the Central Bank about the activities carried on in the republic.  
 
The supervision of EU branches is the responsibility of the competent 
supervisory authority of the home member state. The supervision may be carried out by 
the supervisory authority itself or through a person it may appoint. However, the Central 
Bank has the right, as the competent authority of the host member state, to carry out on 
the spot supervision of branches of banks authorized in another member state (Banking 
Law, 1997). The supervision of branches of banks from third countries is the 
responsibility of the competent authority of the country concerned. The supervisory 
authority may carry out inspections of the branch, provided the Central Bank has been 
informed and has given its consent (Banking Law, 1997).   
 
3.3.2.3 Representative Offices  
According to the Banking Law, a representative office is an office from where the 
interests of an entity to which it belongs are promoted or assisted, but at which no 
banking business is carried on. There is only one representative office in Cyprus, which 
is used exclusively to facilitate liaison activities between the head office or other 




The representative office may have the word “bank” or any grammatical variation 
of it as part of its name, provided that this is the name of the bank to which it belongs, 
and this name must be accompanied by the description “Cyprus Representative Office” 
(Banking Law, 1997). The representative office must also provide information regarding 
the activities of the office at any time that the Central Bank requests.    
 
3.3.3 Size of the Banking Sector 
Before the crisis, the Cyprus banking sector was extremely large. The total bank 
assets were equivalent to as much as nine times the country‟s GDP compared to a 
European average of 3.5 times (Central Bank of Cyprus). Countries can have large 
banking sectors for two reasons: a high level of international activity and the lack of no 
other alternative for financial intermediation. Cyprus fell into both categories.  
 
Prior to the accession in the European Union, Cyprus had a sound banking 
system that operated in a closely regulated environment , with controls on capital flows 
and interest rate ceilings, and it was primarily deposit based. In 2004, after the accession 
of the country in the European Union, the market conditions for banks changed . The controls on 
capital flows were raised and, as a result, Cyprus attracted a lot of foreign corporate 
clients, mainly due to the favourable corporate tax rate which was set at 10%. These 
foreign companies, in their turn, required significant financial services that were 
provided by Cyprus banks. Transaction revenues related to international banking have 




Cyprus banks5. Up to the crisis, banking accounted for over 8% of GDP and 4% of 
employment.  
 
Bank of Cyprus, Laiki Bank, Hellenic Bank and the Cooperatives societies took 
advantage of the liquidity abundance to expand domestically. During 2005 - 2008, domestic 
credit advanced by these banks more than doubled6. Lending continued to grow up to 2012, when it 
would have been prudent to ease off considering that the crisis was already evident. A large part of 
this lending was provided to the real estate sector which was growing due to the strong 
demand from non-residents.  
 
The rapid growth in international banking has also been accompanied by rapid 
growth in foreign deposits. Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic Bank and Laiki took advantage of the 
increased liquidity, and began to grow abroad. During the 2000‟s, Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic 
Bank and Laiki Bank moved into foreign markets primarily in Greece and to a lesser extent in 
the UK, Russia and other Eastern European countries. Hence, these banks‟ balance 
sheets expanded dramatically7.  
 
When the global financial crisis erupted in 2007, demand for Cyprus real estate began to 
fall, driving down property prices, and therefore loan collateral. Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic Bank and 
Laiki started to suffer international losses, mainly from Greece due to the country‟s worsening 
problems. An inescapable blow came in 2011, when 80% of the banks‟ holdings in Greek 
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government bonds were written off. As Greece‟s crisis deepened, the Cypriot banks‟ Greek 
operations indicated a higher level of bad debts than the domestic business8.  
 
In March of 2013, the Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated between 
the newly elected government and the European Union. A condition for securing 
financing was the “downsizing” of the banking sector. As previously mentioned, Laiki 
bank was separated into two parts, the “bad” bank and the “good bank”. The “bad bank” 
closed down and Bank of Cyprus absorbed the “good” bank. Bank of Cyprus and 
Hellenic Bank had to sell foreign operations, close a large number of domestic branches and 
reduce personnel. The reduction in personnel was achieved by offering employees voluntary 
retirement schemes9.  Cooperative societies were also consolidated down to a smaller 
number.  
 
3.4 The Geopolitical Importance of Cyprus 
Cyprus is located in the Eastern Mediterranean, at the crossroads of the Middle 
East, Asia and Africa. The country‟s strategic location has played a key role in shaping 
its history and in developing the island into a centre for trade and international business. 
Cyprus joined the European Union on May 1‟ 2004, and thus became the southern 
border of Europe with the Middle East.   
 
In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus and captured the northern part of the island 
(approximately 39% of the area). A separate Turkish Cypriot state was established in 
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1983, which is recognized only by Turkey. This political situation is a matter of 
continuing dispute. Turkey still maintains troops on the island, thus making Turkey a 
major player in the geopolitical situation of Cyprus.   
 
The republic of Cyprus has sovereignty over the government controlled area and 
its surrounding waters, except for the British Overseas territory, which is administered 
as a sovereign base area. The importance of the UK military bases is based on the 
strategic location of Cyprus at the eastern edge of the Mediterranean, close to Suez 
Canal and the Middle East and the ability to use the bases as a staging post for military 
aircrafts and training.  
 
The eastern Mediterranean is a home to vast reserves of natural gas. Noble 
energy got promising results from a gas field off the coast of Israel and from south of 
Cyprus. Cyprus is trying to cooperate with Israel to construct a pipeline that will help 
transport gas to Europe. Surveys suggest more than 5 trillion of cubic feet of reserves 
lie between Israel and Cyprus. Oil reserves of between 1.2 and 1.4 billion barrels have 
also been found below the gas deposits. Cyprus‟ energy sector currently presents the 
best opportunities for foreign investors and economic growth.  
 
Finally, due to its strategic location, Cyprus constitutes one of the largest 
shipping management centres in the world. Around fifty shipping companies are 
conducting operations in the country, and the majority of them have established fully 




three continents and its proximity to Suez Canal, has made shipping an important sector 
of the economy10. Today, the shipping sector accounts for around 6% of the country‟s 
GDP.  
 
3.5 A Brief History of the Banks Investigated in this Thesis  
The banks investigated in this study include the four banks that are listed in the 
Cyprus Stock Exchange. These are: Bank of Cyprus, Laiki Bank, Universal Savings 
Bank and Hellenic Bank. These local banks were created in order to serve the interests 
of the community which were not accommodated by the foreign banks that had already 
established branches in Cyprus. A brief history is provided next.  
  
 In1863, the Ottoman Bank, registered in Turkey, established its first branch in 
Nicosia. This institution was an Anglo – French creation and was managed by two 
committees in London and Paris (Phylaktis 1995, p.5). The Bank acted mainly as a 
banker to the government. The Bank was also involved in the financing of trade 
and for this reason it opened up branches in Larnaca and Limassol, the two main 
ports of the island. The local community and specifically farmers were not target 
customers of this institution (Phylaktis 1995, p.7). The Ottoman Bank operated until 
1967 when it was taken over by Grindlays Bank, which in its turn was taken over by the 
Cyprus Popular Bank (known until March of 2013 as Laiki). 
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 In 1926, the Ionian Bank, a British institution, commenced operations by 
setting up a branch in Nicosia and agencies in other major cities (Phylaktis 
1995, p.10). A year later, the Bank made an attempt to obtain the accounts of the 
government by offering more favourable terms but was unsuccessful (Phylaktis 
1995, p.14). For this reason it concentrated on attracting large customers because 
of economies of scale in collecting information and the low risk attached to such 
lending. These customers were a few firms in the mining industry (Phylaktis 1995, 
p.13). The Ionian Bank continued to operate until 1958 when it was taken over by the 
Chartered Bank, which in its turn was taken over by the Bank of Cyprus.   
   
  Barclays Bank also established a branch in Cyprus in 1937 (Phylaktis, 
1995, p.10). This Bank mainly supported the Central Cooperative Bank through the 
provision of an overdraft, using as security British government bonds and promissory 
notes of member societies (Phylaktis, 1995, p.14). Barclays Bank operated in Cyprus 
until 1996, when the Hellenic Bank absorbed its operations.  
 
 Due to the unwillingness of the three foreign banks to provide services to the 
local community, several local banking institutions began to be established. They were 
called savings banks, and were opened up in all the principal cities of the island. They 
had some balances with the Ottoman Bank, even though they kept a major part of 
their reserves in London (Phylaktis 1995, p.9). The local banks had an advantage 
over their foreign rivals because they had substantial knowledge of customer 




higher deposit rates. Their only disadvantage was that they did not have lender-of-
last-resort facilities from affiliated banks (Phylaktis, 1995, p.13).   
  
 When a bank crisis occurred in 1939, the Ottoman and the Barclays Bank came to 
the rescue by lending funds to the local banks under government guarantee 
(Phylaktis, 1995, p.15). The colonial government took measures to ensure safe and 
sound banking practice. Local banks followed the instructions meticulously and soon 
gained their stability. The increased strength of the local banks enabled them to 
acquire further market share. By the end of 1946 the Nicosia Savings Bank had taken 
over all the Savings Banks that had opened up, except for the Yialousa Savings Bank 
and the Popular Savings Bank of Limassol (Phylaktis, 1995, p.16). The first two 
companies are still operating today under the names of Bank of Cyprus, and Universal 
Savings Bank respectively. The Popular Savings Bank of Limassol, known as Laiki 
operated until March of 2013 when it was closed down.  
 
3.5.1 Bank of Cyprus 
Bank of Cyprus was founded on January 1‟ 1899, under the name of Nicosia 
Savings Bank. The capital of the bank was raised through small weekly deposits in 
exchange for shares. Shareholders could borrow up to 75% of their capital invested 
using their shares as a guarantee. Even though shareholders were given priority in 
loans, non-depositors could also borrow from the bank with guarantee or mortgage but 
at higher interest rates. The bank had no legal restriction over the distribution of its 




bank‟s lending to non-shareholders grew, the initial constitution with unlimited liability 
was no longer suitable. Following an application by the shareholders to the High 
Commissioner, it was recognized as a public company and was renamed Bank of 
Cyprus.   
 
The bank continued to grow rapidly by absorbing the operations of other Savings 
Banks. It also took over the Chartered Bank, which had previously taken over the Ionian 
bank, one of the first foreign banking institutions that had established branches on the 
island.  
 
Over the years, the bank has become one of the leading financial services 
organizations and it operates under the supervision and regulation of the Central Bank. It 
became listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange in 1996. In addition to full retail and 
commercial banking services, the bank has expanded in other areas such as insurance, 
fund management and corporate finance services, provision of venture capital and 
advisory services for mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructuring projects and 
factoring. The bank has also grown rapidly abroad. It has operations in London, 
Greece, Channel Islands, Australia, Romania, Bucharest, Russia and Ukraine.  
 
The bank has also proven its immense contribution to society. The employees of 
the group around the world share the vision of a more human society and have made a 
shared commitment to benefit every community where they operate. The bank has 




environment, strongly believing that this is the best possible way to support a society 
with vision and future.  
  
In 2011, the bank began to have liquidity problems and as a result was unable to 
make new loans, thereby creating a problem in the economy due to its systemic 
importance. In that year, a large portion of its investments in Greek government bonds 
was written off, which resulted in a large loss that significantly reduced the bank‟s 
capital base.  
 
In March of 2013, Bank of Cyprus had to absorb the “good part” of Laiki Bank, 
together with the large debt provided to the latter by the Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
as of 2009. In order to increase its capital base, the bank had to proceed with a “bail in” 
of 47,5% of uninsured deposits. The Bank also sold foreign operations, closed down 
branches and reduced personnel by offering voluntary retirement schemes.  
 
3.5.2 Laiki Bank  
Laiki Bank was established in 1901, under the name of Popular Savings Bank of 
Limassol. Their aim was to encourage savings among the general public, in particular 
among the workforce. In the first years of its operation, the bank accepted deposits of 
one shilling or more and granted loans on current accounts and bonds. 




In 1924, following a decision by the board of directors, the bank became an 
institution with limited liability, in accordance with the Company Law that had recently 
been enacted.   
 
At the beginning of the 1970‟s, the Hong Kong Bank, one of the largest banking 
groups in the world, acquired 21.16% of the bank shares. This cooperation gave the 
institution the ability to become an autonomous and strong organization and to expand 
rapidly, both in Cyprus and abroad. At that time, it also changed its name to the Cyprus 
Popular Bank Ltd, reflecting a truly pancyprian character. In 1982 the bank took over the 
operations of Grindlays Bank, one of the oldest and largest foreign banks that existed 
on the island. In year 2000, the Cyprus Popular Bank launched a new corporate identity 
by changing its name to Laiki Group. A milestone in the history of the Group was the 
completion of the triple merger of Laiki, Marfin and Egnatia Banks in 2008.   
 
Similar to the Bank of Cyprus, the bank grew in size through the establishment of 
branches in all major cities across the country. Laiki operated under the regulation and 
supervision of the Central Bank. It became listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange in 1996. 
In addition to the full banking retail and commercial services, it expanded in other areas 
such as hire purchasing, insurance, investments, consultancy services, factoring 
services, treasury, shipping services, stock broking and capital management. Laiki also 
expanded abroad, in Greece, United Kingdom, Australia, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, 





  Corporate social responsibility was a major strategic pillar of Laiki. It 
included a framework of policies and practices ensuring active contribution to the 
sustainable development and welfare of the societies in which it operated. 
Humanitarian contribution and solidarity, the adoption of socially responsible 
practices in all sectors of the business activities, the support of environment 
protection and sustainable development of education, culture and sports were the 
main pillars of its corporate social strategy.   
 
Similar to the Bank of Cyprus, the bank began to have liquidity problems in 2011 
and as a result was unable to make new loans, thereby creating a problem in the 
economy due to its systemic importance. In that year, a large portion of the investments 
in Greek government bonds was written off, which resulted in a large loss that 
significantly reduced the bank‟s capital base. 
 
In March of 2013, Laiki Bank was separated into two parts, the “bad” bank and 
the “good bank”. The “bad bank” closed down and Bank of Cyprus absorbed the “good” 
part of Laiki. The banks‟ foreign subsidiaries were also sold.   
 
3.5.3 Universal Savings Bank  
  Universal Savings Bank was established in 1925, under the name of Yialousa 
Savings Bank. The bank business was interrupted by the Turkish invasion in 1974, 




license to carry out banking business. Operations commenced again in March of 1990 
with financial assistance from the government.   
  
  In 1996, Universal Life Insurance Company, one of the largest insurance 
companies in Cyprus acquired 30% of the bank‟s share capital, which increased over the 
next ten years to 61.06%. Following the acquisition, the bank was renamed Universal 
Savings Bank Limited. From that time onwards a dynamic growth began, together with 
the expansion into the broader financial sector. The board of directors decided to 
perform an organizational restructuring to enable the organisation to become a fully- 
fledged commercial bank, to expand its activities to foreign exchange operations and 
commercial business as well. The customers of the bank began to have access to a full 
range of personal and business banking products and services both in Cyprus and 
abroad, either directly through the bank or through its network of foreign 
correspondents.  Universal Savings Bank has been licensed by the Central Bank of 
Cyprus and is operating under its regulation and supervision. It became listed in the 
Cyprus Stock Exchange in 1996.  
  
 At the beginning of 2007, Universal Life Insurance transferred the 50.99% of its 
share capital to Schoeller Holdings Ltd and Path Holdings Ltd, in equal shares. In 2011, 
BLC Bank SAL acquired 94,14% of the bank‟s share capital. BLC bank operates in 
Lebanon with a network of thirty five branches and is a member of the 
FRANSABANK group. The satisfactory capital adequacy and strong liquidity, the 




range of services to national and international clients represent priorities for the 
future development and profitability. As a member of the BLC group, the bank is 
expected to gain expertise and know-how from an international organisation as well 
as exploit opportunities arising from the international network of BLC customers.  
  
 The bank considers it a duty and responsibility to contribute to society and 
invest in fields that will have a positive impact on the quality of life of people. It 
contributes in the field of health, education, culture and environmental protection.  
 
3.5.4 Hellenic Bank 
 Hellenic Bank entered the market in 1976, without losses from the Turkish 
invasion. In a relatively short period of time, it has succeeded in becoming one of the 
largest financial organizations in Cyprus. In March of 1996, it acquired the onshore 
operations of Barclays Bank in Cyprus; this acquisition helped to expand the branch 
network.  Hellenic Bank has been licensed by the Central Bank of Cyprus and is 
operating under its regulation and supervision. It became listed in the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange in 1996.  
   
Besides the traditional banking services, Hellenic Bank offers a variety of other 
products such as hire purchase and leasing, factoring, insurance, investment and 
consultancy services, private banking, asset management, debt collection and sales 
management services. The bank has also been successful in expanding operations 





The Bank is a modern organisation which has devoted itself to honouring its 
commitment to society. This is why the principles of corporate social responsibility 
form an integral part of its vision and policy. Its anthropocentric nature is focused 
on giving back to society. The group is active in the fields of education, research 
and health, culture, sports and environment.  
 
3.6 Summary 
The banking sector of Cyprus is headed by the Central Bank, which is 
responsible for the supervision and inspection of the banks it has licenced. The banks in 
Cyprus are classified into three categories: local banks; branches of foreign banks (from 
EU and non- EU countries); and representative offices.  
 
The local banks are further classified as: commercial banks listed in the Stock 
Exchange; commercial banks that are foreign subsidiaries (from EU and non-EU 
countries); cooperative societies; and other banks. The category “other banks” includes 
the Cyprus Development Bank and the Housing Finance Corporation.  
 
 The commercial banks offer conventional banking services as well as other 
services such as insurance, investment, factoring and consultancy. Up to the period of 
the crisis, the commercial banking business was heavily concentrated with Bank of 
Cyprus, Laiki Bank and Hellenic Bank. The Cooperative Societies‟ primary purpose is to 
accommodate the needs of the agricultural sector. The Cooperative movement has 




banks. And, it may also grant loans to non-members. The Cyprus Development Bank‟s 
goal is to finance the manufacturing and development sectors whereas the Housing 
Finance Corporation provides long term loans for housing purposes only.  
 
Branches are places of business of a bank at which banking business is carried 
on, whereas a representative office is an office from where the interests of an entity to 
which it belongs are promoted or assisted, but at which no banking business or the 
business of accepting deposits is carried on. 
 
Finally, an empirical investigation of the Cyprus banking sector is of interest 
because of the systemic importance of banks to the economy. Banks rely mostly on 
deposits in order to raise funds and perform their financial intermediation role. For 
business, individuals and households banks are the best source of flexible funding. The 
existence of no other alternative to transfer capital between savers and lenders proves 












Chapter 4: The Cyprus Regulatory Framework  
 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 5: “Theory of Methodology” this empirical study is 
classified under the critical realism philosophy. In critical realism research, after the 
phenomenon of interest has been chosen, a researcher proceeds with a critical 
evaluation of the literature in order to develop a conceptual framework and set the 
research objectives (Zachariadis and Scott, 2010). Based on the conceptual framework 
developed from the evaluation of the earnings management literature, the research 
objectives were set as follows:   
1. Why does earnings management take place i.e. the incentives 
2. How does regulation provide opportunities for earnings management and  
3. How corporate governance and regulation can help limit such practices.   
 
Besides the conceptual framework developed from the literature review, critical 
realists argue that the assessment of government reports and other sources can also 
help build up an explanatory framework (Olsen, 2009) In critical realism research, it is 
assumed that an external reality exists, and this reality affects human activity and 
creates the phenomena observed (Wikgren, 2005). Consistent with these arguments, 
this chapter includes a critical evaluation of the legal framework that affects banks‟ 
financial reporting and provides explanations for why earnings management takes place 
at banks in Cyprus (i.e. the incentives), and how does regulation provide opportunities 




Section 4.2 explains how the regulatory framework can provide incentives for earnings 
management; Section 4.3 illustrates the opportunities for profit manipulation; and 
Section 4.4 describes how regulation can create disincentives for such practices.     
 
4.2 Incentives for Earnings Management 
The critical evaluation of the laws that affect banks‟ financial reporting in Cyprus 
has revealed that, the incentives for earnings management are: to increase profitability so 
as to increase the capital base for regulatory and internal capital adequacy purposes; attract 
and maintain shareholders and affect the stock price; compensation considerations of 
executive directors and key management personnel; and fear of dismissal.  These 
motivations are explained next.  
 
4.2.1 Capital Adequacy 
The Central Bank of Cyprus is responsible for the supervision of banks and the 
orderly functioning of the banking system11. The review and evaluation is conducted at 
least on an annual basis and it is risk based.  
 
When a bank fails to comply with any of the provisions of the Banking Law or 
with other Regulations and Directives, the governor of the Central Bank has the power 
to impose an administrative fine and where this violation continues, there is a further 
administrative fine for each day that the contravention continues. In addition, any 
director, chief executive, manager, or other employee of the bank who authorises or 
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knowingly permits the violation of any provisions of the Banking Law or any Regulations 
or Directives, shall be guilty of an offence, which is punishable by either imprisonment 
not exceeding two years or by a fine, depending on the seriousness of the 
contravention. If the violation continues, there shall be a further administrative fine for 
each day that the contravention continues. The Central Bank can also take additional 
measures to rectify matters such as imposing conditions on a bank‟s licence or restrict 
the bank‟s business in a particular way.  
 
Considering the restrictive measures or the penalties that can be imposed, it can 
be argued that banks have a strong motive to meet regulatory requirements. Therefore, 
since the Directives on Capital Adequacy Ratio and the Supervisory Review Process 
are connected to accounting reported profits, they provide an incentive for engaging in 
earnings management in order to meet the relevant provisions.  
 
4.2.1.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
The Central bank requires that banks maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio; 
this ratio is the capital base divided by risk weighted assets and off balance sheet items. 
The rationale behind maintaining adequate funds is to cover the risks to which banks 
are exposed. If a bank experiences losses that are large enough to eliminate most of 
the capital base, the bank will fail unless more capital is raised. Therefore, small capital 





The first directive for the “Computation of Banks‟ Capital Adequacy Ratio” was 
issued in January‟ 1999. At that time, the minimum capital adequacy ratio was set at 
8%. In year 2002, the required ratio was raised to 10% until year 2007 when the 
minimum was set again at 8%. As of July of 2011, the minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio 
should be at 11.5%. This increase was considered necessary because, in 2011, a large 
portion of banks‟ investments in the Greek government bonds were written off. The 
write-off resulted in large losses that significantly reduced the capital base of the banks 
exposed to Greece. In addition, the banks in Cyprus experienced multiple downgradings 
due to their large exposure in the Greek government bonds and due to the large size of 
the banking sector in Cyprus.    
 
 In its capital adequacy directive, the Central Bank prescribes the items that 
should be included in the numerator and the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio.  
 
The numerator includes the capital base. The capital base comprises of Tier 1 
core capital, Tier 2 supplementary capital and Tier 3 capital less deductions from 
capital. Tier 1 core capital includes ordinary share capital and perpetual non-cumulative 
preference shares, share premium, retained earnings, government subordinated loan, 
reserves (except revaluation reserves), minority interest less goodwill, other intangible 
assets and own shares held by the bank. Tier 2 supplementary capital comprises of 
revaluation reserves (including revaluation of premises), hybrid capital instruments, 




arising from participations in Tier 2 capital. Tier 3 capital must consist of subordinated 
loan capital with a maturity of no less than two years.    
 
The denominator of the ratio comprises of risk weighted assets and off balance 
sheet items. Banks are given instructions regarding the classification of their assets into 
categories that carry risk weightings of 0%, 20%, 50% and 100%. Directions are also 
provided concerning the classification of off balance sheet items into groups of full, 
medium, medium to low and low risk.  
  
  The capital adequacy ratio can be managed if a bank changes the numerator, 
the denominator or both. For example, banks may pursue capital strengthening through 
the management of risk weighted assets or the increase in share capital. There are 
various elements included in the ratio, which provide banks with a lot of flexibility to 
manage its calculation. Where such management takes place, it would qualify as 
capital adequacy ratio management.  
 
However, the purpose of this study is to investigate earnings management. The 
retained earnings are included in the capital base (numerator). Hence, one way for 
banks to increase both their capital adequacy ratio is with profitability. Another element 
of the capital base, which is also part of calculating accounting profits, is the loan loss 
provisions. If managers increase their loan loss provisions, the profits will go down by 1 
– tax rate, whereas the capital base will increase by the amount of the loan loss 




increasing and hence the capital adequacy ratio will go up. Therefore, the directive for 
capital adequacy provides an incentive for earnings management and for management 
of loan loss provisions, so long as the provisions do not exceed the 50% requirement of 
the total of risk weighted assets and off balance sheet items.   
 
4.2.1.2 Supervisory Review Process  
The directive for the “Calculation of the Capital Requirements and Large 
Exposures of Banks” was issued in December 2006‟, in line with Basel II. Basel II 
comprises of three pillars. Pillar 1 includes the guidelines for calculating the minimum 
capital requirements in order to cover the credit, market and operational risks. Pillar 2, 
the supervisory review process, includes rules to ensure that additional capital is held to 
cover risks which are not sufficiently covered by minimum capital requirements, such as 
residual risk, credit concentration risk, business and strategy risk and any external 
factors affecting the bank. Pillar 3 deals with required disclosures to allow market 
participants to assess important information about the capital structure, risk exposures, 
risk assessment processes and the capital adequacy of banks.  
  
Pillar 2, the supervisory review process includes two elements: the supervisory 
review evaluation process and the internal capital adequacy assessment process.   
  
The supervisory review and evaluation process is conducted at least annually 
and it is risk based. Based on its review, the Central Bank may classify banks into four 




Medium -; and Low. The systemic importance and the riskiness of a bank are assessed 
at the domestic banking system and at the banking group level12. 
 
The evaluation of the systemic importance of a bank at the domestic banking 
system level considers both quantitative and qualitative criteria. The market share in 
deposits is the most important quantitative criterion. The qualitative criteria include 
whether the bank is an integral part of the payments and the clearing system and 
whether the credit institution provides liquidity to the banking system.  
   
The evaluation of the systemic importance of a bank at the banking group level 
also includes both quantitative and qualitative criteria. The quantitative criteria include 
total income, profit or loss before tax, regulatory capital and total assets. The qualitative 
criteria include the strategic significance of the bank for the whole group and the level of 
autonomy that the credit institution maintains.   
 
As part of the capital management strategy, banks must assess the level of 
capital held against risks through the Internal Capital Assessment Process (ICAAP). 
The process involves the review of risk management processes, stress testing capital 
levels through various scenarios of profitability, growth in risk weighted assets as well 
as the assessment of capital level against risks, in addition to those covered under Pillar 
1. The Central Bank must also evaluate the ICAAP design methodology, the 
                                                 
12






assumptions made, the stress tests carried out and the adequacy of own funds held to 
cover risks.  
 
Based on its supervisory review, the Central Bank draws conclusions about the 
adequacy of the capital held and the coverage of risks. If weaknesses are identified, 
measures may be imposed such as:  obliging the bank to hold own funds in excess of 
the minimum capital requirements; requiring the reduction of risk inherent in the 
activities together with a reinforcement of internal control and risk management policies.  
   
Considering that one of the measures that can be imposed is to increase own 
funds over the minimum regulatory requirement, an incentive for earnings management 
is created. As previously explained, accounting earnings are included in the capital 
base; when profits are increased, the capital base also increases and hence the risks 
are adequately covered.   
 
4.2.2 Company Law 
According to the Company Law, like any other organization, a bank‟s principal 
goal is to maximize shareholders‟ wealth, which is measured by the market value of the 
stock. The market value in its turn depends on the amount of dividends paid. Since 
dividends are paid out of profits, any information concerning profitability may cause 
investors to change expectations and decide whether to buy, hold or sell their shares. 
For example, information that loan loss provisions have decreased because of a strong 




also assess how much wealth has been generated and can potentially be distributed to 
them, by using accounting ratios such as earnings per share, basic and diluted.  
 
Maximization of shareholders‟ wealth also helps to attract prospective investors. 
An increase in share capital provides banks with another advantage; it increases the 
capital base and thus the capital adequacy ratio rises.  
 
Therefore, maximizing shareholders wealth, maintaining the ability to pay 
dividends and attracting new investors are motivations for earnings management.    
 
4.2.3 Director‟s Remuneration 
The remuneration of executive and non-executive board members and of key 
management personnel is handled by the remuneration committee. This committee 
should be composed wholly or by a majority of non-executive and independent 
directors, in order to provide assurance to shareholders and other stakeholders13. The 
committee‟s suggestions take into consideration the relevant responsibilities, workload, 
qualifications, academic background, experience, individual performance and 
remuneration of comparable positions in the market. The committee's aim is to attract 
and retain good quality officers at executive and general management levels, in order to 
better serve the interests of the bank, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
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The level of remuneration of non-executive directors is based on the time spent 
to attend meetings and the responsibilities of each member. Non-executive 
remuneration is not correlated to the profitability of the bank. Non-executives receive 
only fees and do not participate in any insurance or pension plan. Therefore the 
compensation of non-executive directors provides no incentives for earnings 
management.  
 
The remuneration package of executive directors and key management 
personnel includes both variable and non-variable components14. The non-variable 
component includes an annual salary payable monthly. The variable elements consist of 
performance related payments such as bonuses and stock options and non-
performance related compensation such as pensions, hospitality expenses, insurance 
cover and the use of a company car. The term „performance‟ encompasses the 
evaluation of the individual performance as well as the performance of the bank in 
relation to the achievement of its targets and profitability.  
 
The connection of executives‟ and key managers‟ remuneration to profitability 
clearly creates an incentive for earnings management. Where a bonus scheme exists, it 
provides an incentive to manage earnings upwards in order to earn the bonus. Equity 
based compensation can also motivate income increasing earnings management. For 
example, a manager that wishes to sell shares acquired under a stock option plan will 
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be inclined to make income increasing choices in order to increase the current stock 
price.   
 
4.2.4 Job Security Concerns  
Bank boards and managers are concerned about profitability not only because of 
profit sharing plans, but because profitability informs shareholders about the quality of 
their decisions. Profitability increases the shareholders‟ wealth. Entrusted by the owners 
to achieve this, bank managers have to ensure that their decisions are in accordance 
with the target fixed by the owners. The CEO and other senior managers can be 
removed from office if they have caused damages from breach of any contract between 
them and the bank15. Shareholders can also remove executive board members at the 
annual general meeting. The Central Bank also has the right to fire board members or 
the CEO if it considers that the bank is not properly run. The regular monitoring of net 
income enables corrective measures to be taken before the situation deteriorates. 
Therefore, job security concerns play a role in managing accounting profits.   
 
4.3 Opportunities for Earnings Management   
The consolidated financial statements of a bank and its subsidiaries include the 
balance sheet, the income statement, the statement of comprehensive income, the 
statement of changes in equity, the statement of cash flows and a summary of 
significant accounting policies and other explanatory information. 
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The financial statements are prepared in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards, the requirements of the Company Law and the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange Laws and Regulations.  
 
The layout of banks‟ financial statements must be in accordance with the format 
prescribed in the directive on the “Layout and Contents of Banks‟ Annual Accounts” 
(Central Bank of Cyprus, 1999), whereas the cash flow statement is prepared in 
accordance with the International Accounting Standards. The Central Bank does not 
allow banks to change the layout and the format of the profit and loss from one financial 
year to the next. The items must be presented in the order specified. New items may be 
added only if their contents are not covered by any of the items prescribed by the 
directive. Furthermore, any set-off between income and expenditure items in the profit 
and loss account is prohibited. Income statement items can be combined only if the 
amounts are immaterial for the purposes of presenting the true and fair view. However, 
the combined items must be disclosed separately in the notes to the accounts. 
Therefore, if banks are required to follow the prescribed format so strictly, the 
opportunity for classificatory earnings management is eliminated.   
 
The preparation of financial statements, including the income statement requires 
management to make use of judgements, estimates and assumptions that affect the 
reported amounts of assets, liabilities, income and expenses. The estimates and 
underlying assumptions are based on historical experience and various other factors 




basis of making judgments about the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities that are 
not readily apparent from other sources. Actual results may differ from these estimates. 
The income statement items over which discretion can be exercised, and therefore can 
be used to manage earnings are explained next.  
 
4.3.1 Loans and Advances to Customers  
With respect to loans and advances to customers, banks can exercise discretion 
over the following: loan loss provisions, loan impairments, classification of loans as non 
performing and loan restructuring16  
 
One of the most discretionary expenses that appear on banks‟ income 
statements is loan loss provision. Banks evaluate individually significant loans 
separately, but most of the loans in the portfolio are evaluated collectively. This 
evaluation is subject to estimation uncertainty, partly because it is not practicable to 
identify losses on an individual loan basis and because of the large number of loans in 
each portfolio. Loss rates are based on historical experience. In normal circumstances, 
historical experience provides the most objective and relevant information from which to 
assess the loss within each portfolio. However, historical loss experience provides less 
relevant information about the incurred loss in a given portfolio if economic, regulatory 
or behavioural conditions have changed. In these circumstances, such factors are taken 
into account when calculating the appropriate levels of loan loss provisions. It is 
possible that the actual results in the next financial year are different from the 
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assumptions made, resulting in a material adjustment to the carrying amount of loans 
and advances. Different factors are also applied in each country to reflect the local 
economic conditions, laws and regulations. Therefore, the total amount of the bank‟s 
loan loss provisions is uncertain because it is highly sensitive to changes in economic 
and credit conditions across a number of geographical areas. Thus, if the level of the 
loan loss provision is discretionary, the charge on the income statement can be 
managed.   
 
At each balance sheet date, banks assess whether there is objective evidence 
that loans and advances to customers have been impaired. An impairment test is first 
made for loans and advances that are individually significant. The evaluation is based 
on the customer‟s overall financial condition, payment record, the prospect of support 
from creditworthy guarantors and the net realisable value of any collateral. Furthermore, 
a collective impairment assessment is made for loans and advances that are not 
individually significant. For the purpose of collective impairment tests, loans are grouped 
based on similar credit risk characteristics taking into account the type of the loan, 
geographic location, past-due days and other relevant factors. Future cash flows for a 
group of loans and advances that are tested for impairment are estimated on the basis 
of historical loss experience. Historical loss experience is adjusted to reflect the impact 
of current conditions that did not exist in the period of the historical loss experience and 
to remove the impact of conditions in the historical period that do not currently exist. The 
impairment loss is measured as the difference between the carrying amount of the loan 




may arise from guarantees and collateral. If, in a subsequent period, the estimated 
impairment loss decreases and the decrease is due to the improvement of the 
creditworthiness of the customer to such an extent that there is reasonable assurance 
that all or part of the principal and interest will be collected timely, the previously 
recognised impairment loss is reversed. Loan impairment is highly discretionary since it 
involves judgments and estimates and can therefore be used to manage earnings.  
 
Interest income from non-performing loans may provide an opportunity to 
manage the income recognised on the income statement. Interest from non-performing 
loans should be credited in the loan loss reserves, which is shown as a deduction from 
the loans and receivables on the balance sheet. However, according to the Central 
Bank, credit facilities, which are fully secured by property, are not classified as non-
performing, regardless of whether customers have exceeded their approved limits or 
have missed payments of instalments and interest for more than three months17.In 
addition, a credit facility which has been classified as non-performing ceases to be 
considered doubtful if the customer provides the bank with additional collateral so that 
there is no longer a security gap. Collaterals are valued by independent qualified 
individuals, but the appraisal is subject to discretion. Therefore, optimistic collateral 
values may allow banks to classify credit facilities as performing and thus, continue to 
report interest income on the income statement. In this way, the reported profits are 
increased.  
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Furthermore, credit facilities that could be classified as non-performing can be 
renegotiated. A renegotiation can be made either through the granting of new credit 
facilities or through a readjustment of the repayment schedule. Through loan 
restructurings, banks can avoid classifying credit facilities as non-performing and 
therefore continue to recognise interest income on the income statement. Higher 
interest income results in reporting higher profits.  
 
4.3.2 Investments  
With respect to investments, banks can exercise discretion over the following 
items: sale, revaluation, impairment and reclassification18.    
 
As a general rule, investments are bought to produce income in the form of 
interest or dividends and capital gains. By buying bonds and shares, interest and 
dividend income are secured over an extended period of time. If managers expect 
interest rates or share prices to change, they can sell securities to report gains or 
diminish adverse effects on bank profits. Investment securities can be sold at 
management‟s discretion since no one can really challenge them as to whether they 
have made the right decision or not. Therefore, disposal of investments can be timed 
and thus be used as an opportunity to manage earnings.  
 
Investments held for trading or designated at fair value through profit and loss 
are recognised at fair value on the balance sheet day and any unrealised gains or 
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losses are reported on the income statement. The best evidence of fair value is a 
quoted price (Level 1). Therefore, where investments are actively traded, the fair value 
and the unrealised gains or losses are not subject to manipulation. If the market for a 
financial instrument is not active, a valuation technique is used (Level 2). Level 2 
techniques include comparisons with similar financial instruments for which market 
observable prices exist, discounted cash flow analysis and other valuation techniques 
commonly used by market participants. Level 2 valuation techniques are based on 
observable market data, and the fair value measurement is considered highly reliable. 
For investments that similar financial instruments do not exist, valuations rely on non- 
observable inputs (Level 3). Level 3 valuation techniques are therefore discretionary 
and thus unrealised gains and losses are likely to be used for earnings management.  
 
Available-for-sale investments in equity securities are impaired when there has 
been a significant or prolonged decline in their fair value below cost. The determination 
of what is significant or prolonged requires managerial judgment. The factors which are 
considered in impairment tests include the expected volatility in share prices and any 
evidence that significant adverse changes have taken place in the economic or legal 
environment in which the investee operates.   
   
Available-for-sale, held to maturity investments in debt securities and other loans 
and receivables are impaired when there is objective evidence of impairment as a result 
of events that have occurred after the initial recognition of the investment and these 




an impairment review takes into account a number of factors such as the financial 
condition of the issuer, any breach of contract, the probability that the issuer will enter 
bankruptcy or reorganisation. Hence, impairment reviews involve a high degree of 
judgment. 
 
If, in a subsequent period, the fair value of an impaired debt security increases 
and the increase can be objectively related to an event occurring after the impairment 
loss, the impairment loss is reversed and taken to the income statement. Reversal of 
impairment losses for equity securities are shown in equity. Considering that impairment 
reviews involve managerial judgement and estimates, impairment losses and their 
reversal can be used to manage earnings.  
 
According to IFRS 7 “Financial instruments: Disclosure” it is permissible to 
reclassify investments out of the “fair value through profit or loss” or “trading” categories 
and reclassify them into the “held to maturity” and “loans and receivables” categories. 
For assets to be reclassified there must be an intent and ability to hold the asset for the 
foreseeable future at the reclassification date. The change of intent to hold for the 
foreseeable future requires management judgment. Management judgment and 
assumptions are also required to determine whether an active market does not exist in 
order for an investment to meet the definition of loans and receivables. Management 
judgment and assumptions are also required to estimate the fair value of the assets 
identified at the date of reclassification, which becomes the amortised cost base under 




A reclassification of investments to “loans and receivables” has an effect on the 
income statement. Unrealised gains and losses for assets previously held for “trading” 
or designated “at fair value through profit and loss” are no longer recorded. After the 
reclassification, interest income is recorded on the income statement using the effective 
interest rate method that is now based on the fair value, which as mentioned before, 
requires managerial judgment. The reclassified items are also tested for impairment at 
each balance sheet date, which again involves assumptions and estimates. Hence 
reclassifications can be used to manage earnings. 
 
4.3.3 Insurance  
With reference to insurance, discretion can be exercised over the adequacy of 
insurance liabilities19. 
 
At each balance sheet date, the adequacy of insurance liabilities is tested. The 
principal risk faced under insurance contracts is that insurance events are random, and 
the actual amount of claims may exceed the insurance liabilities. Any increase in 
insurance liabilities is recognised on the income statement.  
 
The liabilities for general insurance contracts are calculated based on estimates 
and facts known at the balance sheet date. The estimates are based on past 
experience and market trends, and take into consideration claims handling costs, 
inflation and number of accident claims each year. Other external factors that may affect 
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the estimate of claims are recent court rulings and the introduction of new legislation. 
For life insurance plans, the estimates are based on past experience, mortality 
assumptions, epidemics, lifestyle changes, terminations, administration expenses and 
expected investment returns. The adequacy of insurance liabilities involves many 
assumptions that are difficult to quantify. Therefore, the adequacy of the insurance 
liability and the amount taken to the income statement can be managed.  
 
4.3.4 Investment Properties  
With reference to investment properties, discretion can be exercised over their 
fair value measurement and the timing of their sale20.  
 
Investment properties are held for rental income and capital appreciation. 
Therefore, banks may choose to time the sale of investment properties in order to report 
gains or diminish adverse effects on profits.  
 
At each balance sheet date, investment properties are measured at fair value 
and any unrealised gain or loss is reported on the income statement. The best evidence 
of fair value is the current price in an active market for similar property, in the same 
location and condition. In the absence of a current price, a bank considers information 
from a variety of sources such as: recent prices of similar properties in less active 
markets with adjustments to reflect changes in the economic conditions since the day of 
the transactions; discounted projected cash flows, using discount rates that reflect 
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current market uncertainty and; current prices in an active market of different properties 
adjusted to reflect those differences. The accounting standard encourages but does not 
require banks to have the valuations carried out by independent qualified valuers. 
Hence, if a current price in an active market does not exist, revaluation gains and losses 
of investment properties can be used to manage profits.  
 
4.3.5 Staff Costs 
The staff costs that may be used to manage profitability include the retirement 
benefit plan costs and the cost of share-based payments21.   
 
The banks included in the sample provide to their permanent employees defined 
benefit retirement plans. Under such plans, the cost recognised in the profit and loss is 
the net of the following amounts: current service cost; interest cost; expected return on 
plan assets; actuarial gains and losses; past service cost; and effects of settlements 
and curtailments. As explained below, all these elements require judgment and 
estimates.  
 
Current service cost is the increase in the present value of the defined benefit 
obligation, which is an estimate itself. Banks estimate their defined benefit obligation by 
reference to the employees‟ salaries and length of service until retirement. Future salary 
estimates are based on inflation, seniority, promotion and supply and demand in the 
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employment market. The length of service takes into account mortality, disability, early 
retirement and employee turnover.   
 
Interest cost equals the present value of the defined benefit obligation times the 
discount rate. Banks have a choice over the discount rate which they can use i.e. the 
discount rate of a high quality bond or where this is absent the rate of a government 
bond.  
 
Expected return on plan assets is based on forward-looking assumptions, 
reflecting market conditions and future expectations at the balance sheet date. 
Adjustments are made annually based on revised expectations of future investment 
performance of plan assets or changes to local legislation that affect investment 
strategy.   
 
Net actuarial gains and losses are recognized in the profit and loss if they exceed 
the greater of: 10% of the present value of the defined benefit obligation or 10% of the 
fair value of the plan assets. This item is amortized and taken to the income statement 
over the expected average remaining working lives of the employees participating in the 
plan.  
 
Similar to actuarial gains and losses, any past service cost resulting from 
introduction or changes to the post employment benefit is amortised over the expected 




Curtailments and settlements are recognised when the events actually occur i.e. 
when the defined benefits are significantly reduced or settled.  
 
Most of the elements included in the defined benefit cost are based on 
assumptions, and therefore this item is manageable. The defined benefit obligation is 
based on future salaries and expected length of service; future salary increases take 
into account promotions and inflation; there is a choice over the rate used to discount 
the defined benefit obligation; return on plan assets is based on forward looking 
assumptions and; finally the actuarial gains and losses and past service cost can be 
amortised over the expected working period of plan participants. Due to the long term 
nature of these plans all these estimates are uncertain and can be used to manage 
earnings.  
 
The cost of share options is measured by reference to the fair value on the grant 
date22. The fair value is determined using option pricing models. The main variables 
taken into account are: the current share price, the exercise price, the expected 
dividend yield, the risk free rate of return, and the expected life period over which to 
allocate the cost of options and the expected share price volatility. There is a 
reasonable range within which these expectations may fall, and they should also be 
weighted by probability of occurrence. For example, the expected exercise life could be 
short if people are assumed to be risk averse and the options are non-transferable. 
People would then be expected to exercise and sell quickly to liquidate their position. 
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Considering that the fair value and hence the cost of share based payments includes 
judgements and expectations, it may be assumed that this item can be used to manage 
earnings.    
 
4.3.6 Property, Plant and Equipment 
With reference to property, plant and equipment, discretion can be exercised 
over depreciation and impairment23.  
 
Upon entry of property, plant and equipment in the books, a depreciation 
schedule is established, which includes the depreciation method, the useful life of the 
asset and the residual value. Banks can choose from a variety of depreciation methods, 
such as straight line, diminishing balance and units of output. The choice of method 
should reflect the pattern in which the assets‟ future economic benefits are expected to 
be consumed. The residual value is the estimated amount expected to be received 
when the assets are removed from service. The useful life is the period over which 
assets are expected to produce economic benefits. Depreciation methods, useful lives 
and residual values are reassessed at each reporting date and may be revised. 
Therefore, depreciation involves choices and estimates which can be used to manage 
profitability. 
 
At the balance sheet date, banks may value long lived assets at cost or fair 
value. Any surplus arising on revaluation is taken to a property revaluation reserve in 
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equity. Depreciation however is calculated on the re-valued amount. A revaluation will 
increase the depreciable base and hence depreciation. Since it is possible to reassess 
depreciation schedules at each balance sheet date, the estimated life of revalued asset 
can be reassessed on the grounds that the revaluation is an indication of an extension 
of the assets‟ useful life. In this way, the depreciation recognized can be decreased.  
 
At the balance sheet date, property, plant and equipment are also tested for 
impairment when evidence indicates that the carrying value may not be recovered. 
Impairment loss is the difference between the carrying amount and the recoverable 
amount. The recoverable amount is the higher of the fair value less costs to sell or the 
value in use. Fair value less costs to sell is the expected selling price of the asset less 
expected selling expenses. The value in use is the present value of cash flows expected 
to be generated from the asset, including proceeds from its disposal. If in a future year, 
there is evidence that the recoverable amount is higher than the carrying amount of the 
asset, it may be reversed. The determination of whether there is evidence that an 
asset‟s carrying amount is lower than the recoverable amount requires managerial 
judgment. The level of the recoverable amount requires managerial estimates. 
Therefore, impairment loss and its subsequent reversal are manageable. Where banks 
have chosen to carry certain groups of assets at fair value, the impairment loss does not 
impact profitability because it is deducted from the revaluation reserve. Impairment can 
also indicate that the useful life or the residual value needs to be revised. Thus, it gives 
an opportunity to managers to change estimates and manage the depreciation recorded 




4.3.7 Intangible Assets 
With reference to intangible assets, discretion can be exercised over their 
amortization and impairment24.   
 
When intangible assets are acquired, an amortization schedule must be 
established, which includes the amortization method, the useful life and the residual 
value. Banks can choose from a variety of amortization methods, such as straight line, 
diminishing balance and units of output. The choice of method should reflect the pattern 
in which the assets‟ future economic benefits are expected to be consumed. The 
residual value is usually zero, unless there is a commitment by another company to buy 
the asset at the end of its useful life. The useful life reflects the period over which 
intangibles are expected to contribute to cash flows. If there are no factors that limit the 
useful life of intangible assets (i.e. contractual or legal), the life is indefinite and there is 
no amortization. Amortization methods, useful lives and residual values are reassessed 
at each reporting date and may be revised. Therefore, amortization involves choices 
and estimates, which can be used to manage profitability.     
 
At the balance sheet date, intangible assets are tested for impairment when 
evidence indicates that the carrying value may not be recovered. The impairment rules 
that apply to property, plant and equipment also apply to limited life intangibles. 
Therefore, impairment loss for intangibles can also be used to manage earnings.  
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Goodwill is considered to have an indefinite life and it is not amortized, but it is 
reviewed for impairment annually. However, because goodwill generates cash flows in 
combination with other assets, impairment is conducted for the cash generating units to 
which goodwill is assigned. The cash flow forecasts of the acquired entities reflect 
management‟s view of future business prospects. The cost of capital assigned to each 
acquired entity and used to discount its future cash flows, can have a significant effect 
on the calculation of the value in use. The cost of capital is generally derived from a 
capital asset pricing model, which incorporates inputs reflecting a number of financial 
and economic variables, including the risk-free interest rate in the country concerned, a 
premium to reflect the inherent risk of the business being evaluated and foreign 
exchange rates. These variables are established on the basis of significant 
management judgment and are subject to uncertainty. The impairment of goodwill is 
taken to the income statement and can therefore be used for earnings management.  
 
4.3.8 Associate Companies 
With reference to investments in associate companies, discretion can be 
exercised over their impairment25.  
  
At each balance sheet date, investments in associate companies must be tested 
for impairment as a single asset. In determining the value in use, a bank can either 
estimate its share of the present value of the cash flows expected to be generated by 
the associate, including cash flows from its disposal or; the present value of expected 
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cash flows to be received from dividends and the disposal of the investment. The cash 
flow forecasts are based on management‟s view of future business prospects. The cost 
of capital used to discount the cash flows incorporates inputs reflecting a number of 
financial and economic variables. The impairment of associates is taken to the income 
statement and since it involves estimates it can be used for earnings management.  
 
4.3.9 Derivatives 
With reference to derivatives, banks can exercise their discretion over the timing 
of their use or revaluation26.  
 
The accounting treatment of derivatives depends on the reason for their 
purchase i.e. whether they have been bought for speculation or hedging. If derivatives 
have been bought for speculative purposes, then managers are expected to use 
derivatives to report gains or diminish adverse effects on bank profits. Therefore, usage 
of derivatives can be timed and thus can be used as an instrument to manage earnings.  
 
On the balance sheet date, derivatives are shown at fair value. The unrealised 
gains and losses from derivatives bought for speculation and derivatives designated as 
fair value hedges are recognised on the income statement. The best evidence of fair 
value is a quoted price (Level 1). Therefore, where derivatives are actively traded, the 
fair value and the unrealised gains or losses are not subject to manipulation. If the 
market for a derivative is not active, a valuation technique is used (Level 2). Level 2 
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techniques include recent arm‟s length transactions between knowledgeable and willing 
parties, reference to the current fair value of an instrument which is substantially the 
same and discounted cash flows. There is very little reliance on estimates and therefore 
the fair value measurement is highly reliable. For derivatives that similar financial 
instruments do not exist, valuations rely on non- observable inputs (Level 3). Level 3 
valuation techniques are discretionary and thus unrealised gains and losses are likely to 
be used for earnings management.  
 
Derivatives designated as cash flow hedges are recognised at fair value, and the 
effective portion is included in other comprehensive income. Any ineffective portion is 
taken to the income statement. Hedges are considered to be highly effective if the ratio 
of gains to losses on the hedging transaction is in the range of 80% to 125%. Where the 
fair value of hedges and the fair values of financial assets hedged can be measured 
reliably (Level 1 and Level 2), the effective and ineffective portions of the hedging 
relationship can be measured reliably. Thus, opportunity to manage earnings by 
keeping ineffective gains or losses in other comprehensive income is minimized. Where 
Level 3 inputs are used, they may be used to manage the effectiveness of the cash flow 
hedging relationship, and thus keep unrealised gains or losses off the income 
statement. 
 
4.3.10 Taxation    
Banks account for revenues and expenses according to International Accounting 




which is a financial reporting item. The tax expense that is recognised on the income 
statement is the pre-tax accounting profit multiplied by the corporate tax rate; the 
corporate tax rate used for banks and their subsidiaries that are residents in Cyprus is 
10%, whereas for foreign operations the tax rate used is the corporate tax rate of the 
country where business is carried out. The tax expense is therefore a financial reporting 
item.  
 
The taxable profit is determined by the tax authorities. This equals the taxable 
revenues less the taxable expenses. The tax payable is calculated by reference to the 
taxable profit times the corporate tax rate. The tax payable is not equal to the tax 
expense due to temporary differences. Temporary differences arise from differences in 
property revaluation, depreciation and amortization, estimates of loan loss provisions , 
investment revaluation, unutilized tax credits, finance leases and other temporary 
differences.   
 
Where the tax payable is lower than the tax expense, a deferred tax liability is 
recognised; similarly, when the tax payable is higher than the tax expense, a deferred 
tax asset is recorded. In subsequent years, when the temporary differences reverse, the 
previously created assets and liabilities are decreased. Therefore, the tax expense 
recognised on the income statement is not affected.  
   
Besides company tax, banks are also obliged to pay other taxes such as the 




shareholders (70% of the profits after tax), special levy tax, which is based on qualifying 
deposits, and capital gains tax from the sale of immovable property. All these taxes are 
determined by tax authorities and cannot be managed.   
 
What does have an impact on the tax expense is permission to carry-forward tax 
loss over a period of five years. For a carry-forward an accounting entry is required, 
which increases the deferred tax asset and decreases the tax expense27. Hence, 
profitability is increased.  
   
 At each balance sheet date, the carrying amount of deferred tax asset must be 
reviewed28. If based on available evidence, it is probable that some portion of the 
deferred tax asset will not be realised, then it must be reduced. The determination of 
whether the deferred tax asset is impaired is based on expectations such as: whether 
the bank has sufficient taxable temporary differences which will result in higher taxable 
profits in the future or whether tax planning opportunities are available that will create 
future taxable profit. When the deferred tax asset is reduced, an accounting entry is 
required, which decreases the deferred tax asset and increases the tax expense. The 
subjective nature of determining the impairment for a deferred tax asset therefore 
provides an opportunity for earnings management.      
 
In summary, the opportunities to manage bank profits include: loan loss provisions, 
loan restructuring and loan classification as non-performing; sale of assets; adequacy of 
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insurance liabilities; depreciation and amortization; revaluation of investment properties; 
defined benefit plan costs and stock based compensation; impairment of assets; unrealized 
gains losses of investments and derivatives (Level 3 inputs); and reduction of deferred tax 
asset.   
 
4.4 Disincentives for Earnings Management 
The critical evaluation of the laws that affect banks‟ financial reporting in Cyprus 
has revealed that, the disincentives for earnings management arise from: the penalties 
that can be imposed as per the Cyprus Stock Exchange and Company Laws; effective 
boards; effective audit committees; inside ownership; active engagement and dialogue by 
shareholders; the quality of the audit and the relationship of the auditors with the Central 
Bank and; supervision and inspection by the Central Bank. These disincentives are explained 
next.  
 
4.4.1 Board of Directors 
The ultimate responsibility for the preparation of financial statements rests with 
bank boards. Board members must make sure that the final accounts present a true and 
fair view in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, the 
requirements of the Cyprus Company Law and the Cyprus Stock Exchange Laws.    
 
More specifically, bank boards are required to submit information that is not false, 
misleading or illusory29. The directors are also responsible for reviewing, at least 
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annually, the procedures used to confirm the accuracy, completeness and validity of the 
information provided to investors. The rationale behind placing issuers under strict 
scrutiny is to prevent them from engaging in dubious acts that may negatively impact 
the interests of the investors. In addition, by providing accurate information concerning 
its activities, a bank can ensure the equal treatment of investors and help them make 
knowledgeable assessments of the securities' value. In this manner the exploitation of 
inside information is prevented, thus preventing insiders from making abnormal profits 
at the expense of small investors. Where information published is misleading or false, it 
constitutes an offence that is punished with imprisonment up to two years or with a fine 
or with both sentences. In such cases the Cyprus Stock Exchange may require the bank 
to restate its financial statements. In addition, any director or other person who has 
participated in the preparation of the misleading financial statements shall be liable to 
pay compensation to all investors who have sustained a loss due to any untrue 
statements. These sanctions, and particularly imprisonment, should encourage 
increased board effectiveness. As explained next, board effectiveness can be achieved 
by independence, splitting of the role of the chairman and the CEO, board size, board 
meetings and fitness and probity.     
 
4.4.1.1 Board Independence  
The board of directors should have a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors. At least 50% of the members of the board of directors, excluding the 
chairman, must be independent, non-executive directors30. If the 50% rule is not met, 
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then at least one third of the directors must be independent and a relevant application 
must be submitted to the Cyprus Stock Exchange to be granted a reasonable period for 
compliance. Independent, non-executive directors should sign a „Confirmation of 
Independence‟ in accordance with Corporate Governance Code and this has to be 
submitted to the Cyprus Stock Exchange together with the report on corporate 
governance.  
 
One non-executive and independent director should be appointed to be the 
senior independent director. The senior independent director should be available to 
shareholders if they have concerns which, board members or senior executive 
management have not resolved. The non-executive and independent director must 
maintain independence and clearly express opposition when the board makes decisions 
about which he / she has serious reservations.    
 
Furthermore, it is recommended that the non-executive and independent 
directors meet, at least annually, with the external auditor and the heads of the internal 
audit, compliance and legal functions. Such meetings can strengthen the ability of the 
board to monitor senior management because they enable non-executive directors to 
ensure that the bank's obligations towards its shareholders and other stakeholders are 
understood and are met. Therefore, the presence of non-executive and independent 





All non-executive directors should resign at regular intervals, at least every three 
years, and submit their names for re-election, accompanied by biographical details to 
help shareholders make an informed decision31. It can be argued that re-election of non-
executive, independent directors can be a factor that limits managerial ability to act 
opportunistically. This is because independent directors who serve the board for a 
certain period of time have a better understanding of the firm and its people and hence 
can monitor managerial performance more effectively (Peasnell et al. 2000).   
 
4.4.1.2 Splitting the Role of the Chairman and the CEO 
The roles of chairman and CEO should not be exercised by the same 
individual32. If these positions are not separated, there should be an explanation in the 
corporate governance report. When the roles are not split, more power is concentrated 
in the CEO‟s position, potentially allowing for more management discretion. The dual 
office structure also permits the CEO to effectively control information available to other 
board members and thus impedes effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, the 
separation between the CEO and the chairman of the board position provides an 
essential check and balance over the management‟s performance.  
 
4.4.1.3 Board Size  
The board of directors should have an adequate number of members and 
appropriate composition so as to exercise judgement independently of senior executive 
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management, political or other outside interests and from influences of dominant 
shareholders33. There is an argument that smaller boards are more effective monitors 
because they are able to communicate effectively and make timely strategic decisions 
(Goodstein et al., 1994). On the other hand, larger boards can be more capable of 
monitoring the actions of top management because more members with varied 
expertise can increase the synergistic monitoring of the board and reduce the incidence 
of earnings management (Xie et al., 2003).  
 
4.4.1.4 Board Meetings  
The board of directors must call one annual general meeting and as many 
extraordinary general meetings as they see fit34. Board members should dedicate the 
required time and attention in order to carry out their duties properly and for this reason 
they should limit the number of positions in board of directors of other companies. The 
board should meet regularly, at least six times a year35.   
 
In all instances, it must be ensured that all board members are informed in 
writing about forthcoming meetings and have all the necessary documents in time to 
review them before the meetings. The annual accounts together with the auditor‟s report 
shall be presented at the annual general meeting. Managers have an obligation to 
provide the board with timely, reliable and accurate information. The CFO must also 
submit to the board for review, information concerning the selection of accounting 
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policies and accounting estimates for the company's financial statements, pointing out 
all consequences of the final decision. Where boards detect problems, they should 
require timely correction. Consequently, active boards with sufficient supply of 
information will be in a better position to monitor management and hence control 
earnings management.  
 
4.4.1.5 Fitness and Probity of Board Members 
Bank boards should include individuals that are competent and suitable for the 
position.36. Each board member should have adequate knowledge, skills, honesty, 
objective judgement, appropriate age and experience for at least the main activities of 
the bank; in this way, board members can properly discharge their supervisory 
responsibilities37. New directors should be provided with a proper induction programme, 
and subsequent to appointment their development needs should be identified and met.  
 
As per Central Bank, any person recommended by the nomination committee for 
appointment in a board position, must submit detailed information concerning academic 
and professional qualifications, experience, any court decisions against them, statement 
of assets and liabilities, any relation with bankruptcy proceedings and the employment 
history during the last ten years. The bank must also receive references from two 
persons, one of which must be the most recent employer of the proposed individual. 
The bank should also certify that the individuals proposed have been reliable, honest, 
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integral and objective in their previous posts. Subsequent to the verification of this 
information, if the Central Bank is satisfied that the person is fit and proper for the 
proposed position, the Central Bank concurs and the bank may proceed with the 
appointment.    
 
The examination of the fitness and probity should be examined after appointment 
as well. The chairman should see that the performance of board and committee 
members is evaluated at least once a year. The nomination committee examines the 
size, composition, output and effectiveness of the board and can propose changes. The 
Central Bank requires that banks have in place policies to identify individuals that violate 
the required procedures and to identify unethical or unlawful conducts. In such 
situations, banks should immediately inform the Central Bank, which may require that 
the said person ceases to act as director. Consequently, the requirement for the 
necessary knowledge and skills to run the bank properly, personal qualities such as 
sincerity, integrity, honesty, reliability, objectivity as well as job security concerns, 
should encourage increased monitoring on behalf of bank boards.  
 
4.4.2 Audit Committee  
The board of directors must establish an audit committee in order to ensure that 
the bank complies with the directives published by the Central Bank, in accordance with 





 This committee is responsible for the appointment of external auditors. Pursuant 
to appointment, the committee must ensure the independence and effectiveness of the 
auditors, particularly when they offer a substantial volume of non-auditing services. 
Where necessary, it can propose the auditors substitution, rotation or at least the 
rotation of the lead audit partner as well as a change in their remuneration. It also 
evaluates the comments of the auditors regarding the preparation and presentation of 
the financial statements.  
 
Another major duty is to examine the contents of the quarterly, semi-annual, 
nine-monthly, annual financial statements and other special periodic financial reports 
and be satisfied that they present a true and fair view. The processes applied by the 
CFO regarding the choice of accounting policies and accounting estimates must also be 
supervised.   
 
The audit committee is also responsible for monitoring and assessing the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the internal audit unit. The internal audit unit has the 
main responsibility to carry out both routine and special audits of the accounting records 
and to evaluate whether the accounting systems produce reliable, complete and up-to-
date financial information. More particularly, the internal audit unit is expected to 
evaluate the granting of credit procedures, the provisioning policy and the methodology 





Considering the responsibilities of the audit committee with reference to the 
preparation and the auditing of financial statements, it can be assumed that an effective 
audit committee should act as a disincentive for earnings management. As explained 
next, effectiveness can be achieved by audit committee independence, expertise and 
number of meetings.  
 
4.4.2.1 Audit Committee Independence  
Banks should appoint at least three and maximum six non-executive directors as 
members of the committee. The majority of the members of the committee must be 
independent38. The chairman of the board should not be a member of the audit 
committee. Audit committees function effectively if they are independent of 
management, so that internal and external auditors remain free from undue influences 
from executives. Where there is a majority of executive directors, they are more likely to 
side with management in any disputes with the auditor. Thus, the requirement for 
independent audit committee members is a key variable that can improve the quality of 
financial reporting.    
 
4.4.2.2 Audit Committee Expertise  
Since the primary function of the audit committee is to monitor the financial 
reporting process, there is a need to have competent and experienced directors, 
particularly in financial aspects. The requirement for banks is that the chairman must 
have knowledge and expertise for the supervision of auditing and accounting matters, 
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while the committee as a whole, should have appropriate knowledge and expertise, 
including knowledge of the bank's broader business environment as well as expertise 
on information systems39. Therefore, directors that have related expertise can be more 
effective as monitors in reducing earnings management.  
 
4.4.2.3 Audit Committee Meetings 
The audit committee should meet at least on a quarterly basis, before the 
announcement of the quarterly results in order to review the financial accounts and 
particularly the sufficiency of loan loss provisions and the adequacy of the internal 
control system40. The committee can also meet on its own to review matters within its 
responsibility. Any officer of the bank, whose opinion may be considered necessary for 
the best conduct of the committee‟s duties should also be invited. Additionally, audit 
committee members can participate in meetings with executive management and the 
internal audit to review issues that arise from the final accounts or from special reports 
or investigations. Finally, the committee must meet with the external auditors at least 
once a year to discuss matters arising from the audit. The number of audit committee 
meetings can be considered as an indication of whether the committee performs its 
monitoring function properly.    
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4.4.3 Inside Ownership  
As previously mentioned, the remuneration package of executive directors may 
include share options.  The use of share options plans can be viewed as a way to align 
executive and shareholder interests, by giving the executives an ownership stake in the 
firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Stock ownership by executive board members gives 
them an incentive to monitor managers carefully (Weber, 2006; Niu, 2006). Hence 
inside ownership may be a disincentive for opportunistic earnings management.  
 
4.4.4 Relations with Shareholders  
Since it is difficult for shareholders to effectively monitor bank boards or senior 
management, transparency is essential. This may be achieved with adequate supply of 
timely and accurate information.  
 
The board of directors must use the announcements of the quarterly or interim 
results, as well as the annual general meeting to make analytical presentations of the 
financial statements to shareholders. The annual accounts, together with the auditor‟s 
report, must be sent to shareholders at least twenty one days before the date of the 
annual general meeting41.  Together with the consolidated financial statements, the 
board must prepare and send a report on the developments and the performance of the 
business and the position of the bank group, including all material changes concerning 
the targets and activities of the bank, major shareholders and voting rights, material 
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foreseeable risks, unusual transactions such as mergers or sale of a significant part of 
the bank‟s assets.  
  
Banks must also disclose on their websites and annual reports, timely and 
accurate information in the following areas: board of directors and senior executive 
management structure; major share ownership of the board members and senior 
executives; remuneration policies; the code of business ethics as well as any applicable 
governance structures and policies, nature and extent of transactions with affiliates and 
related parties, including any bank matters for which members of the board have 
material interests, either directly or indirectly or on behalf of third parties. 
 
During the general meetings substantial dialogue must be encouraged in the 
decision making procedure42. All shareholders should be treated equally, and those with 
a sufficient number of shares (5%) are allowed to place items on the agenda of the 
general meetings. The chairmen of the audit, remuneration and nomination committees 
should be available to answer to questions. Proposals submitted at extraordinary 
general meetings, should be explained to shareholders, who should be given sufficient 
time before the date of the meeting in order to evaluate them. The shareholders also 
have the opportunity to contact the investor relations officer regarding matters that 
concern them.   
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Therefore, active engagement and dialogue as well as adequate supply of 
information can help to reduce information asymmetry and strengthen the monitoring 
role of shareholders. Hence earnings management can be controlled.  
 
4.4.5 Auditing  
  
4.4.5.1 Quality of Audit and Independence  
Auditors have the right to access all books and accounts and require from 
officers additional information and explanations. Auditors must also evaluate the 
appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting 
estimates made43.   
 
 The auditors‟ report should state whether they have obtained all the necessary 
information and explanations needed for their audit. The report should also include the 
opinion as to whether proper books have been kept and whether the financial 
statements are in accordance with such books. The auditors‟ responsibility is then to 
express their opinion as to whether the financial statements give a true and fair view of 
the financial position, the financial performance and the cash flows in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards and the requirements of the Cyprus 
Company Law. The auditors should comply with ethical requirements when they plan 
and perform their audit. The procedures selected depend on the auditor‟s judgment.  
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 Banks should not entrust a substantial volume of non-audit services to auditors 
unless the latter are in a position to confirm in writing that such assignments will not 
affect their objectivity and independence44. If auditors offer other services apart from 
auditing, their objectivity and independence must be ensured by having the non-auditing 
services provided by different companies or different departments of the auditing firm in 
accordance with the professional code of certified accountants / auditors. The total 
remuneration for the auditors must be shown in the notes to the accounts as follows: 
audit of annual accounts, assurance services, tax advisory services and other non-audit 
services.  
 
 Finally, every three years, banks are required to have their internal procedures 
audited by auditors, other than those responsible for the auditing of the final accounts 
on a yearly basis.  
  
Therefore, assuming ethical behaviour on behalf of auditors and independence, 
the quality of the audit is enhanced and may help to control earnings management.   
 
4.4.5.2 Relationship of Auditors with the Central Bank 
The Central Bank requires that there should be a relationship between itself and 
the external auditors of banks45. At least once a year, a meeting should be arranged 
between the Central Bank, the external auditors and the bank concerned. The agenda 
includes items mainly determined by the Central Bank, but the other parties can request 
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inclusion of additional issues. During this meeting, a discussion is made of the bank‟s 
final accounts, the report of the external auditor as well as of matters arising from the 
audit work i.e. whether the bank does not maintain, or will not be able to maintain in the 
future the required capital adequacy ratio, or has not made adequate loan loss 
provisions.  
 
The auditors can also ask for discussion of issues about which the bank 
concerned may not agree. This is because, auditors are expected to fully understand 
that the Central Bank has a major responsibility to protect the interests of depositors, 
and therefore should be provided with all necessary information that will assist it in 
carrying out its supervisory role. A bilateral meeting can also be arranged if the auditors 
have reasonable suspicions that the bank that they audit is violating the provisions of 
the Banking Law.   
 
Consequently, it can be assumed that this regulation can act as a mechanism for 
controlling earnings management, since bank managers are aware of the fact that, in 
the annual tripartite meetings, they should be prepared to justify their choices and 
decisions, particularly in areas where they have the flexibility to exercise judgment. In 
addition, bank managers may find it more difficult to manage accounting reported 
numbers if they know that auditors can bring to the discussion issues for which they do 
not agree. Furthermore, there is always a possibility that the auditor may communicate 
to the Central Bank any suspected violations of the Banking Law, any inadequacies in 




unethical behaviour. Assuming auditor independence and integrity, managerial flexibility 
to manage profits with the purpose to mislead is restricted.  
 
4.4.6 Supervision and Inspection  
The Central Bank of Cyprus is responsible for the supervision of banks and the 
orderly functioning of the banking system46. The review and evaluation is conducted at 
least on an annual basis and it is risk based. Every bank must make available for 
examination its liquid and other assets, books or records, accounts and other 
documents, including the granting of loans and other facilities, as well as reports 
obtained by the bank regarding the business and financial position of debtors. The 
Central Bank shall also review the processes and mechanisms implemented by banks 
in order to comply with the provisions of the Banking Law and evaluate the risks to 
which banks are exposed to. The frequency and the intensity of the review and 
evaluation is determined considering the size, systemic importance, nature, scale and 
complexity of the activities of the bank concerned47. 
 
When a bank fails to comply with any of the provisions of the Banking Law or 
with other Regulations and Directives, the Central Bank has the power to impose an 
administrative fine and where this violation continues, there is a further administrative 
fine for each day that the contravention continues. In addition, any director, chief 
executive, manager, or other employee of the bank who authorises or knowingly permits 
the violation of any provisions of the Banking Law or any Regulations or Directives, shall 
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be guilty of an offence, which is punishable by either imprisonment not exceeding two 
years or by a fine, depending on the seriousness of the contravention. If the violation 
continues, there shall be a further administrative fine for each day that the contravention 
continues. 
 
The Central Bank can also take additional measures to rectify matters such as 
imposing conditions on a bank‟s licence; restrict the scope of a bank‟s business in a 
particular way i.e. prohibit the bank from entering into certain transactions such as 
limitations on accepting deposits, granting credit facilities, making investments or 
require the bank to hold additional own funds; it may assume control of the bank for so 
long as the Central Bank may consider necessary and finally it can close the bank. 
 
Therefore, the restrictive measures or the penalties that can be imposed and the 
frequency and intensity of the review and evaluation can act as disincentives for 
earnings management.   
  
4.5 Summary 
The following table is a synopsis of the findings derived from the critical 




Table 17: Summary of incentives, opportunities and disincentives derived from the critical evaluation of the 
regulatory framework 
Incentives for earnings management 
 Increase profitability so as to increase the capital base for regulatory and internal capital adequacy purposes.  
 Attract and maintain shareholders and the stock price effect  
 Compensation considerations of executive directors and key management personnel 
 Job security concerns  
Opportunities for earnings management 
 Loans and advances to customers: provision for loan losses; impairment of loans and advances to customers; classification of 
non-performing loans and advances to customers; renegotiation of loans and advances to customers 
 Investments: sale; unrealised gains and losses from the revaluation of investments (Level 3 inputs); impairment loss and reversal 
of impairment loss of investment in debt and equity securities available for sale, securities held to maturity and other loans and 
receivables; reclassification of investment securities 
 Insurance: increase in the adequacy of insurance liabilities 
 Investment properties: sale; revaluation 
 Staff costs: defined benefit plans; cost of share based payments 
 Property, plant and equipment: depreciation; impairment 
 Intangible assets: amortization; impairment 




Opportunities for earnings management 
 Derivatives: timing of their use; revaluation (Level 3) 
 Taxation: reduction of deferred tax asset 
Disincentives for earnings management 
 Penalties that can be imposed as per the Cyprus Stock Exchange and Company Law 
 Corporate governance: effective boards, effective audit committees; inside ownership; active engagement and dialogue by 
shareholders and; the quality of audit  
 The relationship between auditors and the Central Bank. 





Chapter 5: Theory of Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and justify the nature of this research 
study, the research paradigms and the research methodology  
 
5.2 Nature of the Research  
Any research study can be classified into four types depending on its purpose, 
data type, logic and outcome. Research according to its purpose can be further 
classified as exploratory, descriptive, explanatory and predictive (Hussey and Hussey 
(1997, p. 9).        
 
According to its purpose, this research study can be classified as explanatory. 
Explanatory research provides answers to the “why” and the “how” questions; it is the 
study of a situation in order to explain why events have taken place (Punch 2005, p.15). 
When conducting such a research, relationships between variables are investigated in 
order to explain the phenomena. The findings are then compared to other research 
outcomes and the results can be generalised (Saunders 2003, p.28).  This research 
study can be classified as explanatory because the purpose was to explain why 
earnings management takes place at banks in Cyprus (i.e. the incentives), how does 
regulation provide opportunities for earnings management and how such practices can 
be limited by corporate governance and other bank regulation (i.e. the disincentives). 




for earnings management was tested with regressions and the results were then 
compared to the findings of other research studies on earnings management.  
 
Depending on the data type, research can be classified into quantitative and 
qualitative (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.12). The choice between quantitative and 
qualitative data depends on the nature of the research project. In order to meet the 
research objectives, this research study includes both types. The quantitative part 
includes numerical data taken from the annual reports, the corporate governance 
reports and the Cyprus Stock Exchange. The qualitative part includes the results from 
which were interviews conducted with CEOs and CFOs of banks and one bank auditor.  
  
Based on its logic, research can be classified as deductive or inductive.   
When a conceptual framework is already in place and the objective of the research is to 
verify theory through empirical observations, the research is deductive (Hussey and 
Hussey 1997, p.13). In contrast, inductive research is a study where generalisations are 
made from particular instances (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.13). The logic of this study 
is a deductive one. A conceptual framework on earnings management was already in 
place, and the objective was to test this theory through an empirical investigation of the 
four listed commercial banks in Cyprus. The research findings were then set within the 
existing conceptual framework.     
 
Based on its outcome, research can be classified as applied or basic (Hussey 




the knowledge without necessarily applying the findings, whereas research that is 
conducted in order to provide a solution to a specific problem is called applied. Clearly, 
this research study is basic research because its outcome is simply knowledge creation.   
  
5.3 Research Paradigms  
The term paradigm refers to the guidelines that one should follow when 
conducting research and to the methods and techniques that ideally should be used 
when carrying out research (Punch 2005, p.26). There are three research paradigms 
that dominate the literature: positivism, phenomenological and critical realism (Saunders 
2003, p.83).  
 
5.3.1 Positivistic Paradigm 
Traditionally, the positivistic paradigm has been associated with theory 
verification (Punch 2005, p.157). Under the positivistic paradigm, the researcher makes 
a critical evaluation of the literature, establishes a conceptual framework and formulates 
hypotheses deductively (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.116). The hypotheses are then 
tested to identify any associations using statistics. For this reason, this paradigm is 
usually associated with quantifiable observations and places an emphasis on a highly 
structured methodology to facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 1997, cited in 
Saunders 2003, p. 83). Highly structured methodology implies that the research 
questions are tightly developed and pre-specified ahead of the empirical work (Punch 
2005, p.22, p.141). The outcome of such research can be law-like generalisations 




can then help to predict phenomena and therefore allow them to be controlled. Finally, 
the samples used are large in order to allow generalization (Hussey and Hussey 1997, 
p.50). 
 
5.3.2 Phenomenological Paradigm 
The phenomenological paradigm is associated with theory generation (Hussey 
and Hussey 1997, p.123), and the samples used are small (Hussey and Hussey 1997, 
p.50). In a phenomenological study, the researcher begins with general questions that 
become more refined and set within a theoretical framework as the study unfolds 
(Punch 2005, p.22). The data are also likely to be unstructured at the point of collection. 
Data categories emerge from the analysis (Punch 2005, p.24).The aim is to generate 
theory systematically from the data collected (Wolcott 1992, cited in Punch 2005, p.5). 
The phenomena investigated are not necessarily measurable. Phenomenologists are 
concerned with human behaviour because the world can only be understood if the 
perceptions of the human actors are understood (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.53).   
 
5.3.3 Critical Realism 
The philosophical position of critical realism is that an external reality exists, 
independent of human thoughts and beliefs (Saunders 2003, p.84). The reality of critical 
realism has two dimensions. The first includes the events that we observe and the 
second includes the unobserved, real mechanisms behind them (Sobh and Perry, 
2006). Critical realists recognise causality (Easton, 2010). This means that the 




determines human activity and creates the phenomena that we experience and 
describe (Wikgren, 2005). The goal of critical realism is to identify and describe these 
hidden structures that have causal powers to produce effects (Easton, 2010).  
 
In order to provide explanations of how a common reality of an economic system 
causes people to operate, critical realists do retroduction. Retroduction refers to asking 
“why” things are being observed as they seem to be and “how” are the phenomena of 
interest explained (Olsen, 2009). Realism research should be consistently asking “why” 
a result has been found, because the observed findings are a result of a deeper, 
unobservable reality (Sobh and Perry, 2006).   
 
5.3.4 Choice of Paradigm 
All research questions are driven by paradigm considerations (Punch 2005, p.3). 
The choice of paradigm is largely determined by the nature of the research problem and 
the questions that need to be answered (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.50).  
 
Considering the research philosophies described above, this research study can 
be classified under the critical realism paradigm. In critical realism research, one needs 
to be consistently asking “why” and “how” questions. In line with this philosophy, the 
purpose of this study was to understand managerial behaviour, that is, “why” bank 
managers make accounting choices in order to manage accounting reported profits and 




The reality of critical realism has two dimensions, the events that we observe and 
the unobserved, real mechanisms behind them. Critical realists argue that the 
unobserved social mechanisms and structures affect human activity and create the 
phenomena we can experience (Wikgren, 2005). The goal of critical realism is to 
identify and describe these hidden structures that have causal powers to produce 
effects (Easton, 2010). Consistent with these arguments, this study has taken into 
consideration the unobserved social reality, which includes the laws that affect the 
decisions of all bank managers. After the critical evaluation of the literature review, the 
next step was to critically evaluate the legal framework that affects banks‟ financial 
reporting and explain why earnings management takes place at banks in Cyprus (i.e. 
the incentives), how does regulation provide opportunities for earnings management 
and how such practices can be limited by corporate governance and other bank 
regulation (i.e. the disincentives). In other words, the purpose was to describe and 
understand how this regulation can create the phenomenon that we experience i.e. 
whether earnings management takes place or not.   
 
5.4 Research Methodology 
There are different types of research methodologies. Some of them are 
considered to be appropriate for use under one paradigm than another (Hussey and 
Hussey, p.59). The choice of the methodology is largely determined by the choice of 
paradigm (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.51). Given that this study is classified under the 
critical realism paradigm, the methodologies used are the ones that are considered 




Critical realism advocates methodological pluralism (Wikgren, 2005). 
Methodological pluralism or mixed methods is a synonym for methodological 
triangulation (Sobh and Perry, 2006). Methodological pluralism allows the use of a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, which are chosen according to the 
type of the study and its objectives (Zachariadis and Scott, 2010). Easton (2010) argues 
that a mixed methodology design can be sequential. In this case, the methods are 
employed sequentially, one after the other, in distinct phases.  
 
In critical realism, the research may include data collection through interviews, 
which can produce results that confirm or disconfirm the conceptual frameworks 
developed from the literature review and other documentary sources (Zachariadis and 
Scott, 2010; Olsen, 2009. However, in realism research, only the perceptions that are 
relevant to the external reality are worth investigating (Yin 2003, p.8). The empirical 
results from interviews can help to reduce data from the conceptual framework, show 
demi-regularities and contribute to the formulation of hypotheses. Critical realists argue 
that where such demi-regularities can be quantified, then regressions may be used, 
where structural variables can be treated as either independent or dependent variables 
(Olsen,   2009). The use of regressions is not about measuring laws, but about testing 
the hypotheses (Zachariadis and Scott, 2010).  
 
It is recommended that, the design of critical realism research includes the 
following stages (Zachariadis and Scott, 2010): choice of the phenomenon to be 
examined and the unit of analysis; critical evaluation of the literature and formulation of 




empirical analysis; and quantitative empirical analysis. Consistent with this 
recommendation, this research has been organised accordingly, and the stages of the 
study are explained next. 
 
5.4.1 Stages of Critical Realism Research 
 
Stage 1 
The first step in critical realism research is to choose the phenomenon to be 
examined and the unit of analysis. In this empirical study, the phenomenon chosen was 
earnings management and the unit of analysis was the Cyprus banking sector.   
 
The area of earnings management was chosen because of the interest the 
researcher has in the area of financial accounting and reporting.  
 
The primary reason for which the banking sector was chosen is because of its 
systemic importance for the Cyprus economy. Since businesses find it difficult to raise 
capital through the local stock exchange, banks are the best source of flexible funding. 
Individuals and households also secure lending for personal and housing needs via 
banks. In their turn, banks rely mostly on deposits in order to raise funds and perform 
their financial intermediation role. The existence of no other alternative to transfer 





Given that the sector to be studied was chosen, the next step was to decide 
which banks would be included in the investigation i.e. the sample. The need to sample 
arises because it is not possible to investigate the whole population due to its size or 
due to time or other constraints (Saunders 2003, p.103). In critical realism research, 
multiple cases may be included in the sample, and the criterion for the case selection is 
relevance rather than sampling logic and representativeness (Stake, 1994). In this 
research, only four banks could be included in the sample, due to data availability. 
Financial statements and reports on corporate governance were publicly available only 
for the banks listed in the Stock Exchange, and these include: Bank of Cyprus, Laiki 
Bank, Universal Savings Bank and Hellenic Bank.  
   
The banking sector was also chosen due to other data availability concerns. 
Earnings management studies use data either from financial reports or interviews or 
both (Stolowy and Breton, 2010). This study includes both. The researcher was aware 
that access to the laws and the financial reports would pose no particular problems, but 
the interviews could be difficult to arrange if people felt that discussing reporting 
practises would be a sensitive matter. Therefore, the researcher decided that a way to 
overcome this difficulty would be to choose a sector where she has connections with 
people in high positions that could help with the interview arrangements.      
 
Stage 2 
In the second stage of the research, it is recommended that critical realists 




examined, from a critical evaluation of the literature. Hence, the second stage in this 
empirical study was to conduct a critical review of the earnings management literature.  
The literature review has revealed that, there are two theories that dominate the  
earnings management literature: the theory on incentives and the theory on 
disincentives for earnings management. The incentives to manage accounting profits 
include: compensation, lending and implicit contracts; political costs; stock price effect; 
fear of dismissal; and taxation. The disincentives for earnings management include: the 
board of directors; audit committees; the quality of external audit; and corporate 
ownership. Finally, under the GAAP, accounting options are given for presenting 
financial performance, thus creating opportunities for earnings management. Based on 
the conceptual framework developed from the literature review, the research objectives 
were formulated as follows:    
4. Why does earnings management take place i.e. the incentives 
5. How does regulation provide opportunities for earnings management and  
6. How corporate governance and regulation can help limit such practices.   
 
Stage 3 
  In the third stage of the research, it is recommended that critical realists proceed 
with an assessment of government reports and other documentary sources in order to 
help in building up an explanatory conceptual framework (Olsen, 2009). In critical 
realism research, it is assumed that an external reality exists, and this reality affects 
human activity and creates the phenomena we observe (Wikgren, 2005). In view of this 




common stimulus to all bank executives and managers and hence affects their 
decisions. The relevant legal framework in Cyprus includes: the Company Law, the Tax 
Law, the Stock Exchange Rules and its Corporate Governance Code, the Regulations 
of the Central Bank and the International Financial Reporting Standards.  
 
The critical evaluation of the Cyprus regulatory framework produced a list of all 
the possible incentives, opportunities and disincentives for earnings management for 
the banks in Cyprus (see Table 17, page 240). This explanatory framework provided 
results that are consistent with empirical evidence found in the earnings management 
literature.     
 
The use of the financial reports and the laws that affect banks‟ financial reporting 
practices had a lot of advantages (Saunders 2003, p. 200). The main advantage was 
that it has not been expensive and time consuming for the researcher to collect. The 
second and most important advantage was that this secondary data provided a 
permanent record that was read over and over again, whenever necessary.  
 
Stage 4  
The fourth stage of realism research may include data collection through 
interviews, which can produce results that confirm or disconfirm the conceptual 
framework developed in the previous stages (Sobh and Perry, 2006). However, in 
realism research, only those perceptions that are relevant to the external reality are 




individuals that are actually involved in the events (Yin 2003, p.8). The empirical results 
from interviews can help to reduce data from the conceptual framework, show demi-
regularities and contribute to the formulation of hypotheses.  
 
In line with the above arguments, after the critical evaluation of the regulatory 
framework, it became necessary to determine which of the incentives, opportunities and 
disincentives for earnings management were considered to be the most important in 
Cyprus. This focus could be obtained with interviews. Since this study is about earnings 
management and financial reporting, the interviewees chosen were either a CEO or a 
CFO, one from each of the twelve commercial banks that operate in the country. This 
choice was made because, in any organisation, the people responsible for the true and 
fair view of financial reports are the CEO and the CFO. An auditor was also chosen 
because this individual works for an audit firm that is responsible for the auditing of five 
out of the twelve commercial banks in Cyprus. He is therefore experienced in banking 
matters. The practical aspects of the interviews as well as the results are presented in 
detail in Chapter 6: “Empirical Analysis, Part 1; Results from Interviews”.  
 
The main advantage of the interviews was that it helped to focus on those 
incentives, opportunities and disincentives for earnings management that were 
perceived by the interviewees to be the most important. Even though a disadvantage of 
collecting primary data with the semi-structured interviews is that it can be very time 
consuming (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.157-158), it was not such a problem with this 




researcher used connections in order to help set up the interview appointments. For this 
reason, the meetings were arranged soon after the participants were asked to provide 
their assistance. A disadvantage of the interviews was that, once they were over, there 
was no chance for a second meeting to clarify the issues further. Another disadvantage 
was whether participants were actually telling the truth. The researcher believes that the 
responses obtained were sound because the participants were knowledgeable, 
experienced and professional; and when they agreed to provide their assistance, they 
were ready to give truthful answers, to the best of their knowledge.  
 
Stage 5 
In the last stage of the research, realists argue that, if the demi-regularities 
observed from interview results can be quantified, regressions may be used, where 
structural variables can be treated as either independent or dependent variables (Olsen, 
2009). The use of regressions is not about measuring laws, but about testing the 
hypotheses (Zachariadis and Scott, 2010).  
 
In line with this argument, after considering the results from interviews, the 
research hypotheses were then formulated. More specifically, it was hypothesized 
the incentives to manage income upwards include: maximization of executive 
variable compensation (cash bonus and stock options) and increase of the capital 
adequacy ratio. It was also hypothesized that effective boards can be a disincentive 
for earnings management. Finally, it was hypothesized that the accounting 




realised securities gains and losses, loan loss provisions and total accruals. The 
regressions estimated to develop measures for earnings management, the 
regressions estimated to test for earnings management and the empirical results are 




The purpose of this empirical study was to explain why earnings management 
takes place at banks in Cyprus (i.e. the incentives), how does regulation provide 
opportunities for earnings management and how can corporate governance and other 
bank regulation can help constrain such practices. The banking sector was chosen 
because of its systemic importance to the Cyprus economy. In Cyprus, banks are the 
only alternative to transfer capital between savers and lenders, and this proves how 
critical banks are for the country. In this research, only four banks could be studied 
because financial statements and reports on corporate governance were available only 
for the banks listed in the Stock Exchange, which include: the Bank of Cyprus; Hellenic 
Bank; Laiki Bank and Universal Savings Bank.   
 
This research study was classified under the critical realism paradigm. In critical 
realism, after the selection of the cases has been made, it is recommended that critical 
realists proceed with a well- developed conceptual framework from a critical evaluation 
of the literature. The literature review revealed that, the earnings management literature 
is dominated with evidence on the incentives or the disincentives for earnings 




accounting options are given for presenting financial performance, thus creating 
opportunities for earnings management. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the 
research objectives were then formulated.    
 
The next step was to consider the regulatory framework that acts as a common 
stimulus to all bank executives and managers and hence affects their decisions. The 
relevant legal framework in Cyprus includes: the Company Law, the Tax Law, the Stock 
Exchange Rules and its Corporate Governance Code, the Regulations of the Central 
Bank and the International Financial Reporting Standards. The critical evaluation of the 
laws in Cyprus produced a list of all possible incentives, opportunities and disincentives 
for earnings management.  
 
In realism research, only those perceptions that are relevant to the external 
reality are worth investigating. For this reason, the next step was to conduct interviews 
with CEOs, CFOs and a bank auditor, in order to determine which of the incentives, 
opportunities and disincentives for earnings management were considered to be the 
most important and relevant for Cyprus.   
 
After considering the results from interviews, the research hypotheses were 
formulated. Regressions were then estimated to develop measures for earnings 






Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis, Part 1; Results from Interviews 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 5: “The Theory of Methodology”, after the phenomenon 
of interest has been chosen, the next two stages of critical realism research include a 
comprehensive review of the literature and an assessment of social structures and 
mechanisms that cause the phenomena observed. The following stage may include 
data collected through interviews, which can produce results that confirm or disconfirm 
the conceptual framework developed in the previous stages. However, in critical realism 
research, only the perceptions of those involved in the actual events are worth 
investigating. Therefore, this chapter includes the results from interviews conducted with 
individuals involved in the financial reporting of banks, in order to determine which of the 
Incentives, Opportunities and Disincentives for Earnings Management were considered 
to be the most important in Cyprus. The remainder of this chapter is organized as 
follows: Section 6.2 includes the practical aspects of the interviews; Section 6.3 
presents the interview results; and Section 6.4 identifies the most significant incentives, 
disincentives and opportunities for earnings management in Cyprus.  
    
6.2 Practical Aspects of the Interviews 
The practical aspects of the interviews included the selection of the respondents, 






6.2.1 Selection of the Respondents 
In critical realism research, the sampling procedure is based on who are the 
people relevant to the research objectives (Bryman 2004, p.334). In other words, 
interviews are needed with individuals that are actually involved in the events (Yin 2003, 
p.8).  
 
Since this study is about earnings management and hence the quality of financial 
reporting, the interviewees chosen were either chief executive officers (CEOs) or chief 
financial officers (CFOs). This choice was made because, in any organisation, the 
people responsible for the true and fair view of financial reports are the CEO and the 
CFO. 
 
The individuals that were initially selected included either the CEO or the CFO 
from each bank included in the sample and one bank auditor. This selection was 
primarily made because of the personal acquaintance between the researcher and the 
interviewees, which ensured direct access. The second reason was that, there was a 
need to obtain the views of individuals from the banks that were examined in this thesis. 
The auditor was also chosen because he works for an audit firm that is responsible for 
the auditing of five out of the twelve commercial banks in Cyprus. He is therefore 
experienced in banking matters.  
 
The next step was to contact the interviewees. A phone call was made to them 




explained very clearly that the study was about banks and that a regulatory review had 
already been carried out, which had produced a list of incentives, opportunities and 
disincentives for earnings management; it was added that their views and opinions were 
needed on those issues. They found it very interesting and they were more than willing 
to assist. Since these individuals were very busy and had limited time to devote to an 
interview, it was suggested, and they agreed, that a copy of “Chapter 4: The Cyprus 
Regulatory Framework” be sent to them, so that they could read it before the meeting. 
As soon as they read the material, they called the researcher in order to make an 
appointment.   
 
By providing the participants with Chapter 4: “The Cyprus Regulatory 
Framework” before the interview may have introduced some bias. This is because the 
participants had time to process the information being requested, thus enabling them to 
think more carefully about what answers they would provide (Saunders 2003, p.255). In 
order to overcome this bias and enhance the reliability of the data, it was decided to 
include in the sample more individuals.  
 
The next step was then to choose the remaining participants. In order to obtain 
results that could be comparable, the remaining respondents were selected from banks 
with similar operations (i.e. commercial banks) and with similar organisational positions 
(i.e. a CEO or a CFO). As explained in Chapter 3, there are twelve commercial banks 
that operate in the country. Four of them are listed in the Stock Exchange, for which the 




individuals that were chosen from the remaining eight banks, one person from each 
bank.   
 
The next issue that had to be addressed was how to contact them and gain 
access. Since CEOs and CFOs are busy people that would probably be reluctant to talk 
about bank practices, the researcher had to use her contacts. These individuals made a 
first phone call to the prospective participants and explained that the researcher was 
conducting an academic study and asked if it was possible to arrange an interview. 
Once they agreed to participate, the researcher called their personal assistants in order 
to make an appointment.   
 
All the meetings took place at a time and location convenient to the interviewees. 
Each meeting took place individually, face to face, on different days and it lasted for 
about two to two and a half hours.  
 
In order to enhance the credibility of the answers, Table 18 on the next page 
shows the position of each interviewee, the educational background and the years of 









Table 18: Position, Qualifications and Experience of Interviewees  
Interviewee  Position Educational Background  Years of Experience in 
the Banking Sector 
A CEO MSc Accounting and Finance, UK 27 
B CEO MSc Accounting and Finance, UK 29 
C CFO Chartered Accountant 20 
D CFO Chartered Accountant 15 
E Auditor Chartered Accountant 30 
F CEO PhD in Economics, USA 26 
G CEO MSc Money and Banking, USA 31 
H CFO Chartered Accountant 20 
I CFO Chartered Accountant 23 
J CEO MSc Economics, UK 30 
K CEO MSc Accounting and Finance 30 
L CFO Chartered Accountant 28 
M CFO Chartered Accountant 22 
*To protect the anonymity of the above individuals, their name and year of birth, the organisation they 
work for and the university that awarded the degree are not disclosed.  
 
6.2.2 Conducting the Interviews 
At the beginning of each interview, it was mentioned that this was an academic 
study and it was stressed that the need was to identify the most significant incentives, 
opportunities and disincentives for earnings management.  
 
It was also explained how the data would be analysed and reported i.e. that the 
most important variables identified would be used in regressions to test their 




agrees to participate in the data collection, it does not necessarily mean that he/she 
consents about the way in which the data will subsequently be analysed and reported 
(Saunders 2003, p.133).  
 
The respondents were given assurance about anonymity and confidentiality and 
of the fact that the findings of the research will make no reference to them and to the 
organisation they work for. Experience shows that when this is done people will express 
their opinions more freely and the quality of the data is improved (Punch 2005, p.100). 
Anonymity was also maintained when during the interviews the participants indirectly 
identified which person was responsible for making the issue being discussed 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, cited in Saunders 2003, p.136). The researcher was 
sensitive to the fact that the research results may have an impact on those individuals 
who provided access and participation.  
 
Given that the purpose was to understand managerial behaviour, the interview 
type was semi structured. Four general, open ended questions were prepared in 
advance. The questions were asked in an order which would seem logical to both the 
respondents and the interviewer (Saunders 2003, p.302). The interviewees were given 
time to talk freely in order to provide extensive and developmental answers. The 
problem with open ended questions was how to manage time, considering the limited 
time available for the interview (Saunders 2003, p.266). For this reason there was no 




discussed. In this way, the same thinks were discussed in all meetings and hence the 
answers were comparable.    
 
The validity and reliability of data collected can be improved if the questions 
asked are clearly stated and include words that are familiar to respondents, without 
leading or proposing (Saunders 2003, p.292). In this particular study, the interviewees 
were people with knowledge and experience about the subject matter so there was no 
difficulty in understanding the topics discussed.   
 
Another issue with interview data is whether people actually do what they say 
(Fielding 1996b, cited in Punch 2005, p.176). The researcher believes that the 
responses obtained were sound because the interviewees are involved in the financial 
reporting process and thus they have knowledge and experience in the matters 
discussed. In addition, since participants agreed to participate in the study, it was 
expected that they were ready to give truthful answers, to the best of their knowledge.  
 
When the interviews were over, participants were once again reassured about 
anonymity and confidentiality and of the fact that the findings of the research will make 
no reference to their position or the firm they work for. Finally, they were thanked for 







6.2.3 Recording of Responses 
During the interviews, the interviewer took notes. When the respondents were 
asked if it would be possible to use a tape recorder, they said they felt uncomfortable to 
talk about confidential or sensitive information and being recorded at the same time. 
Since they accepted to discuss such sensitive issues so willingly, it was not considered 
appropriate to put them in a difficult position.  
 
After the end of each meeting, enough time was allocated to write a full set of 
notes so as not to lose the exact nature of explanations provided or mix up data from 
different interviews. When all the interviews and the notes were completed, they were 
compared in order to find similarities and differences between the answers. The 
questions asked and the answers given are presented in the next section.  
 
6.3 Interview Results 
This section includes the responses obtained from the interviewees. In all 
interviews the questions asked were exactly the same and in the same order.    
 
Question 1 
“It would be appreciated if you could have a look at the list of incentives for earnings 
management. Would you like to explain how much each item affects managerial 





The incentives for earnings management and a summary of the respondents‟ 
comments follow:  
 
Incentive 1: Increase Profitability so as to Increase the Capital Base for Regulatory and 
Internal Capital Adequacy Purposes.  
All the respondents agreed that the capital adequacy is of extreme importance to 
banks in order to avoid penalties from regulators. They said that the recent financial 
crisis confirms the importance of adequate capital base which can be increased with 
profitability. The arguments made were as follows:  
 
“Banks wish to meet the regulatory minimum capital requirements primarily to 
satisfy regulators and profitability is a way to do it” (Interviewee A).  
 
“There is a need for banks to have strong capital base and profits can help due to 
their direct and immediate effect on the capital base” (Interviewee B).  
 
“A strong capital base is definitely important and it can be increased through 
internal capital generation, which is bank profits” (Interviewee C).  
 
According to interviewees D and E, the importance of capital adequacy is 
confirmed by the recent financial crisis and that the most important concern of the 
Central Bank and the government is the recapitalization of banks.  
 
“Banks need to have a strong capital base to avoid intervention from the Central 
Bank, and one way to achieve this is through increases in profits” (Interviewee F).  
 
“Interviewee G suggested that banks have strong motive to increase profitability 
so as to increase the capital base”.  
 
“A strong capital base is extremely significant and it can be increased with 
profitability” (Interviewee H). 
 
Interviewees I and L said that, banks need to maintain the minimum capital 





“The requirement to maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio does create the 
incentive to manage profits so as to increase the capital base” (Interviewee J).  
 
“Profitability can be used to boost the capital adequacy and satisfy the 
supervisory authorities” (Interviewee K).   
 
“A major issue that concerns the Central Bank is a strong capital base, so if 
profitability helps a bank to achieve this goal, then yes capital adequacy is an incentive 
for earnings management” (Interviewee M) 
 
Incentive 2: Attract and Maintain Shareholders, Stock Price Effect.   
The respondents disagreed that earnings management was used to attract and 
maintain shareholders during the period for which the research is conducted. During this 
time, banks were considered to be financially strong and nobody expected that they 
would end up having such serious troubles. Dividends and adequate capital base seem 
to help gain market confidence and keep shareholders happy. More specifically, it was 
stated:   
 
“The banks in Cyprus had no problem in attracting shareholders because they 
were considered by everybody as sound organizations where the investments were 
safe” (Interviewee A).  
  
“Two of the largest banks in the sample have been in the market for over one 
hundred years and have survived the Turkish occupation without serious problems. 
That is why nobody was afraid to buy shares because nobody believed that the two 
banks with the highest systemic importance would have such serious problems” 
(Interviewee B).  
 
“Banks could attract and keep shareholders by paying dividends” (Interviewee 
C).  
 
“It is a strong capital base that helps to attract and maintain investors. By 
increasing the capital base, banks gain market confidence” (Interviewee D).  
 
“Investors in Cyprus do not really make informed investment decisions, so they 
do not really look at bank profits. The decision to buy or sell shares can be influenced 





“Most individual investors never read financial statements prior to making their 
decision; in Cyprus it was commonly accepted that investing in bank shares was a safe 
choice” (Interviewee F).  
 
“Up to the period of the crisis, banks in Cyprus attracted shareholders with great 
ease, so there was no need to manage profits to achieve this” (Interviewee G).  
 
Interviewees H, K and M agreed that prospective shareholders did not analyze 
the financial statements as such; they got information about banks from other sources 
like the news, media etc.”  
 
“Most of the investors in Cyprus bought bank shares without analyzing final 
accounts. They only cared about dividends” (Interviewee I).  
 
“The mentality in Cyprus was that banks were one of the best choices for an 
investment; I do not believe that people looked at the bottom line profit prior to making 
their decision” (Interviewee J).  
 
“Individuals and other small institutional investors like private provident funds, 
were attracted simply by dividends” (Interviewee L).   
 
 
Incentive 3: Compensation Considerations of Executive Directors and Key Management 
Personnel 
The opinions of the respondents concerning compensation of executive directors 
differ. Two of the participants said that bonuses and stock options do not provide 
incentives for earnings management. It should be noted that these comments were 
made for the two small banks in the sample that have paid no bonuses. They have only 
granted stock options and for some of these options there was a condition to hold upon 
retirement. The remaining interviewees thought that variable compensation has led 
boards to engage in activities that would increase their own wealth. More specifically, it 
was stated:  
 
“I do not believe that bank boards allow earnings management in order to 




“Earnings management does not happen for the sake of compensation but for 
the sake of the ability to pay large dividends to keep shareholders happy” (Interviewee 
B).  
 
 “The desire to increase personal wealth, has led boards to engage in 
opportunistic activities” (Interviewee C).  
 
“Bank boards are currently being blamed that their personal greed has driven 
their actions and decisions” (Interviewee C).  
 
“The bankruptcy of one of the largest bank and the struggling for survival of 
another proves that bank boards have behaved opportunistically” (Interviewee D).  
 
“If you wish to determine the importance of the compensation you just consider 
that, a board member that resigned requested that his bonus be paid to him 
immediately. And this bonus was paid by a bank that used depositors’ money to 
recapitalize” (Interviewee E).  
 
Interviewees F, G, and I said that, the recent financial crisis is evidence of the 
risks taken by executives in order to maximize profits and their personal wealth.  
 
“The personal greed has led executives to make bad decisions so as to 
maximize profits and secure their bonuses” (Interviewee H).  
 
“The fact that there are pending law suits against board members for questionable 
practices, including their compensation, proves that the executives’ only concern was 
their personal wealth” (Interviewee J).    
 
“Generous incentive schemes were in place, awarding bonuses based on short term 
performance targets, thus encouraging risky behavior” (Interviewee K).  
 
“Board members and other top managers cared about maximizing their 
compensation and I believe they would do anything to secure it, including management 
of earnings” (Interviewee L).   
 
“The ongoing investigation of bank practices focuses on some creative 
accounting choices made so as to secure executive bonuses. So yes, I think 
compensation creates a motive to manage profitability” (Interviewee M).  
 
Incentive 4: Job Security Concerns  
According to the respondents, job security was not a strong motive for earnings 




Interviewees A, B, C, D and E agreed that, during the period of the study, no 
board member, or chief executive or senior manager has performed their duty fearing 
dismissal.  Even though the shareholders could remove board members, this has not 
happened. Nor has any chief executive been removed because they have not done 
their job properly. So job security was not a strong motive for earnings management.  
 
Interviewees G and K said that, up to the period of the crisis, banks were one of 
the most popular employers because of job security. So managing profits especially to 
avoid dismissal was not a concern.  
   
“There was no issue of dismissal from banks. Even when the crisis made itself 
evident, board members resigned and other top executives accepted voluntary 
retirement schemes” (Interviewee F). 
 
“There has not been a case where board members or top executives were 
removed from position due to profitability concerns” (Interviewee H).   
 
Interviewees I and L agreed that, job security was not an issue for bank 
employees. So there was no need to engage in earnings management particularly for 
keeping the job.   
 
“I do not believe that the fear of dismissal could be a reason for trying to boost 
profits because, in Cyprus, having a job at a bank meant security” (Interviewee J).   
 
“Nobody got fired from banks, even after the crisis” (Interviewee M) 
 
Question 2 
“It would be appreciated if you could have a look at the list of opportunities for earnings 
management. Would you like to comment on how frequently each item is used and 
which one(s) do you think are the most important? 
 
The opportunities for earnings management and a summary of the respondents‟ 






Opportunity 1: Loan Loss Provisions, Loan Impairment, Non-Performing Loans, 
Renegotiated Loans 
All respondents strongly agreed that loan loss provisions and impairment of loans 
is the most important item used for earnings management because of its highly 
discretionary nature and because of its recurring and large impact on profits. More 
specifically, the following arguments were made: 
Interviewees A and B argued that, provisions for loan losses are based on a 
large number of subjective parameters and can definitely be used for earnings 
management.  
 
“Since loan loss provisions are estimated both on individually important loans 
and on loans that are collectively evaluated there is a lot of discretion and so this item 
can be used to manage profits” (Interviewee C).  
 
“It is an item that is used for managing profitability every year due to its large 
effect on reported profits” (Interviewee D).  
 
“The importance of loan loss provisions is confirmed by the fact that the most 
frequent disagreements between banks, auditors and the Central Bank are about the 
level of impairments and provisions of loans and advances to customers” (Interviewee 
E).  
 
“Loan loss provisions are definitely an opportunity for earnings management, 
because these provisions are estimated by considering a large number of subjective 
factors” (Interviewee F).   
 
Interviewees G and H agreed that, managers have a lot of discretion when 
estimating loan loss provisions, so this item can be used to manage profits.  
 
“Loans are a bank’s largest asset; so loan loss provisions, if managed, are likely 
to have a large impact on profitability” (Interviewee I).   
 
“There is a lot of discretion when evaluating the loans, either individually or 
collectively, so the loan loss provisions can be managed in order to affect the bottom 
line profit” (Interviewee J).  
 
“One of the most discretionary expenses that appear on a bank’s income 






Interviewees K and M also suggested that, the estimation of loan loss provisions 
involves a lot of uncertainty, so it can be used for earnings management.  
 
 
Ten participants disagreed that banks could manage the value of collaterals so 
as to avoid the classification of loans as non-performing. This is because the valuations 
are made by independent experts; they are non-recurring and are challenged by 
auditors and the Central Bank. More specifically, the following arguments were made:  
“Valuations of collaterals are made by independent professionals who hold a 
relevant degree and must follow certain guidelines when conducting their valuation” 
(Interviewee A).  
 
Interviewees B and E agreed that collateral valuations are audited and have to 
be accepted by the Central Bank.  
 
“Banks revalue collaterals every three years, because the cost is charged to the 
customers and they don’t wish to dissatisfy clients. Hence, valuation has a non-
recurring impact on profitability” (Interviewee C).  
 
Interviewees F, H and J agreed that, collateral values cannot be overestimated 
because valuations are done by experts.  
 
Interviewees G, and I suggested that, valuations are made by independent 
professionals with the necessary qualifications and expertise.  
 
“The individuals that carry out the valuations have a relevant degree and follow 
specific guidelines when making their appraisals” (Interviewee K).  
 
“Collateral values must be accepted by the auditor as well” (Interviewee L). 
 
“Industry practice is that collaterals should be revalued every three years, so 
even if valuations were used to keep loans out of the non-performing category, that 
would have a non-recurring effect on profitability” (Interviewee M).   
 
Three individuals agreed that, the valuation of collaterals can be used for 
earnings management. More specifically they said:  
“Non-classification of loans as non-performing due to presumably sufficient 




“It is the optimistic value of collaterals that has allowed banks to give loans 
generously and hence be able to report higher interest revenue and higher net profits” 
(Interviewee G).  
 
“Banks in Cyprus have managed to continue to treat their loans as performing, 
even if there were arrears, because of inflated collateral values” (Interviewee M).  
 
Twelve of the participants disagreed that renegotiation of loans is made in order 
to manage profits. They said that renegotiations are made to facilitate customers and 
only if there is collateral and evidence of paying ability. One individual (Interviewee D) 
agreed that, renegotiations were used for some time to continue to book interest income 
on the income statement. More specifically:  
 
Interviewees A and B agreed that renegotiations are used mostly as a tool to 
help customers.  
 
“Banks are reluctant to start legal procedures because of the long period of time 
that is needed to resolve such issues through court. So instead of waiting, banks prefer 
to make adjustments to the terms of the loan and secure cash flows” (Interviewee C).  
 
“Renegotiations are made only if there is evidence provided by customers 
concerning their future repaying ability, with additional collateral” (Interviewee E).  
 
“Only if a customer can provide evidence about his/her future paying ability and if 
there is further collateral, the bank will consider a restructuring off the loan” (Interviewee 
F).   
 
Interviewees G, K and M said that, renegotiations are only considered when 
there is a real need to help customers.  
 
“A bank will accept to do a loan restructuring only if there is serious evidence that 
the customer has difficulty to make payments and there is evidence for this inability i.e. 
reduction in salary” (Interviewee G).   
 
“Renegotiations are used as a tool to help customers provided that the latter can 
provide evidence that they can continue to pay the reduced installment” (Interviewee H). 
 
Interviewees I and L said that, banks enter into restructuring agreements with 
customers that have financial difficulty in order to avoid default and secure some cash 




Opportunity 2: Realized Gains and Losses from the Sale of Investments, Unrealized 
Gains and Losses from Revaluation, Impairment, Reclassification 
All respondents strongly agreed that realized gains and losses from the sale of 
investments can be used as a tool to manage earnings. This is because investments 
comprise a large bank asset and gains and losses from disposal can have a recurring 
and large impact on profits. The arguments made were the following:  
 
Interviewees A and B supported that, investments are purchased with the 
intention to produce income in the form of interest, dividends and capital gains, so they 
are used for earnings management.  
 
Interviewees C and D said that, it is part of the banking business to take 
advantage of interest rate movements and share prices that yield capital gains and 
hence increase profits.  
 
“We cannot really challenge managers about their decision to sell or not; so yes 
realized gains and losses can be used to manage profits” (Interviewee E).   
  
“Investments can be used for earnings management, particularly the trading 
investments, for which there is a market and they can be sold quickly” (Interviewee F).  
 
Interviewees G, J and K suggested that, investment securities can be sold at 
management‟s discretion, so investment disposal can be timed.  
 
Interviewees H and I said that, as a general rule, banks make investments in 
order to secure revenue, but where investments values have risen, they can be sold to 
book profits.  
 
“Decisions to sell investment cannot be challenged even by the auditor, so 
managerial discretion is not limited” (Interviewee L).  
 
“Investments are a bank’s major asset that can be bought and sold quickly either 
to minimize further losses or to recognize gains” (Interviewee L).  
 
 
All the respondents disagreed that unrealized gains and losses can be used as a 




Interviewees A, B, C, D and E argued that, banks hold investments that are 
valued mostly using Level 1 and Level 2 inputs. Therefore, the measurement reliability 
is high. 
 
Respondents F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M argued that, banks in Cyprus usually hold 
investments that are listed and therefore are actively traded. Thus the fair value is the 
quoted market price. The participants also said that, even if the market for investments 
is not active, fair value measurement is done by reference to similar instruments and the 
measurement liability is considered high.  
 
  Eleven respondents disagreed that the impairment of investments is a tool for 
earnings management. More specifically: 
Interviewees A, B, C, D and E commended that impairments are challenged by 
auditors and by the Central Bank supervisors.   
 
Participants F, H, I, J, K and L argued that an impairment test is conducted when 
there is serious evidence that the value of the investment is significantly below cost and 
if there is evidence that the issuers have financial difficulties (i.e. reorganisation or 
bankruptcy) or if there are problems in the economic or legal environment of the 
investee company.   
 
Respondents I and J added that the impairment assumptions must be accepted 
by the auditor and the Central Bank.  
 
Individuals F, H and K also said that, testing associates for impairment does not 
happen every year, so the non-recurring nature of this item makes it unlikely that it can 
be used for earnings management.  
 
Individuals G and M had a different opinion. In particular:  
 
 “Investments are large assets for banks; their impairment is highly discretionary 
and when understated, it can have a large impact on profits” (Interviewee G).  
 
“A lot of assumptions are made when estimating impairments and they can be 
used to manage profitability” (Interviewee M).   
 
Twelve individuals said that, reclassification of investments between categories 
could not be used for earnings management. It was argued that reclassifications are 




addition, reclassifications are challenged by the auditor and the Central bank. More 
specifically it was stated:  
“Reclassifications can be made only if there is a change in management intent 
with respect to the assets since initial recognition” (Interviewee A).  
 
“Reclassifications are made only if there is clear evidence about a change in the 
conditions of issuer. Our bank has investments classified as held to maturity in another 
bank that is under resolution. Because the future of the bank is questioned, we can 
reclassify these assets as available for sale” (Interviewee B). 
  
“Any reclassification must be approved by the Asset and Liability Committee 
which may limit managerial discretion to engage in such activities for earnings 
management reasons” (Interviewee C).  
 
“If reclassifications are made for the wrong reasons, then banks are likely to 
receive qualified audit opinions” (Interviewee E).  
 
Interviewees F J and K said that, an investment can be reclassified only if the 
managers have really changed their intentions about the particular investment, as 
prescribed by the accounting standard.   
 
Interviewees G, L and M suggested that, a bank should be in a position to justify 
a reclassification decisions to the Central Bank, so it cannot be done arbitrarily.   
 
“Any reclassification must meet the conditions prescribed in the relevant 
Accounting Standard. If the conditions cannot be met, the reclassification cannot be 
done” (Interviewee H).  
 
“If reclassifications cannot be justified, the bank is likely to receive a qualified 
audit opinion” (Interviewee I).  
 
Only one had a different opinion. This person said:  
“Reclassifications have been made for a while with the intention to manage 








Opportunity 3: Increase in Insurance Liabilities 
All the participants disagreed that the level of insurance liabilities can be used by 
banks for managing profitability. This is because the estimates are made by experts and 
the reliability of the measure is considered to be high. More specifically:  
 
Interviewees A, B, C and D commented that, it is common industry practice for 
these decisions to be made by independent actuaries.  
 
“The assumptions made for the level of insurance liabilities cannot differ from the 
reality a lot because they have to be accepted by the auditors” (Interviewee E).  
 
Interviewees F, I and J said that, all the assumptions about insurance liabilities 
are made by actuaries who are independent professionals.  
 
Interviewees G, K and L also suggested that, decisions about actuarial 
assumptions are made by individuals with relevant qualifications and experience.   
 
“The insurance cost taken to the income statement cannot be used for earnings 
management, because the decisions are made by independent experts” (Interviewee 
H).  
 
All assumptions made about the insurance liabilities can be challenged by the 
auditor (Interviewee M).  
 
Opportunity 4: Depreciation, Amortization and Impairment of Property, Plant, Equipment 
and Intangibles  
The participants disagreed that depreciation and amortization provide significant 
flexibility to manage profits. They commented that the depreciation method used is the 
straight line and this is not frequently changed. They also said that the depreciation 
estimates are made within a specific range and are not frequently changed.  
 
Eleven of the respondents disagreed that impairments can be used to manage 




Individuals A, B, C, D and E argued that impairments of these assets are not 
recurring and that they are challenged by auditors and by the Central Bank supervisors.   
 
Participants F, H, I, J K, and L said that an impairment test is conducted for 
property plant and equipment when the market value of the asset has declined or if the 
cash flows needed to operate the asset exceed expectations.  
 
Respondents F, H, I, J K, and L also claimed that for intangibles like goodwill or 
insurance contracts, the impairment is deemed necessary when the cash flows 
generated from the assets are less than expected. Technological changes determine 
when software should be tested for impairment.  
 
Respondents J and H added that the impairment assumptions must be accepted 
by the auditor and the Central Bank.  
 
Individuals F, H and K also said that, impairment test are not conducted every 
year, so the non-recurring nature of this item makes it unlikely that it can be used for 
earnings management.  
 
 
Individuals G and M had a different opinion. They argued that, impairment 
estimates are based on a lot of assumptions and this expense may be underestimated 
 
Opportunity 5: Sale and Revaluation of Investment Properties 
The respondents disagreed that sales of investment properties are used for 
earnings management because of its non-recurring nature. The arguments made were 
as follows: 
 
Interviewees A and D agreed that, banks acquire such properties not for capital 
appreciation purposes but as part of debt-settlements.  But since investment properties 
are obtained at a good price, when they are sold they are likely to book profits.  
 
“According to the Central Bank, these properties must be sold within three years 
from acquisition date, so waiting longer than hoping for more capital appreciation is not 





Interviewees B and C said that, investment properties do not comprise a large 
item, their sale is non-recurring thus not making them a useful tool for earnings 
management.   
 
Interviewees F and H suggested that banks hold investment properties because 
they accept them in order to settle debts, not because they can time their sale to book 
profits.  
 
Interviewees G and I said that, investments properties are properties that have 
been seized; banks eventually dispose of them, and if they manage to book a profit 
that‟s even better.   
 
Interviewees J and L claimed that banks do not hold investment properties for 
capital appreciation purposes; the Central Bank requires that these properties be 
disposed within three years from the day they were obtained.     
 
Interviewees K and M suggested that, the size of investments properties held by 
banks is not so large, so that it would justify the timing of a sale in order to book a gain.   
 
 
Eleven of the respondents disagreed that the revaluation of investment 
properties provides flexibility for manipulation.  The comments made were:   
Individuals A, B, C, D and E stated that the evaluation is done by independent 
professional evaluators who must follow certain guidelines when conducting their 
evaluation i.e. the age of the property, prices of similar properties in the nearby area 
and so on. Thus the reliability of the measure is considered to be high.    
 
Interviewees F, H and K agreed that, revaluation of investment properties cannot 
be used to inflate earnings, because valuations are done by experts.  
 
Similarly, interviewees J and L suggested that, valuations are made by 
independent professionals with the necessary qualifications and expertise.  
 
“The individuals that carry out the valuations have a relevant degree and follow 
specific guidelines when making their appraisals, i.e. the age of the property, prices of 
similar properties in the nearby area and so on” (Interviewee I).  
 
Two individuals, G an M, agreed that revaluations of investment properties can 
be used for earnings management. They argued that, revaluations can be optimistic in 






Opportunity 6: Defined Benefit Plans, Cost of Share Based Payments 
The participants disagreed that defined benefit plans are used by banks for 
managing profitability. This is because defined benefit plan estimates are made by 
experts, they are non-recurring and must be accepted by the auditor. More specifically it 
was stated: 
“Even though a lot of assumptions are involved when making estimates, these 
are made by independent actuaries” (Interviewee A).  
 
Interviewees B and E agreed that, the assumptions made cannot be unrealistic 
and they have to be accepted by the auditor as well.  
 
“Even if this item could be used as a way to affect reported profits, its impact 
would be non-recurring because changes in actuarial assumptions are made every two 
to three years” (Interviewee C).  
 
“The significant impact on profitability has not come from changes in actuarial 
assumptions but from the change from defined benefit to defined contribution plans as 
of 2012 (Interviewee D).   
 
Respondents F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M said that the assumptions about these 
plans are made by actuaries who are independent professionals, with qualifications and 
expertise. So the plan cost cannot be used to manipulate profits.   
 
Respondents J, K and L also stressed that, actuarial assumptions are not revised 
yearly, so even if banks could manipulate the cost, the impact on profitability would be 
non-recurring.    
   
Finally interviewees F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M claimed that the plan cost 
assumptions must be accepted by the auditor as well.  
 
 
With reference to the cost of share options the respondents did not agree that 
this is an item with a potentially strong impact on reported profits because of its size and 
because it is audited. In particular: 
 
Interviewees A and B argued that, the amount of the stock options is not so 




Interviewees C and D said that, valuation of options involves estimates, but there 
is a reasonable range within which these estimates can fall.  
 
“Stock option valuations must be accepted by auditors, therefore, discretion is 
limited” (Interviewee E).   
 
Individuals F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M disagreed that stock options is used for 
earnings management. They argued that the compensation packages in Cyprus include 
a small amount, so even if this item was manipulated, the potential impact on the 
bottom line profit would be small.   
 
 
Opportunity 7: Impairment of Associates  
 Eleven of the interviewees disagreed that the impairment of associates can be 
underestimated in order to affect bank profits because it is non-recurring and because it 
is challenged by the auditor and the Central Bank. The following comments were made:  
 
Interviewees A and C agreed that this is a non-recurring item and it is not likely to 
be used for earnings management.  
 
Interviewees B and D said that, banks in Cyprus conduct such impairment tests 
only when there are serious going concern issues, such as the company has law suits 
against it or a lot of defaults on its liabilities.  
 
“The assumptions involved in the determination of the impairment have to be 
accepted by auditors and the Central Bank” (Interviewee E).    
 
Participants F, H, I, J, K and L said that an impairment test is conducted when 
there is serious evidence that operations of the associate are deteriorating, possibly 
leading to future reductions in cash flows.  
 
Respondents J and L added that the impairment assumptions must be accepted 
by the auditor and the Central Bank.  
 
Individuals F, H and K also said that, testing associates for impairment does not 
happen every year, so the non-recurring nature of this item makes it unlikely that it can 
be used for earnings management.  
 
Two Interviewees, G and M, agreed that the impairment of associates can be 




projected cash flows from the associate as a whole business, and the projections are 
highly uncertain.  
 
Opportunity 8: Realized Gains and Losses from Sale of Derivatives, Revaluation of 
Derivatives 
The interviewees disagreed that realized gains and losses from the sale of 
derivatives can be used as a tool to manage earnings. They claimed that, derivatives 
are not purchased for speculative purposes. They said that, banks buy derivatives in 
order to hedge the risks to which they are exposed. Derivatives are derecognized from 
the books when they have expired, terminated or exercised.   
 
The respondents also disagreed that unrealized gains and losses can be used as 
a way to manage profitability. More specifically:  
Interviewees A, B, C, D and E argued that, banks hold derivatives that are valued 
mostly using Level 1 and Level 2 inputs. Therefore, the measurement reliability is high. 
 
Respondents F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M argued that, banks in Cyprus usually buy 
or sell derivatives through organized exchanges. So derivatives are actively traded and 
have a quoted price. This does not leave any room for managing any unrealized gains 
and losses recognized when derivatives are marked to market at year end.  
 
Opportunity 9: Reduction of Deferred Tax Asset    
The respondents disagreed that impairment of the deferred tax asset can be 
underestimated so as to increase profits. More specifically, the following comments 
were made:  
 
Interviewees A, B, C and D agreed that this item is challenged by the auditors 





“The Central Bank cooperates with the tax authorities, which may question the 
level of provisions to reduce tax assets and may make recommendations for revisions” 
(Interviewee E).     
 
Respondents F, H, I, J, K and L argued that, the reasons that determine whether 
a deferred tax asset will be realized include: loss carry forwards, sufficient temporary 
differences and tax planning opportunities.  Where a bank has a loss carry forward 
option, which would mean it has a loss, the loss would be visible to auditors and the 
Central Bank. The auditors are also in a position to determine if temporary differences 
caused by depreciation, loan loss provisions etc. are sufficient to so that the deferred 
tax asset will be realized. Finally, the respondents said that, where auditors provide tax 
services to their clients, they should be aware of future tax planning opportunities.  
 
Two Individuals, G and M, agreed that the reduction of the deferred tax asset can 
be understated in order to manage profits. They said that such impairment test is based 
on a lot of forward looking assumptions, which are highly discretionary.  
 
Question 3  
“It would be appreciated if you could have a look at the list of disincentives for earnings 
management. Would you like to explain how much each item affects managerial 
decisions and which items do you think are the most important?” 
 
The disincentives for earnings management and a summary of the respondents‟ 
comments follow:  
 
Disincentive 1: The Cyprus Stock Exchange and Company Laws 
The respondents disagreed that these laws were binding for bank boards, at 
least during the period of the research. More specifically: 
  
Respondents A, B, C, D and E disagreed that these laws were binding for bank 
boards. They argued that, up to the period of the crisis, no director has been imprisoned 
or requested to pay a fine for damages caused to investors. Neither has the Stock 




information. This would apply more to situations of fraud and not earnings management 
within the GAAP.  
 
“These laws have not restrained the actions of board members or other top 
executives, so how could they have mitigated earnings management” (Interviewee F).  
 
“The Cyprus Stock Exchange has never questioned the quality of financial 
reports of listed firms” (Interviewee G).  
 
“I do not believe that the provisions of the Company Law and the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange Law have been properly enforced, so how could they be a disincentive for 
profit manipulation” (Interviewee I). 
 
“The regulatory framework is in place, but I do not believe that it is been strictly 
adhered to” (Interviewee M).  
 
Respondents H, J, K and L argued that, in Cyprus, no banker has gone to jail or 
at least asked to pay for damages caused to investors or depositors. So the provisions 
of the above mentioned laws will hopefully be a disincentive for earnings management 
in the period after the crisis.  
 
 
Disincentive 2: Effective Boards and Effective Audit Committees  
The respondents disagreed that the audit committees can act as a disincentive 
for earnings management, but bank boards are considered extremely important in 
controlling earnings management. Specifically, the following comments were made: 
 
“Even though audit committees perform their duties diligently and do a thorough 
investigation of the financial statements, the final approval comes from the board” 
(Interviewee A).  
Interviewees B and D agreed that, audit committee members are part of the 
board so the control of earnings management is ultimately exercised by the board.  
 
“The responsibility to govern and control banks rests with the board of directors, 
who should recognize the importance of implementing sound practices in order to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth” (Interviewee C).  
 
“The importance of bank boards is confirmed by the fact that, when the directors 
of one of the surviving banks resigned, it took the government a month to appoint new 
members. This is because nobody wants to be a director since they now realise their 





Individuals F and I argued that the ultimate responsibility for good corporate 
governance and honest financial reporting rests with bank boards 
 
Respondents G and J argued that the various board committees, including the 
audit committee are derived from the board; so if there is a need to constrain earnings 
management, this should come from the board.  
 
Interviewees H and K suggested that the audit committee is supposed to ensure 
that the final accounts present the true and fair view, but the ultimate responsibility 
belongs to the board.  
 
“Boards had the responsibility to ensure that banks had proper procedure to 
monitor and control risks and provide necessary checks for top managers” (Interviewee 
L).  
 
“The importance of bank boards is confirmed by the fact that, the pending 
lawsuits for damages caused to both shareholders and depositors are against board 
members and not simply audit committee members” (Interviewee M).  
 
 
At this point the participants were asked: “since there are legal requirements for 
independent boards which should include competent and fit individuals, how is it 
possible that our banking system is in this predicament?” The answers were:   
 
Interviewees A, B, C and E agreed that, the legislation is there, the willingness to 
obey is there, but there are no right people to implement it.  
 
“Board members are not bankers, they don’t know anything about banking 
operations and that is why our banking system is now in crisis” (Interviewee D).   
 
The remaining participants (F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M) agreed that, even though 
the Central Bank has all the powers necessary to ensure that banks operated prudently, 









Disincentive 3: Inside Ownership  
With reference to inside ownership, six respondents agreed that inside board 
ownership, acquired in the form of stock options is an important disincentive for 
earnings management. The comments made were as follows:  
  
“Stock options put board members in the same position with shareholders. The 
boards’ obligation is to supervise management and not to satisfy their own personal 
interest in the short run” (Interviewee A).  
 
Respondents F, G, I, K and L agreed that inside board ownership, acquired in the 
form of stock options could be an important disincentive for earnings management. 
These individuals said that compensation packages in Cyprus include a small portion in 
the form of stock options. It is possible that more inside ownership could provide 
executives with an incentive to think about the value of their investment in the long run.    
 
 
The remaining participants argued that compensation in the form of stock cannot 
limit earnings management. More specifically:  
 
Interviewees B and C agreed that, the award of stock options has led to personal 
greed and as a result earnings management was used to maximize boards‟ own wealth.  
 
Interviewees D and E said that bank boards have operated without ever 
considering the shareholders or the depositors, they cared only about their personal 
wealth.  
 
Participants H, J and M said that, up to the period of the crisis, bank boards have 
proven that they care about their personal wealth. If profitability has an increasing effect 
on stock price, board members will manage earnings to maximize the value of the 
shares they hold.  
 
Disincentive 4: Active Engagement and Dialogue by Shareholders  
The respondents disagreed that active engagement and dialogue is a controlling 




was argued that: 
“The role of shareholders is cosmetic” (Interviewee A). 
 
“Some shareholders may come to the annual general meetings and ask 
questions about the final accounts but their contribution is not significant” (Interviewee 
B).  
 
“Shareholders and especially smaller ones view themselves as having a 
negligible effect on shareholder meetings and they opt out of bank control” (Interviewee 
C).   
  
“A few shareholders, who are usually the same people, shout at general 
meetings, even if there is no real problem, without offering any constructive comments” 
(Interviewee D).  
 
“Shareholders become really involved only in times of crisis, when their 
investment is in danger” (Interviewee E).   
 
Individuals F and M said that shareholders did not care about engagement, most 
of them were invited to the general annual meetings and did not come.  
 
Participants G and L argued that most of the bank shareholders were individuals 
that had no knowledge of accounting and other bank issues, so essentially they had no 
“voice”.  
 
Respondents H and K suggested that, shareholders in Cyprus became involved 
only when the crisis became evident and their investments were wiped out.  
 
Finally, individuals I and J claimed that, many shareholders did not come to the 
meetings, but even those who did come had nothing significant to contribute due to lack 
of skills in accounting and other bank issues.   
 
 
Disincentive 5: The Quality of Audit  
Four individuals agreed that auditing is a disincentive for earnings management> 
More specifically:  
“The quality of the audits is enhanced because they are conducted by the Big 
Four auditors who are more experienced. And auditing independence is secured by 
separating auditing and other services” (Interviewee A).  
 




prepare a report to managers on things they should correct (the management audit 
report) in order to improve the true and fair view of the final accounts” (Interviewee E).  
 
Individuals F and G argued that, in Cyprus, the bank audits are conducted by 
auditors of the Big Four accounting firms. Given that these auditors are more 
experienced, they should be in a position to challenge management on issues they 
do not agree, including accounting estimates and choices.   
 
The remaining respondents argued that the quality of the audit is compromised 
and hence cannot limit discretion over reported profits. More specifically:  
 
“Auditors have developed a lot of inter-personal relationships with their 
customers and therefore their independence is compromised” (Interviewee B).  
 
“The fact that there is no audit rotation points to their lack of independence and 
hence the quality of the services offered” (Interviewee C). 
 
“It is questionable if the quality of the audit is a control of earnings management 
due to lack of independence and the high fees paid to audit firms” (Interviewee D). 
 
 Individuals H and K said that, the audit independence is compromised because 
two Big audit firms are responsible for the audit of nine out of the twelve commercial 
banks in the country. So this audit concentration may make auditors more inclined to 
satisfy customer wishes. 
 
Respondents I and J suggested that, the audit firms in Cyprus offer a lot of non- 
audit services to banks, hence audit independence may be compromised due to the 
high non-audit fees paid.  
 
Finally, participants L and M argued that, there is no audit rotation and auditors 
have developed close relationships with their customers. This makes it possible that 
auditors may be tolerant to creative accounting.  
 
 
Disincentive 6: The Relationship Between Auditors and the Central Bank. 
Except for the auditor, the interviewees did not consider the relationship of 





Respondents A, B, C and D confirmed that the required tripartite annual general 
meetings do take place and the items discussed are mainly determined by the Central 
Bank. Even though auditors are allowed to ask for the inclusion of other items on the 
agenda, about which the bank concerned may disagree, this has never occurred. The 
auditors have never asked for bilateral meetings with the Central Bank because they 
had suspicions that the bank concerned violated the Banking Law. They usually take 
the side of the bank they audit.  
 
Respondents F, H, J and L stressed that, auditors should have understood that 
Central Bank‟s major role was to protect depositors and hence auditors should have 
provided the Bank with all the necessary information for inspection and supervision.  
 
“No auditor has requested for a bilateral meeting with the Central Bank in order 
to communicate any suspected violations of the laws or inadequate applications of 
accounting standards” (Interviewee G).  
 
“Trilateral meetings between the bank, the auditors and the central banks were 
not arranged on a regular basis i.e. annually” (Interviewee I). 
 
“The relationship of auditors with the central bank seems to have been neglected 
up to the period of the crisis” (Interviewee K). 
 
“In the trilateral meetings, there were instances where the auditor sided with 
management” (Interviewee M). 
 
 
Disincentive 7: Supervision and Inspection by the Central Bank 
The respondents disagreed that the supervision and inspection by the Central 
Bank has acted as a disincentive for earnings management, a fact which is confirmed 
by the recent financial crisis. More specifically:   
 
Interviewees A and D agreed that, the recent financial confirms that Central Bank 
has not been discharging its inspection and supervision duties properly.  
 
Interviewees B and E said that, lax supervision by the Central Bank is confirmed 
by the fact that, some members of the Central Bank‟s board have resigned, claiming 






“Supervision and inspection by the Central Bank does not act as a disincentive 
for earnings management simply because those responsible do not do their job 
properly” (Interviewee C).   
 
All respondents (F, G, H, I, J, K, L and M) agreed that, the financial crisis 
confirms that the Central Bank has obviously been ineffective with its inspections and 
supervisions 
 
“Inefficient supervision has not restrained Cypriot banks from investing heavily in 
Greece, a country facing problems for so many years (Interviewee F).   
 
“Up to the period of the crisis, the supervision and inspection division of the 
Central Bank was potentially under resourced in terms of numbers and experience of 
staff members (Interviewee G).    
 
“Supervisors did not properly identify and prioritize risks” (Interviewee J).     
 
“The Central Bank failed to anticipate or mitigate the risks that banks were 
exposed to, especially for those banks that expanded in foreign markets, and 
specifically in Greece” (Interviewee K). 
 
 “Systemically important banks should have had more intensive supervision”  




“According to your experience, do you think that the list of incentives, opportunities and 
disincentives on earnings management is correct and complete? If not, what other items 
do you think should be included?” 
All the participants confirmed that, based on their experience with banks and the 
laws and regulations that affect them, the list was complete and accurate.    
 
The reason that this question was asked was because there was a need to 
establish that the conclusions from the regulatory review were accurate. The laws and 




amended over the years, so it was necessary to ensure that there were no mistakes. 
Second, it was crucial to confirm that the list was complete, because there would not be 
a chance for a second interview to discuss more issues. Thus, if participants, based on 
their experience, had a suggestion to make, the interview could be directed in such a 
way so as to include the new issues.  
 
6.4 Most Significant Incentives, Disincentives and Opportunities for Earnings 
Management in Cyprus 
 After having conducted the interviews, the next step was analyse the data 
collected and determine which incentives, opportunities and disincentives were 
considered to be the most significant for Cyprus.   
 
Table 19 on the following page includes a list of all the possible incentives for 













Table 19: Most Important Incentives for Earnings Management in Cyprus 
Incentives for earnings management Agree  Disagree 
Increase profitability so as to increase the capital base for 





Attract and maintain shareholders, stock price effect  0 13 






Job security concerns  0 13 
   
The above results show that for Cyprus, the most important incentives for banks‟ 
earnings management were the capital adequacy and the compensation of executives 
and key management personnel. These findings are confirmed by the Cyprus reality. 
When the financial crisis made itself evident, the most serious issues that attracted the 
attention of regulators, of the media and the public were the recapitalization of banks 
and the variable remuneration of boards. It is also true that nobody was fired from 
banks, at least up to the period of the crisis. Furthermore, the crisis also proves that 
banks were not sensitive about shareholders‟ interests. Based on these results, the two 
incentives that were examined in this research were the capital adequacy ratio and 
variable compensation in the form of a cash bonus.  
 
Table 20 on the next page includes a list of all the possible opportunities for 







Table 20: Most Important Opportunities for Earnings Management in Cyprus 
Opportunities for earnings management Agree  Disagree 
Loan loss provisions and loan impairments 13 0 
Optimistic collaterals to avoid classifying loans as non- performing  3 10 
Renegotiated loans 1 12 
Real gains and losses from sales of investments  13 0 
Unrealized gains and losses from investment revaluation  0 13 
Impairment of investments 2 11 
Reclassification of investments 1 12 
Increase in insurance liabilities 0 13 
Depreciation, amortization and impairment of property, plant, 
equipment and intangibles 
2 11 
Sale and revaluation of investment properties 2 11 
Defined benefit plans 0 13 
Cost of share based payments 0 13 
Impairment of associates 2 11 
Realized gains and losses from sale and revaluation of derivatives 0 13 
Reduction of deferred tax asset 2 11 
 
According to the above findings, the most important opportunities for earnings 
management were the loan loss provisions and the real gains and losses from the sale 
of investments. For this reason, real securities gains and losses and loan loss 
provisions and impairments were included in the research study as opportunities for 





Furthermore, with reference to the remaining income statement variables, 
individuals G and M agreed that revaluations of collaterals and investment properties 
and asset impairments could be used as tools for earnings management.  
 
All the other participants said that, the remaining income statement variables 
were not opportunities for earnings management arguing: non-recurring nature; small 
size and consequently small impact on profits; measurements by independent experts; 
or measurements based on evidence and by reference to similar transactions. They 
also claimed that these variables were not manageable because they were audited and 
challenged by the Central Bank. But when they were asked whether the quality of the 
audit and the supervision and inspection by the Central Bank could be disincentives for 
earnings management, they answered that auditors have not been independent and 
that the Central Bank has not been effective.  
 
The problem with the opportunities for earnings management is that they involve 
choices and estimates that are not transparent like the incentives or disincentives for 
such practices i.e. they may never make the news. In view of the possibility that the 
participants did not want to reveal inside information about accounting choices, and 
because it was not possible to examine all income statement variables one by one, the 
researcher decided to use accruals as an additional measure for earnings management. 
Accruals are measured as the difference between net income and operating cash flows. 
Thus they include depreciation, amortization, revaluations, impairments etc. and capture 




The following table includes a list of all the possible disincentives for earnings 
management, and the number of interviewees that agreed or disagreed.  
 
Table 21: Most Important Disincentives for Earnings Management in Cyprus 
Disincentives for earnings management Agree  Disagree 
The Cyprus Stock Exchange and Company Laws 0 13 
Effective boards 13 0 
Effective audit committees 0 13 
Inside ownership 6 7 
Active engagement and dialogue by shareholders 0 13 
Quality of the audit 4 9 
Relationship with the auditor and the Central Bank 1 12 
Supervision and inspection by the Central Bank 0 13 
 
The above results show that for Cyprus, the most important disincentive for 
earnings management was the board of directors, a finding which is consistent with the 
Cyprus reality. When the financial crisis made itself evident, only board members were 
held responsible and consequently were sued. Nobody has blamed audit committees, 
bank auditors, or even shareholders for their lack of engagement. In addition, the 
inefficiency of the Central Bank was “quickly fixed” by replacing the previous governor, 
without penalties. Considering the above findings, one of the disincentives for earnings 






With reference to inside ownership six individuals agreed that it can be a 
disincentive for earnings management and seven people had a different opinion. Inside 
ownership is acquired from stock options and seven out of thirteen individuals agreed 
that the award of stock options was an incentive for earnings management in order to 
maximize boards own wealth. However, there is evidence in the literature that, inside 
ownership can lead to the entrenchment effect or the alignment effect. For this reason, 
inside ownership was included in the research study as both an incentive and a 
disincentive for earnings management.  
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter includes the results from interviews that were conducted in order to 
determine which of the incentives, opportunities and disincentives for earnings 
management were considered to be the most important in Cyprus.  
 
Interviews were conducted with thirteen individuals. The sample included either a 
CEO or a CFO from each of the twelve commercial banks that operate in Cyprus. An 
auditor was also chosen because he works for an audit firm that is responsible for the 
auditing of five out of the twelve commercial banks in Cyprus. He is therefore 
experienced in banking matters.  
 
The interview type was semi structured. Four general, open ended questions 
were prepared in advance. In all interviews, the questions asked were exactly the same 




The interview results have shown that for Cyprus, the most important incentives 
for earnings management were the capital adequacy and variable compensation of 
executives and key management personnel. In addition, the most important disincentive 
for earnings management was the board of directors.  Inside ownership acquired from 
stock options was treated as both an incentive (the entrenchment effect) and a 
disincentive for earnings management (the alignment effect).  
 
The interview results have also shown that for Cyprus, the most important 
income statement variables that provide opportunities for earnings management were 
the loan loss provisions and the real gains and losses from the sale of investments. For 
the remaining income statement items, the participants said that, they were not used for 
earnings management arguing, amongst other justifications, auditing and challenge by 
the Central Bank. But at the same time, they argued that, auditors have not been 
independent and that the Central Bank has not been effective. In view of the possibility 
that the participants did not want to reveal inside information about accounting choices, 
and because it was not possible to examine all income statement variables one by one, 
the researcher decided to use accruals as an additional measure for earnings 









Chapter 7: Empirical Analysis, Part 2; Testing for Earnings Management 
 
7.1 Introduction 
At the beginning of the research, a critical evaluation of the earnings 
management literature was conducted and the research objectives were set. In the next 
stage, the laws that affect banks‟ financial reporting were critically evaluated, and this 
review produced a list of all the possible incentives, opportunities and disincentives for 
Cyprus. Interviews were then conducted with individuals involved in the financial 
reporting of banks, in order to determine the most significant incentives, opportunities 
and disincentives for earnings management for Cyprus. 
 
This chapter includes the research hypotheses that were formulated based on 
the interview results. Executive compensation and capital adequacy were hypothesized 
to be incentives for earnings management whereas bank boards were assumed to be 
disincentives for earnings management. Other bank specific variables that could provide 
explanatory variations in earnings management were also considered. Loan loss 
provisions, real securities gains and losses and accruals were used as opportunities for 
earnings management. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 
7.2 includes the data and the methodology; Section 7.3 reviews how the incentives 
and disincentives can affect earnings management in order to formulate the 
hypotheses. Other bank specific variables that may provide explanatory variations 
in earnings management are also described; Section 7.4 includes the tests for 




includes an interpretation of the findings.    
 
7.2 Data and Methodology 
 
7.2.1 Data    
As discussed in chapter 3: “The Banking Sector of Cyprus” banks are classified 
into three categories: local banks, branches of foreign banks (from EU and non- EU 
countries), representative offices.    
 
Branches of foreign banks and bank representative offices are required to submit 
information about their activities to the Central Bank of Cyprus, but this information 
cannot be made publicly available since the host competent supervisory authority is 
binded by secrecy. Therefore, they are excluded from the study due to unavailable data.   
 
The local banks are further classified as: commercial banks listed in the Stock 
Exchange; commercial banks that are subsidiaries of foreign banks; cooperative 
societies; and other banks. The subsidiaries of foreign banks, the cooperative societies 
and other banks are required to submit a copy of their final accounts with the Central 
Bank of Cyprus, but this information is not available because they are not listed. Hence, 
they are excluded from the study. The dataset used in this study is therefore limited to the 
four listed commercial banks in Cyprus, which are: the Bank of Cyprus, Laiki Bank, 




These banks became listed on March 29‟ 1996 when the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
began its operations. The corporate governance code was issued in September of 2001 
and became a requirement as of 2002. Consequently, since this study examined the effect 
of corporate governance on earnings management, observations for the period from 1996 
to 2001 were excluded due to the unavailability of governance information.  
 
Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic Bank and Laiki Bank were able to comply with the code 
immediately. Universal Savings Bank was able to comply in year 2004. Hence, the period 
examined includes the following years: 2002 – 2011 for Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic Bank and 
Laiki; and 2004 – 2011 for Universal Savings Bank. This available information produced a 
total number of 38 firm-year observations, which constitute the total population.  
 
According to Central Bank statistics, the total deposits of the sample banks 
constitute, on average, 54% of the total bank deposits, whereas the total loans comprise, 
on average, 49% of total bank loans. Therefore, the sample banks‟ practices represent 
the operations of half the Cyprus banking sector.  
 
Accounting data have been extracted from the annual financial reports. The 
corporate governance data have been taken from the reports on corporate governance 







7.2.2 Methodology  
As explained in Chapter 5” Theory of Methodology”, this research is classified under 
the critical realism paradigm. Critical realism advocates methodological pluralism 
(Wikgren, 2005). Methodological pluralism or mixed approach in methodology allows 
the use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (Zachariadis and Scott, 
2010). Easton (2010) argues that a mixed methodology design can be sequential. In 
other words, the results of a qualitative analysis can be used as inputs in the 
quantitative analysis. The empirical results of a qualitative analysis can also help to 
reduce the data from the conceptual frameworks developed and help with the 
formulation of hypotheses. In this research study, the first part of the empirical analysis 
includes the results from interviews which were conducted with individuals involved in 
the financial reporting of banks. The interview results revealed the most significant 
incentives, opportunities and disincentives for earnings management for Cyprus and 
helped to formulate the hypotheses 
 
In critical realism, if demi-regularities observed from the qualitative analysis can 
be quantified, regressions may be used, where structural variables can be treated as 
either independent or dependent variables (Olsen,   2009). The use of regressions is 
not about measuring laws, but about testing the hypotheses (Zachariadis and Scott, 
2010). Consistent with this argument, since the results obtained from the interviews 
could be quantified, regressions were used to develop measures for earnings 
management and regressions were estimated to test the hypotheses. The incentives 




whereas the opportunities for earnings management were treated as dependent 
variables.    
 
7.3 Incentives and Disincentives for Earnings Management and Other Bank Specific 
Variables  
 Considering the results from the interviews, the following hypotheses were formulated:  
 
7.3.1 Executive Compensation    
The remuneration package of executive directors may include both variable and 
non-variable components48. The variable elements consist of bonuses and stock 
options, which are performance related. The term “performance” encompasses the 
evaluation of the individual performance as well as that of the performance of the bank. 
Variable remuneration that is connected to profitability therefore creates an incentive for 
earnings management.  
 
When a cash bonus scheme exists, it encourages discretion to manage reported 
earnings upwards. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, variable executive compensation in the form of cash 
bonus will lead to higher levels of earnings management by overstating discretionary 
securities gains and losses and understating discretionary loan loss provisions.  
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Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris paribus, variable executive compensation in the form of cash 
bonus will lead to higher levels of earnings management through the use of 
discretionary accruals.  
 
When executive compensation is tied to the price of the firm's stock (through 
stock options) executives may allow earnings management to improve the apparent 
performance of the firm and, consequently, increase board members' personal wealth. 
Alternatively, the use of share options plans can be viewed as a way to align executive 
and shareholder interests. Stock ownership by executive board members gives them an 
incentive to monitor managers carefully. These arguments lead to the following 
hypotheses:  
  
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, higher levels of inside board ownership will lead to 
higher levels of earnings management by overstating discretionary securities gains and 
losses and understating discretionary loan loss provisions.  
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, higher levels of inside board ownership will lead to 
higher levels of earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals.   
Hypothesis 2c: Ceteris paribus, higher levels of inside board ownership will lead to 
lower levels of earnings management through the use of discretionary securities gains 
and losses and discretionary loan loss provisions.  
Hypothesis 2d: Ceteris paribus, higher levels of inside board ownership will lead to 





7.3.2 Capital Adequacy 
According to the Banking Law (1997), the Central Bank requires banks to 
maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio, which expresses the capital base as a 
proportion of the risk weighted assets and off balance sheet items. To ensure 
compliance with the minimum capital standards, the Central Bank can impose restrictive 
measures to non-complying banks. The minimum capital adequacy ratio can be 
managed if a bank changes the numerator, the denominator or both. Banks may pursue 
capital strengthening through the management of risk weighted assets or the increase 
in share capital. They may also increase both their capital base and the capital 
adequacy with internal capital generation through profitability. Therefore, when capital 
levels are low relative to the minimum required, managers have incentives to manage 
earnings in order to increase their capital adequacy ratios. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
  
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, lower levels of capital lead to higher levels of earnings 
management by overstating discretionary securities gains and losses and understating 
discretionary loan loss provisions.  
Hypothesis 3b: Ceteris paribus, lower levels of capital lead to higher levels of earnings 
management through the use of discretionary accruals.   
 
7.3.3 Board Effectiveness   
Banks are governed and controlled by the board of directors, who must operate 




Exchange, the Banking Laws and the Bank‟s Articles of Association. Bank boards 
should recognize the importance of implementing sound corporate governance together 
with practices followed by the various committees in order to maximize shareholders‟ 
wealth. Board effectiveness can be achieved through independence, splitting the role of 
the chairman and the CEO, whether the CEO sits in the nomination committee and 
board meetings.      
 
7.3.3.1 Board Independence  
The board of directors should have a balance of executive and non executive 
directors. At least 50% of the members of the board of directors, excluding the 
chairman, must be independent, non-executive directors49. If the 50% rule is not met, 
then at least one third of the directors must be independent. If the board is dominated 
by a greater proportion of independent directors, it may play an important role in 
monitoring top management and hence associated with lower levels of earnings 
management. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Ceteris paribus, board independence leads to lower levels of earnings 
management through the use of discretionary securities gains and losses and 
discretionary loan loss provisions.    
Hypothesis 4b: Ceteris paribus, board independence leads to lower levels of earnings 
management through the use of discretionary accruals.     
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7.3.3.2 Splitting the Role of the Chairman and the CEO  
The roles of the chairman and the CEO should not be exercised by the same 
individual50. When the roles are not split, board independence is compromised because 
the chief executive has more power, potentially allowing for more management 
discretion. No duality may also allow the CEO to effectively control information available 
to other board members, thereby obstructing managerial monitoring. This leads to the 
following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Ceteris paribus, when the roles of the chairman and the CEO are not 
split, this will lead to higher levels of earnings management by overstating discretionary 
securities gains and losses and understating discretionary loan loss provisions.    
Hypothesis 5b: Ceteris paribus, when the roles of the chairman and the CEO are not 
split, this will lead to higher levels of earnings management through the use of 
discretionary accruals.     
 
7.3.3.3 The CEO Sits in the Nomination Committee 
The independence of the board of directors may also be compromised if the CEO 
sits in the nominating committee because the CEO is involved in the selection of 
nominees for board positions. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 6a: Ceteris paribus, when the CEO sits in the nomination committee, this 
will lead to higher levels of earnings management by overstating discretionary securities 
gains and losses and understating discretionary loan loss provisions.    
Hypothesis 6b: Ceteris paribus, when the CEO sits in the nomination committee, this 
will lead to higher levels of earnings management through the use of discretionary 
accruals.     
 
7.3.3.4 Board Meetings  
The board of directors must call one annual general meeting and as many 
extraordinary general meetings as they see fit51. The board of directors must dedicate 
the required time and attention in order to carry out their duties properly should meet 
regularly, at least six times a year52.  When boards meet frequently, it may be assumed 
that they devote the required time to perform their duties diligently and remedy urgent 
matters. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 7a: Ceteris paribus, board activity will lead to lower levels of earnings 
management through the use of discretionary securities gains and losses and 
discretionary loan loss provisions.  
Hypothesis 7b: Ceteris paribus, board activity will lead to lower levels of earnings 
management through the use of discretionary accruals.   
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7.3.4 Bank Size  
Large firms are considered to be politically visible since their activities affect a 
large number of people and because size conveys the feeling of power (Hagerman and 
Zmijeski, 1979). Even though bank regulators have the responsibility to maintain the 
safety and soundness of the entire banking industry, they have at least some tendency 
to scrutinize more closely the largest institutions that have the potential to severely 
impact the industry and the overall economy should problems arise. Consequently, 
larger banks may be less likely to engage in earnings management. The natural 
logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for bank size. This leads to the following 
hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 8a: Ceteris paribus, larger banks are less likely to engage in earnings 
management by overstating discretionary securities gains and losses and understating 
discretionary loan loss provisions.  
Hypothesis 8b: Ceteris paribus, larger banks are less likely to engage in earnings 
management through the use of discretionary accruals.   
 
7.3.5 Growth 
Firms with increased growth opportunities are likely to report less discretionary 
accruals because they experience increased monitoring (Cornett et al., 2009). Therefore, 
increased monitoring provides fewer opportunities for earnings management . The 
market-to-book ratio of equity is used as a proxy of growth prospects.  This leads to the 





Hypothesis 9a: Ceteris paribus, growing banks are less likely to engage in earnings 
management through the use of discretionary securities gains and losses and 
discretionary loan loss provisions.  
Hypothesis 9b: Ceteris paribus, growing banks are less likely to engage in earnings 
management through the use of discretionary accruals.   
 
7.3.6 Leverage  
Firms with higher debt have more incentives to manage earnings in order to 
reduce the probability of violating covenants in debt contracts (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990). More leveraged banks are therefore expected to artificially inflate accounting 
earnings for reasons related to debt contract restrictions. This leads to the following 
hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 10a: Ceteris paribus, more leveraged banks are likely to engage in earnings 
management by overstating discretionary securities gains and losses and understating 
discretionary loan loss provisions.  
Hypothesis 10b: Ceteris paribus, more leveraged banks are likely to engage in earnings 
management through the use of discretionary accruals.   
 
7.4 Testing for Earnings Management 
This section includes the regressions estimated to develop the measures of 
earnings management (i.e. the opportunities) and the regressions that were 




7.4.1 Loan Loss Provisions and Realized Securities Gains and Losses 
All the interviewees agreed that, the two income statement variables which can 
be used by banks in order to manage profits are the loan loss provisions and the 
gains realised from the sale of investments.   
 
Hence, the first measure for earnings management was based on loan loss 
provisions (LLP‟s) and realized securities gains and losses (RSGL‟s). LLP‟s and 
RSGL‟s include both a non-discretionary and a discretionary component. The 
discretionary component is an appropriate estimate of banks' earnings management 
behaviour. Following Cornett et al., (2009) and Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) the 




LOSS = αit + β1LnASSETit + β2NPLit + β3LLAit + β4LOANMit + β5LOANTRit + 
β6LOANTit + β7LOANCit + β8LOANPit + β9LOANOit + ειt    
 
where: 
i = bank holding company identifier; 
t = year (2002 to 2011); 
LOSS = loan loss provisions as a percentage of total loans; 
LnASSET = the natural log of total assets; 




LLA = loan loss allowance as a percentage of total loans; 
LOANM = manufacturing loans as a percentage of total loans; 
LOANTR = trade loans as a percentage of total loans; 
LOANT = tourism loans as a percentage of total Iοans; 
LOANC = construction loans as a percentage of total loans; 
LOANP = personal and professional loans as a percentage of total loans; 
LOANO = other sector loans as a percentage of total loans; 
ε = error term. 
 
  The discretionary component of loan loss provisions (DLLP‟s) was the error term 
from regression 1. The error term was standardized by total assets and the 
measure was defined as:   
 
DLLP‟sit = (εit x LΟΑΝSit) / ASSΔΤSit       (1) 
where: 
LOANS = total loans  
ASSETS = total assets. 
 
The measure of nondiscretionary loan loss provisions (ΝDLLP‟s) was: 





The next step was to estimate the discretionary part of realized securities gains and 




RSGL‟sit  = αt + β1LnΑSSΔΤit  +  β2UNSGL‟sit  + εit        
 
where:  
i= bank holding company identifier;  
t = year (2002 to 2011); 
RSGL‟s = realized security gains and losses as a percentage of total assets (includes 
realized gains and losses from available-for-sale securities and held-to-maturity 
securities); 
LnASSET = the natural log of total assets; 
URSGL‟s = unrealized security gains and losses (includes only unrealized gains and 
losses from available-for-sale securities) as a percentage of total assets; 
ε = error term. 
 
The discretionary component of realized security gains and losses (DRSGL‟s) 
was the error term from regression 2 and the measure of nondiscretionary realized 
security gains and losses (NDRSGL‟s) was:  





Earnings management (EM) was then measured as the difference between 
discretionary real securities gains and losses (DRSGL‟s) and discretionary loan loss 
provisions (DLLP‟s).  
 
EMit = DRSGL‟sit - DLLP‟sit          (4) 
 
Lower levels of loan loss provisions and higher levels of realized securities gains 
correspond to higher levels of earnings management, which, ceteris paribus, increase 
income.  
 
Non-discretionary earnings management (NDEM) was measured as the 
difference between non discretionary real securities gains (NDRSGL‟s) and losses and 
non discretionary loan loss provisions (NDLLP‟s).   
 
NDEMit = NDRSGL‟sit - NDLLP‟sit        (5) 
 
7.4.2 Accruals  
For the remaining income statement variables most of the participants said that, 
they are not used for earnings management arguing that these items are challenged by 
the auditor and the Central Bank. But at the same time they all agreed that auditors 
have not been independent and that the Central Bank has not been effective. In view of 
the possibility that the participants did not want to reveal inside information about 





variables one by one, the researcher decided to use accruals as an additional measure 
for earnings management. Accruals are measured as the difference between net 
income and operating cash flows. Thus they include depreciation, amortization, 
revaluations, impairments etc. and capture earnings management in a comprehensive 
manner.  
 
The second measure of earnings management was discretionary accruals. 
Following Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) who used the Jones's (1991) model (modified 
for banking institutions by Yasuda et al. 2004), the discretionary portion of bank's total 
accruals was estimated from the following regression:  
 
Regression 3 
ACCRit = β1(1/TAit-1) + β2(ΓΟΙit/ΤAit-1) + β3(ΒRΔit/ΤΑit-1) + εit    
 
where:  
i= bank holding company identifier;  
t = year (2002 to 2011); 
ACCR  = the total accruals estimated as the difference between net income and operating 
cash flows; 
ΤΑ = total assets; 
ΓOI = the change in bank's operating income between t-1 to t; 
BRE = the bank's premises and equipment; 




The discretionary component of total accruals (DACCR) was the error term 
from regression 3.  Higher levels of discretionary accruals will increase net profit 
and vice versa.  
 
Nondiscretionary accruals (NDACCR) were then measured as:  
 
NDACCRit = ACCRit – DACCRit        (6)  
  
After having derived the two measures of earnings management (EM and DACCR), 
two broad sets of regressions were estimated. Regression 4 treats earnings 
management (EM) as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are: cash 
bonus, board ownership, board independence, CEO duality, whether the CEO sits in the 
nominating committee, board meetings, capital adequacy ratio, market to book value, 
the natural logarithm of assets and leverage.  
 
Regression 4 
EMit = β1NDEMit + β2BONUSit + β3DOWNit + β4BIit + β5DCEOit + β6CEONOMit + 
β7MEETit + β8CAPit + β9MKBKit + β10LnAssetit + β11LEVit + εit      
 
where:  
i= bank holding company identifier;  
t = year (2002 to 2011); 
EM = the difference between discretionary real securities gains and losses and 




NDEM = the difference between non discretionary real securities gains and 
losses and of non discretionary loan loss provisions as a percent of total assets ; 
BONUS = 1 if executive compensation includes a cash bonus and 0 otherwise ; 
DOWN = the percentage of shares owned by the board of directors (less the 
shares owned by the CEO if the CEO is sitting on the board); 
BI = (1/ board size) * [INDI / EXDI + NONEXDI)] (following Brick et al. 2006 who 
measure board independence by combining board composition and board size); 
EXDI = the percentage of directors who are executives; 
NONEXDΙ = the percentage of directors who are non executives; 
INDI = the percentage of directors who are independent;  
Board size = the number of directors on the board; 
DCEO = 1 if the CEO is also the board chair and 0 otherwise; 
CEONOM = 1 if the CEO is a member of the nominating committee and 0 otherwise;  
MEET = number of board meetings; 
CAP = the capital adequacy ratio;  
MKBK = total year-end market value of equity of the bank divided by the total year-end 
book value of equity; 
LnAsset  = the natural logarithm of year-end total assets; 
LEV = the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
 
Regression 5 treats discretionary accruals (DACCR) as the dependent variable. 
The explanatory variables are: cash bonus, board ownership, board independence, 








DACRRit = β1NDACCRit + β2BONUSit + β3DOWNit + β4BIit + β5DCEOit + 
β6CEONOMit + β7MEETit + β8CAPit + β9MKBKit + β10lnAssetit)  
+ β11LEVit + εit               
 
where:  
i= bank holding company identifier;  
t = year (2002 to 2011); 
DACCR = discretionary accruals as a percent of total assets; 
NDACCR = non discretionary accruals as a percent of total  assets; 
BONUS = 1 if executive compensation includes a cash bonus and 0 otherwise ; 
DOWN = the percentage of shares owned by the board of directors (less the 
shares owned by the CEO if the CEO is sitting on the board); 
BI = (1/ board size) * [INDI / EXDI + NONEXDI)] (following Brick et al. 2006 who 
measure board independence by combining board composition and board size); 
EXDI = the percentage of directors who are executives; 
NONEXDΙ = the percentage of directors who are non executives; 
INDI = the percentage of directors who are independent;  
Board size = the number of directors on the board; 




CEONOM = 1 if the CEO is a member of the nominating committee and 0 otherwise; 
MEET = number of board meetings; 
CAP = the ratio of actual regulatory capital to the minimum required ratio;  
MKBK = total year-end market value of equity of the bank divided by the total year-end 
book value of equity; 
LnAsset  = the natural logarithm of year-end total assets; 
LEV = the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
 
7.5 Empirical Results 
Table 22 on the next page presents the results for Regression 1, which was 
estimated in order to calculate the discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP‟s).  The 
discretionary component is an appropriate estimate of banks' earnings management 
behaviour.  The error term from regression 1 reflects DLLP‟s.   
 
The model is significant at the 1% level i.e. 99% of the times the model does not 
produce results by chance. The explanatory power is good, considering that real life data 
is used (R squared = 0.256503) i.e. 25,65% of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variables. The Durbin Watson is 1,4426, and this observed 
statistic falls between the lower and the upper bound critical values of the Durbin Watson 
table. When this occurs, one can err on the side of conservatism and accept that there is no 
autocorrelation. No autocorrelation between residuals implies that significant variables have 




negative number implies that there are no unit roots. Non- existence of unit roots suggests 
that the model produces valid estimates.    
 
Table 22: Regression 1; Times Series and Cross Section Estimates 
Regression 1: LOSS = αit + β1LnASSETit + β2NPLit + β3LLAit + β4LOANMit + β5LOANTRit + 
β6LOANTit + β7LOANCit + β8LOANPit + β9LOANOit + ειt  
Independent variables Coefficients t-values Sign.  
CONSTANT -0.039965 -1.297947 .1965 
LNASSET 0.002662 2.185706 0.0305** 
NPL 0.009063 2.132411 0.0347** 
LLA 0.052956 1.617482 0.1080 
LOANM -0.084914 -1.406465 0.1618 
LOANTR 0.030858 1.007496 0.3154 
LOANT 0.133575 2.268629 0.0248** 
LOANC -0.031842 -1.409523 0.1609 
LOANP -0.049776 -3.103158 0.0023** 
LOANO 0.010714 0.541020 0.5894 
Model   Sign 
R squared 0.256503    
F 3.996189  0.000026*** 
Durbin Watson 1.442628   
Levin, Lin & Chu unit root test  -2.88055   
*** significant at 1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
   
 
Table 23 on the next page presents the results for Regression 2 that was estimated 
in order to calculate the discretionary realised securities gains and losses (DRSGL‟s). 
The discretionary component is an appropriate estimate of banks' earnings 




The model is significant at the 1% level i.e. 99% of the times the model does not 
produce results by chance. The explanatory power is good, considering that real life data 
is used (R squared = 0.065712) i.e. 6,57 % of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variables. The Durbin Watson is 2,2232570, and this 
observed statistic is above the upper bound critical value of the Durbin Watson table, 
suggesting no autocorrelation. No autocorrelation between residuals implies that significant 
variables have not been omitted from the model. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test is 
-1.82428. A negative number implies that there are no unit roots. Non- existence of unit 
roots suggests that the model produces valid estimates.    
 
Table 23: Regression 2; Times Series and Cross Section Estimates 
Regression 2: RSGLSit  = αit + β1LnΑSSΔΤit  +  β2UNSGLSit  + εit   
Independent variables Coefficients  
 
 t-values Sign.  
CONSTANT -0.003076 -2.845885 0.0051* 
LNASSET 0.000145 3.067390 0.0026** 
UNSGLS -0.017983 -0.772221 0.4412 
    
Model   Sign 
R squared 0.065712   
F 2.053739  0.074540* 
Durbin Watson 2.232570   
Levin, Lin & Chu unit root test  -1.82428   
*** significant at 1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 





Table 24 on the next page presents the results for Regression 3, which was 
estimated in order to calculate the discretionary accruals (DACCR).  The discretionary 
component is an appropriate estimate of earnings management behaviour. The error 
term from regression 3 reflects (DACCR).   
 
The model is significant at the 1% level i.e. 99% of the times the model does not 
produce results by chance. The explanatory power is good, considering that real life data 
is used (R squared = 0.102369) i.e. 10,23% of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variables. The Durbin Watson is 2.226912, and this 
observed statistic is above the upper bound critical value of the Durbin Watson table, 
suggesting no autocorrelation. No autocorrelation between residuals implies that significant 
variables have not been omitted from the model. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test is 
-4.14270. A negative number implies that there are no unit roots. Non- existence of unit 













Table 24: Regression 3; Times Series and Cross Section Estimates 
Regression 3: ACCRit = αit + β1(1/TAit-1) + β2(ΓΟΙit/ΤAit-1) + β3(ΒRΔit/ΤΑit-1) + εit    
Independent variables Coefficients   
 
 t-values Sign.  
CONSTANT -0.0115327 -0.801242 0.4243 
ΓΟΙ / ΤΑ -3.525691 -4.075612 0.0001*** 
ΒRE / TA -0.035080 -0.025762 0.9795 
    
Model   Sign 
R squared 0.102369   
F 3.330056  0.007055*** 
Durbin Watson 2.226912   
Levin, Lin & Chu unit root test  -4.14270   
*** significant at 1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
   
 
The first measure for earnings management (EM) was then measured as the 
difference between discretionary real securities gains and losses (DRSGL‟s) and 
discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP‟s). Lower levels of loan loss provisions and 
higher levels of realized securities gains correspond to higher levels of earnings 
management, which, ceteris paribus, increase income.  
 
After having derived the first measure of earnings management (EM) regression 4 
was estimated. Regression 4 treats earnings management (EM) as the dependent 
variable, which is the difference between DRGL‟s and DLLP‟s. The independent 
variables are: cash bonus, board ownership, board independence, CEO duality, 




ratio, market to book value, the natural logarithm of assets and leverage. The findings 
for Regression 4 are shown in table 25 on the next page.   
 
The model is significant at the 1% level i.e. 99% of the times the model does not 
produce results by chance. The explanatory power is good, considering that real life data 
is used (R squared = 0.463836) i.e. 46,38% of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variables. The Durbin Watson is 2.0401198 and this 
observed statistic is above the upper bound critical value of the Durbin Watson table, 
suggesting no autocorrelation. No autocorrelation between residuals implies that significant 
variables have not been omitted from the model. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test is 
-4.51807. A negative number implies that there are no unit roots. Non- existence of unit 















Table 25: Regression 4; Times Series and Cross Section Estimates 
Regression 4: EMit = αit + β1NDEMit + β2BONUSit + β3DOWNit + β4BIit + β5DCEOit + 
β6CEONOMit + β7MEETit + β8CAPit + β9MKBKit + β10LnAssetit + β11LEVit + εit     
Independent variables Coefficients   t – values  Sign.  
CONSTANT 0.003427 (0.592376) 0.5546 
NDEM -0.276405 (-2.327619) 0.0214** 
BONUS -0.000128 (-0.182620) 0.8554 
DOWN 0.004383 (2.693526) 0.0080** 
BI 0.005518 (3.166707) 0.0019** 
DCEO -0.001164 (-0.844782) 0.3997 
CEONOM -0.001179 (-1.222282) 0.2238 
MEET -6.84EEE-05 (-1.652743) 0.1007 
CAP -0.041521 (-2.237942) 0.0269** 
MKBK 0.001999 (7.924647) 0.0000*** 
LNASSET 0.000340 (1.381734) 0.1694 
LEV -0.000619 (-7.181254) 0.0000*** 
    
Model   Sign 
R squared 0.463836   
F 8.218466  0.00000*** 
Durbin Watson 2.041198   
Levin, Lin & Chu unit root test  -4.51807   
*** significant at 1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
   
 
 
The second measure of earnings management (DACCR) was estimated with 
Regression 3. Higher levels of DACCR increase net profit and vice versa. 
Regression 5 was then estimated. Regression 5 treats DACCR as the dependent 
variable. The independent variables are: cash bonus, board ownership, board 




meetings, capital adequacy ratio, market to book value, the natural logarithm of assets 
and leverage. The findings for Regression 5 are shown in table 26 on the next page.  
 
The model is significant at the 1% level i.e. 99% of the times the model does not 
produce results by chance. The explanatory power is good, considering that real life data 
is used (R squared = 0.340533) i.e. 34,05% of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variables. The Durbin Watson is 2.706528 and this observed 
statistic is above the upper bound critical value of the Durbin Watson table, suggesting no 
autocorrelation. No autocorrelation between residuals implies that significant variables have 
not been omitted from the model. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test is -5.69464. A 
negative number implies that there are no unit roots. Non- existence of unit roots suggests 















Table 26: Regression 5; Times Series and Cross Section Estimates 
Regression 5: DACCRit = αit + β1NDACRRit + β2BONUSit + β3DOWNit + β4BIit + β5DCEOit + 
β6CEONOMit + β7MEETit + β8CAPit + β9MKBKit + β10LnAssetit + β11LEVit + εit     
 
Independent variables Coefficients    t-values Sign.  
CONSTANT 0.399367 3.593676 0.0005*** 
NDACCR 0.094191 0.421099 0.6744 
BONUS -0.062767 -4.753572 0.0000*** 
DOWN -0.125569 -4.102568 0.0001*** 
BI -0.164886 -5.224919 0.0000*** 
DCEO 0.072803 3.060780 0.0027*** 
CEONOM -0.027888 -1.5300208 0.1283 
MEET 0.000606 0.758420 0.4495 
CAP -1.588929 -4.574840 0.0000*** 
MKBK 0.012759 2.608686 0.0101*** 
LNASSET -0.003762 -0.821425 0.4129 
LEV -0.005449 -3.392227 0.00009*** 
    
Model   Sign 
R squared 0.340533   
F 6.421939  0.00000*** 
Durbin Watson 2.706528   
Levin, Lin & Chu unit root test  -5.69464   
*** significant at 1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 






7.6 Interpretation of Findings 
  Before the interpretation of the findings is made, it should be mentioned that, in 
2012 and 2013, the Central Bank of Cyprus requested three Independent Committees 
to make investigations of certain bank matters, including the banks examined in this 
study53. These Committees had access to bank documents, e-mails and conducted 
interviews with board members and people from the Central Bank. Therefore, the 
Committees had inside information, which was not available to the researcher. For this 
reason, where the results from these independent investigations are in line with the 
findings of this study, they are used as a way to prove the robustness of the 
conclusions. The interpretations of the regression results are presented next.   
 
7.6.1 Bonus 
The existence of a cash bonus is insignificant and negatively related to EM.  
Hypothesis 1a is therefore not supported.  
 
The relationship of the cash bonus and DACCR is significant at the 1% level and 
negative. A negative relationship indicates that when there is a cash bonus, 
discretionary accruals decrease. But when discretionary accruals decrease, the quality 
of earnings is improved. This finding fails to prove hypothesis 1b, that the existence of a 
cash bonus creates an incentive for earnings management through the use of accruals.   
                                                 
53
 PIMCO: “Independent Due Diligence Report of the Banking System in Cyprus”, February 2013 ; 
Alvarez and Marsal: “Statement of Protocol to Report of Investigations Into Specific Aspects of 
the Cyprus Banking Crisis”, March 26‟ 2013; Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus 







The above findings were not as expected. A possible explanation for this result is 
that banks must have been using some other income statement variable to manage 
profits for bonus purposes. In order to clarify this matter, one of the interviewees was 
conducted again. This person explained that, for bonus purposes, net profit is relevant 
but, what determines whether a bonus will be paid or not is also the number of non 
performing loans and an efficiency ratio measured as costs / revenues. A low ratio (i.e. 
low expenses and high revenues) indicates more efficiency. In addition, the numerator 
of the ratio includes only real expenses such as salaries, rent, advertising etc. Any 
provisions made for impairments, loan loss provisions, amortisation, depreciation etc. 
are excluded.  
 
The fact that banks have managed their revenues and their non performing loans 
for bonus purposes is confirmed by the findings of the Independent Committees.  It has 
been found that banks have been granting loans with extreme ease, by relying heavily 
on collaterals and assets of guarantors rather than on the borrower‟s ability to pay. Thus 
the significant increase in credit led to an increase in interest revenue. Subsequent to 
the granting of the loans, given the optimistic collateral values, many past due loans 
were not classified as non-performing. As a consequence, high levels of unpaid interest 
were recognized on bank income statements, enabling to report higher net interest 
margins. Finally, banks have been very accommodative with borrowers who faced 
significant liquidity issues. Loan restructurings have been made frequently. By 
restructuring problematic loans, banks were able to keep them out of the non performing 




In view of this information, the results can be explained as follows: for bonus 
purposes, banks have an incentive to manage their efficiency ratios. This can be 
achieved by increasing revenues and reducing real costs. Hence, discretion over 
accruals to increase profit is unnecessary, since these items are not considered in 
bonus decisions. However, discretionary accruals decrease, and this does not happen 
because executives or managers were ethical. Discretion over accruals is not unlimited; 
this flexibility was therefore saved so that it could be used to manage earnings upwards 
when the bottom line net profit made a difference i.e. increase the capital adequacy 
ratio. It can therefore be inferred that, if discretionary accruals were considered in cash 
bonus decisions, earnings management through DACCR would most likely be 
observed, thus confirming hypothesis 1b. This empirical result is consistent with findings 
in the literature that, managers engage in earnings management with the use of 
DACCR in order to secure a cash bonus [Healy (1985); Gaver, Gaver and Austin 
(1993); Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995); Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999); Gao 
and Shrieves (2002); Shuto (2007)].  
 
7.6.2 Inside Ownership 
Inside ownership is significant at the 1% level and positively related to EM. This 
finding indicates that as inside ownership increases, directors have an incentive to 
artificially boost profits by overstating securities gains and losses and understating loan 
loss provisions. Hypothesis 2c is rejected and hypothesis 2a is supported, that is, 





Inside ownership is significant at the 1% level and negatively related to DACCR. 
This result implies that when inside ownership goes up, discretionary accruals go down, 
and thus earnings quality is improved. With this finding, hypothesis 2b is rejected and 
hypothesis 2d is supported, that is, the interests of directors are aligned with those of 
shareholders and earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals is 
mitigated.  
 
The two findings are obviously contradictory. However, the coefficient of inside 
ownership reveals that the impact on EM is significantly lower than the impact on 
DACCR. When inside ownership increases, EM increases by 0.004 whereas 
discretionary accruals decrease by 0.1255. Therefore, when directors own shares, they 
think like shareholders and have an incentive to monitor discretionary accruals more 
closely, possibly due to their large impact on profitability. Hence inside ownership 
creates a disincentive for earnings management. This empirical result is consistent with 
findings in the literature that, inside ownership is a way to align the interest of managers 
with those of the shareholders [Dempsey et al. (1993); Warfield et al. (1995); Weber 
(2006); Niu (2006); Yang, Lai and Tan (2008); Banderlippe II (2009); Alvez (2012); Lee 
and Hwang (2012); Fauzi and Locke (2012)].  
 
The above finding is also in line with the suggestions made by the Independent 
Committees. These Committees have suggested that incentive schemes should include 
more stock options, so as to reward executives for achieving long-term targets and 




7.6.3 Capital Adequacy Ratio  
The capital adequacy ratio is significant at the 5% level and negatively related 
EM. This finding supports hypothesis 3a, that is, when capital adequacy is close to its 
regulatory minimum, banks overstate real securities gains and losses and understate 
loan loss provision in order to boost the capital base. This finding is consistent with 
evidence from the literature [Moyer (1990); Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990); 
Warfield and Linsmeier (1992); Bernard, Merton and Palepu (1995); Kim and Kross 
(1998); Ahmed, Takeda, and Shawn (1998); Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) 
 
The capital adequacy ratio is significant at the 1% level and negatively related to 
DACCR.  The coefficient of the capital adequacy ratio reveals that the impact on 
DACCR is much larger than on EM. The coefficient is -.04 for EM and -1.58 for DACCR. 
Thus, banks seem to use discretionary accruals more so as to increase profits and 
hence artificially boost their capital base. This finding is consistent with evidence from 
the literature [Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991); Kato, Kunimura and Yoshida (2001); 
Schrand and Wong (2003); Ramesh and Revsine (2011)].   
 
7.6.4 Board Independence  
Board independence is significant at the 1% and positively related to EM. This 
finding indicates that as board independence increases, profits are managed upwards 
by overstating securities gains and losses and understating loan loss provisions. 
Hypothesis 4a is not supported, which states that, more independent directors should 




independent directors have not been able to challenge executives on loan loss 
provisions and securities gains and losses due to the lack of adequate information. This 
finding is then in line with the findings of the Independent Committees. In the interviews 
conducted by the Committee members, some independent directors said that they were 
deliberately left in the dark about certain serious managerial decisions.  
 
Board independence is significant at the 1% level and negatively related to 
DACCR. This finding implies that as board independence increases, discretionary 
accruals go down, suggesting better quality of earnings. With this finding, hypothesis 4b 
is supported, that is independent directors challenge insiders and they are better 
monitors.  
 
The results on EM and DACRR are contradictory. The coefficient of board 
independence however reveals that the impact on EM is significantly lower than the 
impact on DACCR. When board independence increases, EM increases by 0.005 
whereas discretionary accruals decrease by 0.1648. Therefore, the existence of more 
independent directors on bank boards helps to reduce earnings management. This 
finding is consistent with the results of other empirical studies [Peasnell, Pope and 
Young (2000, 2005); Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004); Vafeas (2005); Niu (2006); 
Ebrahim (2007); Johnstone, Li and Rupley (2011)]. 
 
The above finding is also in line with the proposal made by the Independent 




be included on bank boards. Since the executives always have the advantage over the 
non-executives, because of greater information and influence, it should be outweighed 
by a majority of independent directors.   
 
7.6.5 Splitting the Role of the Chairman and the CEO 
CEO duality is insignificant and negatively related to EM. This finding fails to 
support hypothesis 5a.    
 
CEO duality is significant at the 1% level and positively related to discretionary 
accruals. This finding suggests that when the CEO is the chairman of the board, there is 
dominance of the chief executive and earnings are managed by using total discretionary 
accruals, possibly because of the largest impact. Hypothesis 5b is therefore supported. 
This result is consistent with findings in the literature [Klein (2000); Johnstone, Li and 
Rupley (2011)].   
 
The result is also in line with the findings of the Independent Committees. From 
interviews held with board members and some documentation reviewed, the 
Committees found that the chief executive‟s actions were not questioned enough by 
other board members. This allowed powerful executives to dominate and to pursue risky 







7.6.6 CEO Sits in the Nomination Committee  
When the CEO is sitting in the nomination committee is insignificant and 
negatively related to both EM and DACCR. The finding fails to support the hypotheses 
6a and 6b, that is, the independence of the board of directors may be compromised if 
the chief executive is involved in the selection of nominees for board positions. Klein 
(2000), who has examined the relationship between earnings management and whether 
the CEO sits in the nominating committee, has also failed to find a significant 
relationship between the two variables.     
 
7.6.7 Board Meetings  
The number of board meetings is insignificant and negatively related to EM. 
Board meetings are also insignificant and positively related to DACCR. Hypotheses 7a 
and 7b are not supported, that is, board meetings increase board efficiency. The result 
contradicts findings in the literature which provide evidence that board meetings help to 
control the incidence of earnings management [Xie et al. (2003); Johnstone, Li and 
Rupley (2011); Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012)].     
 
7.6.8 Bank Size     
The natural logarithm of total assets is insignificant and positively related to EM 
and insignificant and negatively related to DACCR. This result fails to support 
hypotheses 8a and 8b, that is, larger banks are less likely to artificially inflate income 
because of increased monitoring by regulators. The current financial crisis confirms that 




strategies of the three large, systemic banks included in the sample i.e. Bank of Cyprus, 
Hellenic Bank and Laiki. The result contradicts findings in the literature which provide 
evidence that large companies engage in income decreasing earnings management to 
avoid regulatory attention and intervention [Watts and Zimmerman (1978); Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1979); Liberty and Zimmerman (1986); Jones (1991); Cahan (1992); 
Bowen DuCharme and Schores (1995); Wong and Young (2012); Bova (2013)].     
 
7.6.9 Growth  
The market to book value is significant at the 1% level and positively related to 
EM and DACCR. The coefficient of the market to book value reveals that the impact on 
DACCR is much larger than on EM. When growth goes up, EM increases by 0.001 
whereas the DACCR increase by 0.012. This finding fails to support hypotheses 9a and 
9b, that is, growth firms attract more attention by regulators and therefore earnings 
management should be less pronounced.  
 
The fact that growth is positively related to EM and DACCR is confirmed by the 
current financial crisis. It proves that the Central Bank has failed to supervise banks 
and ensure that they operated prudently. Thus banks were able to operate without 
serious regulatory challenge until it was too late. It can therefore be inferred that, if 
banks were subject to more scrutiny from competent supervisory authorities, they 
would most likely be more conservative, thus confirming hypothesis 9. This result is 
consistent with findings in the literature which provide evidence that large companies 




Zimmerman (1978); Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979); Liberty and Zimmerman (1986); 
Jones (1991); Cahan (1992); Bowen DuCharme and Schores (1995); Wong and 
Young (2012); Bova (2013)].     
 
This result also agrees with the findings of the Independent Committees. From 
interviews held with people from the Central Bank, the Committees found that bank 
supervision was lax. The regulatory authorities failed to question the bank strategies 
when the Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic Bank and Laiki started to expand overseas into 
potentially difficult markets such as Greece and Eastern Europe. The Central Bank also 
approved a high number of branches in Greece despite the country‟s crisis. There were 
also no effective attempts by the supervisory authorities to restrain the increasing 
number of bank loans both domestically and in Greece. Little was done to discourage 
lending practices based on collateral rather than ability to pay, which has lead to poor 
credit origination and loan recovery practices. The investments in Greek government 
bonds by Bank of Cyprus and Laiki, despite Greece‟s rapidly worsening economic 
climate was questioned by the supervisors but not followed through. The oversight of 
the banks‟ corporate governance structures and practices was also deficient. The 
supervisors failed to address, serious weaknesses in the banks‟ governance structures, 
particularly in the area of risk management, internal controls, and the role of the 
executives. Moreover, the monitoring by the Central Bank of the banks‟ risk exposures 
was inadequate and was not exercised in a frequent and timely manner. The trilateral 
meetings between the Central Bank and the external auditors were also allowed to 




adequate co-ordination between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance, the two main 
authorities responsible for financial stability.  
  
7.6.10 Leverage 
The leverage is significant at the 1% level and negatively related to both EM and 
DACCR. This result suggests that as leverage increases, earnings management 
practices are less pronounced. The coefficient of the leverage reveals that the impact 
on DACCR (-0.005) is much larger than on EM (-0.0006). This finding fails to support 
hypotheses 10a and 10b, that is, banks with more leverage are more likely to manage 
profits by overstating securities gains and losses, by understating loan loss provisions 
or by overstating discretionary accruals. The result contradicts findings in the literature 
which provide evidence that, managers engage in earnings management to avoid 
violation of debt covenants which are tied to accounting profits [Haw, Jung and Lilien 
(1991); Sweeney (1994); DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994);  DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1994); Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996); Jaggi and Lee (2002)]. 
 
A possible explanation for this result is that, the banking system in Cyprus is 
primarily deposit funded. Of the total debt reported on banks‟ balance sheets, over 60% 
of the liabilities are composed of deposits. Deposit schemes do not include covenants 
that have to be met like other debt contracts. The only consideration for banks is to offer 
high interest rates, given the intensity of competition for deposits. Once the deposit has 
been secured, there is no monitoring of accounting numbers on behalf of depositors. 




line net profit does make a difference i.e. increase the capital adequacy ratio. However, 
given that managers have been opportunistic it can be inferred that, if deposit schemes 
included debt covenants tied to accounting profits, earnings management would most 
likely be observed, thus confirming hypothesis 10.  
 
7.7 Summary of Findings 
  This research is an empirical study of the four commercial banks listed in the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange, for which there is available information. According the Central Bank 
statistics, the total deposits of the sample banks constitute, on average, 54% of the total 
bank deposits, whereas the total loans comprise, on average, 49% of the total bank loans. 
Hence, if a single asset i.e. bank loans constitutes almost half the total bank loans, it can be 
inferred that the sample banks‟ total assets represent more than half the total bank assets. 
Therefore, the practices of the four banks can be generalised to the whole banking sector.  
  
 The banks examined became listed on March 29‟ 1996, when the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange began its operations. The corporate governance code was issued in September 
of 2001 and became a requirement as of 2002. Consequently, since this study examines the 
effect of corporate governance on earnings management, observations from 1996 – 2001 
were excluded due to the unavailable governance information. Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic 
Bank and Laiki Bank were able to comply with the code immediately. Universal Savings 
Bank was able to comply as of 2004. Hence the period examined includes the following 




available information produced a total number of 38 bank-year observations, which 
constitute the total population.  
 
The first measure for earnings management (EM) was calculated as the difference 
between discretionary real securities gains and losses (DRSGL‟s) and discretionary loan 
loss provisions (DLLP‟s). Lower levels of loan loss provisions and higher levels of 
realized securities gains correspond to higher levels of earnings management, which, 
ceteris paribus, increase income. Regression 1 was estimated in order to calculate the 
discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP‟s) and Regression 2 was estimated in order to 
calculate the discretionary realised securities gains and losses (DRSGL‟s).    
 
The second measure for earnings management was the discretionary accruals 
(DACCR).  Regression 3 was estimated in order to calculate the discretionary accruals 
(DACCR).  Higher levels of DACCR increase net profit and vice versa.  
 
 After having derived the two measures of earnings management (EM) two sets of 
regressions were estimated. Regression 4 treats earnings management (EM) as the 
dependent variable, which is the difference between DRGL‟s and DLLP‟s. Regression 5 
treats DACCR as the dependent variable. Both regressions have the same independent 
variables which are: cash bonus, board ownership, board independence, CEO duality, 
whether the CEO sits in the nominating committee, board meetings, capital adequacy 





The following table presents in summary of the independent variables that are 
statistically significant and their relationship and impact on earnings management (EM) 
and discretionary accruals (DACCR).   
 
Table 27: Statistically significant variables and their impact on EM and DACCR 
Independent variables EM 
(Dependent Variable)  
DACCR 
(Dependent Variable) 
Bonus   -0.062767 
Inside ownership  0.004383 -0.125569 
Board independence  0.005518 -0.164886 
CEO is also board chairman  0.072803 
Capital adequacy ratio -0.0415 -1.588929 
Growth 0.001999 0.012759 
Leverage -0.000619 -005449 
 
A glance at table 28 above reveals that, the impact of the independent variables 
is much larger on DACCR than on EM. This finding contrasts findings in the literature 
which provide evidence that, banks are more likely to use a single industry accrual, 
such as loan loss provisions, due to the material size and the substantial judgement 
required. The results also contradict the prediction that bank managers will choose to 
time the sale of their investments since no one can really challenge them on whether 
they have made the right decision or not. The evidence proves that, in Cyprus banks, 
DACCR have been used to manage earnings due to their potentially larger impact. 
When DACCR increase, the quality of earnings deteriorates, suggesting that accounting 




 More specifically, the existence of a cash bonus does not create incentives to use 
EM in order to secure compensation (Hypothesis 1a). The relationship of the cash 
bonus and DACCR is significant and negative suggesting that when there is a cash 
bonus, discretionary accruals decrease and hence the quality of earnings is improved. 
This finding fails to prove hypothesis 1b. This result is observed simply because 
DACCR are not considered in bonus decisions. Hence discretion is saved so that it can 
be used to manage earnings upwards when the bottom line net profit does make a 
difference.  
 
When directors hold bank shares, they have an incentive to artificially boost 
profits by engaging in EM in order to maximize their own wealth (Hypothesis 2a). Inside 
ownership is negatively related to DACCR, suggesting that when inside ownership goes 
up, discretionary accruals go down, and thus earnings quality is improved (hypothesis 
2d). The coefficient of inside ownership reveals that the impact on EM is significantly 
lower than the impact on DACCR accruals. Therefore, when directors own shares, they 
think like shareholders and have an incentive to monitor discretionary accruals more 
closely, possibly due to their large impact on profitability.   
 
The evidence supports that banks use both EM and DACRR in order to boost the 
capital base (hypotheses 3a and 3b). The coefficient of the capital adequacy ratio 
reveals that the impact on DACCR is much larger than on EM. Thus, banks seem to use 
discretionary accruals more so as to increase profits, potentially because of the larger 




More independent directors do not help to reduce EM (hypothesis 4a). In 
contrast, board independence is related to lower level of DACRR and hence better 
quality of earnings (hypothesis 4b).  The coefficient of board independence reveals that 
the impact on EM is significantly lower than the impact on DACCR. Therefore, the 
existence of more independent directors on bank boards helps to reduce earnings 
management.  
 
There is no evidence that when the CEO is also the chairman of the board EM is 
more pronounced (hypothesis 5a). However, the results suggest that CEO duality leads 
to higher level of DACRR. This finding suggests that when the CEO is the chairman of 
the board, there is dominance of the chief executive and earnings are managed by 
using total discretionary accruals, possibly because of the largest impact (hypothesis 
5b).  
 
The findings fail to support that board independence may be compromised if the 
chief executive is involved in the selection of nominees for board positions (hypotheses 
6a and 6b).  
 
There is no evidence that board activity, measure by the number of meetings 
leads to lower levels of EM or DACRR (hypotheses 7a and 7b).     
 
Similarly, there is no evidence that larger banks are less likely to artificially inflate 




Growth banks artificially boost their profits by using both EM and DACCR, but the 
impact on DACCR is much larger. These results fail to support the argument that growth 
firms attract more attention by regulators and therefore earnings management should 
be less pronounced (hypotheses 9a and 9b).    
   
Leverage is significant and negatively related to both EM and DACCR. This 
result suggests that as leverage increase, earnings management practices are less 
pronounced. This finding fails to support the argument that banks with more leverage 


















Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This empirical study is an examination of incentives, opportunities and 
disincentives for earnings management. The research was conducted for the four 
commercial banks that are listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange.  
 
After having considered the literature review, the evaluation of the laws that 
affect banks‟ financial reporting and the results from interviews it was determined that, 
over the years 2002 to 2011, the most important incentives for earnings management 
included variable executive compensation and capital adequacy. Board of directors was 
considered to be the most significant governance variable that could control earnings 
management. Two accounting measures (i.e. opportunities) were used to detect 
earnings management. The first measure was the difference between discretionary real 
securities gains and losses and discretionary loan loss provisions (EM) and the second 
measure was discretionary accruals (DACCR).  
 
The following hypotheses were then formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Variable compensation in the form of a cash bonus will lead to higher 
levels of earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher level of inside board ownership will lead to higher levels of 




board ownership will lead to lower levels of earnings management (the alignment 
effect). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Lower levels of capital adequacy will lead to higher levels of earnings 
management.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Board independence leads to lower levels of earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis 5: When the roles of the chairman and the CEO are not split, this will lead to 
higher levels of earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis 6: When the CEO sits in the nomination committee, this will lead to higher 
levels of earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Board activity will lead to lower levels of earnings management.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Larger banks are less likely to engage in earnings management (the 
natural logarithm of total assets was used as a proxy for bank size). 
 
Hypothesis 9: Growing banks are less likely to engage in earnings management (the 





Hypothesis 10: More leveraged banks are more likely to engage in earnings 
management.  
 
As discussed in “Chapter 7: Empirical Analysis; Part 2”, the impact of the 
independent variables is much larger on DACCR than on EM. This finding contrasts the 
argument that banks are more likely to use a single industry accrual, such as loan loss 
provisions, due to the material size and the substantial judgement required. The results 
also contradict the prediction that managers will choose to time the sale of their 
investments since no one can really challenge them on whether they have made the 
right decision or not. The evidence proves that, in Cyprus banks, DACCR have been 
used to manage earnings due to their potentially larger impact. When DACCR increase, 
the quality of earnings deteriorates, suggesting that accounting profits have been 
managed.   
 
The empirical results provide evidence that, when a cash bonus exists, DACCR 
decrease suggesting that the quality of earnings is improved. This finding is observed 
not because managers were ethical but simply because DACCR were not considered in 
cash bonus decisions. A cash bonus depends on the efficiency ratio, which is measured 
as real costs / revenues. Therefore, since the flexibility to manage accruals is not 
unlimited, discretion was saved to manage earnings upwards for when the bottom line 
net profit made a difference. Overall, the results can be interpreted as follows. DACCR 
were saved for bonus purposes, so that they could be used to manage the regulatory 




paid less attention. Banks were then able to grow and to grant loans very generously. 
Recognition of more interest revenue helped to decrease the efficiency ratio and hence 
executives were able to earn their cash bonus. This is consistent with the argument that 
managers will manage those income statement items that will secure their 
compensation. Given that executives have been opportunistic, it can be inferred that, if 
DACCR were considered in cash bonus decisions, earnings management through 
DACCR would most likely be observed, thus confirming hypothesis 1.  
 
The empirical evidence on inside ownership is mixed. This variable is positively 
related to EM, suggesting that when executives own more shares they are more likely to 
income maximise so as to increase their personal wealth (the entrenchment effect). 
However, the coefficient of inside ownership and DACCR is larger than that of EM and it 
becomes negative, indicating that inside ownership leads to better quality of earnings. 
Therefore, when directors own shares, their interests are aligned with those of 
shareholders and they have an incentive to monitor managers more closely (hypothesis 
2).   
 
The results also show a negative relationship between the capital adequacy ratio 
and both EM and DACRR. Thus, when the regulatory ratio is low, as compared to its 
minimum required, banks manage earnings upwards in order to artificially boost their 
capital adequacy ratios and avoid regulatory intervention. This finding is consistent with 




maximize because they are subject to regulation, which includes accounting profits 
(hypothesis 3).  
 
The empirical evidence on board independence is mixed. This variable is 
positively related to EM, suggesting that when the proportion of independent directors 
increases, EM is more pronounced. However, the coefficient of board independence 
and DACCR is larger than that of EM and becomes negative, indicating that board 
independence leads to better quality of earnings. Therefore, as board independence 
increases, independent directors challenge insiders more and they are better monitors 
(hypothesis 4).  
 
The pronounced use of DACCR is evident by the fact that when the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, there is a positive relationship between CEO duality and 
DACCR. This is consistent with the argument that when the CEO and chairman roles 
are not split, the CEO dominates the board (hypothesis 5).    
 
 The empirical findings fail to support hypotheses 6, 7 and 8. There is no evidence 
that when the CEO sits in the nomination committee, the board independence is 
compromised (hypothesis 6). Board activity is also not significant in controlling earnings 
management practices (hypothesis 7). Finally, the results do not suggest that bank size, 
used as a proxy for attracting regulatory attention, creates incentive to income minimize 





If regulators in Cyprus were fooled by capital adequacy management, according 
to the political cost hypothesis, they would be less likely to scrutinise banks closely. Lax 
supervision is confirmed by the fact that growth is statistically significant and positively 
related to both EM and DACCR, but again the relationship is stronger with accruals. 
Even though regulators should be watching growing banks more closely, they failed to 
do so and hence more earnings management is observed. The lack of supervisory 
scrutiny is evident by the fact that, the three largest banks (Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic 
Bank and Laiki) have expanded rapidly both on the island and abroad, without constrain 
from the Central Bank. This growth was followed by a generous granting of loans, which 
was based on collateral rather than on customer paying ability. For this reason, most of 
these loans are today non-performing. Regardless of the quality of the loans, banks 
continued to book interest revenue, thereby increasing profits as well. It can therefore 
be inferred that, if banks were subject to more scrutiny from competent supervisory 
authorities, they would most likely be more conservative, thus confirming hypothesis 9.  
 
The empirical evidence on leverage is similar to that of the cash bonus. The 
results indicate that, as debt increases, the quality of earnings is improved. This occurs 
not because managers were ethical but because, in Cyprus, most of the banks‟ debt is 
in the form of deposits. Deposit schemes do not include covenants that have to be met 
like other debt contracts. Once the deposit has been secured, there is no monitoring on 
behalf of depositors. DACCR were therefore saved in order to manage earnings 
upwards when the bottom line net profit does make a difference. Overall, the results can 




so that it could be used to increase the capital adequacy ratio and avoid regulatory 
attention. Less scrutiny by regulatory authorities allowed the three largest banks in the 
sample to expand by granting more loans and thus recognising more interest revenue. 
Higher interest revenue helped to cover higher interest paid to attract and maintain 
depositors, given the competitiveness of such a small market like Cyprus. This evidence 
is consistent with the argument that managers will manage those income statement 
items when it most advantageous to them. Given that executives have been 
opportunistic, it can therefore, if deposit schemes included debt covenants tied to 
accounting profits, earnings management would most likely be observed, thus 
confirming hypothesis 10.   
 
The above findings provide answers to the research questions that were outlined 
in Chapter 1. The research objectives were to examine: 
1. Why does earnings management take place (i.e. the incentives)? 
2. How does regulation provide opportunities for earnings management and  
3. How corporate governance and regulation can help limit such practices 
 
Answer to research question #1 
The incentives for earnings management are to: increase the capital adequacy 
ratio; secure variable compensation in the form of cash bonus; and attract and maintain 






Answer to research question #2 
The opportunities for earnings management arise from the discretion that 
accounting standards provide to financial statement preparers. The findings suggest 
that discretionary accruals are mostly used to manage bank earnings. Discretionary 
accruals are measured as the difference between net income and operating cash flows. 
Thus they include loan loss provisions, gains and losses from sales of assets, 
impairment, depreciation, amortization, unrealized gains and losses from revaluation of 
investment properties etc. Hence, bank managers exercise discretion in a 
comprehensive manner.  
 
Answer to research question #3 
The corporate governance variables that limit earnings management include: 
board independence (i.e. the number of independent directors sitting on the board); 
CEO duality (i.e. when the roles of the chairman and the chief executive officer are 
split); inside ownership; and more attention and intervention by the Central Bank.  
 
8.1 Originality 
  This study contributes to the literature, by providing evidence on earnings 
management for the banks in Cyprus. To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, a 
similar study has not been conducted for the Cyprus banking sector. Given the current 
financial crisis, the government has requested independent committees to make 
investigations but the purpose was not to determine whether earnings management 




members and inside bank documents. Therefore, this thesis is a different approach to 
detect incentives, opportunities and disincentives for earnings management.   
 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the literature by providing evidence on 
both the incentives and disincentives for earnings management. Overall, the review of 
the earnings management literature has revealed that, most of the empirical studies 
examine either the relationship between incentives for earnings management and 
opportunities for such practices or the relationship between disincentives for earnings 
management and opportunities for such practices. This dissertation provides a bridge to 
this gap since it examines both incentives and disincentives for earnings management 
for banks.  
 
In addition, most of the empirical studies on banks use loan loss provisions and 
securities gains and losses as a measure of earnings management. This dissertation 
uses an additional variable as a measure of earnings management, the discretionary 
accruals, which capture earnings management in a comprehensive manner.  
 
8.2 Implications for Practitioners 
The results of this empirical study could be of interest to the remuneration and 
audit committees, the auditors and the supervisory authorities.  
 
More specifically, the results prove the extreme importance of effective 




provide executives with incentives to manage any income statement items that are 
necessary to secure their compensation. Replacing cash bonuses with stock based 
compensation is a mechanism whereby the interests of executives can be aligned with 
those of shareholders.  Therefore, remuneration committees may consider making an 
important portion of incentive payments payable in the form of shares.  
 
  The findings also provide evidence that imprudent growth of banks did not attract 
the attention of the supervisory authorities. The current banking crisis in Cyprus proves 
that, lack of regulatory attention has allowed banks to make unwise moves and, as a 
result, both shareholders and depositors have lost money. These results suggest that, 
in the future, the Central Bank of Cyprus must use its powers to challenge bank 
strategies, restrain imprudent lending and enforce strong governance in banks.   
 
  One major responsibility of the audit committee is the supervision of the 
processes applied by the CFO regarding the choice of accounting estimates and 
accounting policies. The empirical evidence shows that banks‟ earnings have been 
managed with the use of discretionary accruals and this proves that the audit 
committees have not been effective. In the future, audit committees should scrutinize 
the CFOs‟ choices more closely, so that the financial statements provide information 
that is more reliable.  
 
  The existence of earnings management also proves that auditors have not been 




services offered to banks. As a result of the close relationship developed between the 
banks and their auditors and the high non-audit fees paid to them, auditor 
independence has been compromised. The audit function of a bank should provide an 
independent check and should have a clear reporting line to the relevant committee. 
Audit committees should ensure auditor effectiveness and when necessary propose 
auditor rotation to safeguard independence.  
 
8.3 Implications for Shareholders and Depositors 
  The results of this empirical study could be of interest to shareholders and 
depositors, because these are the two groups of stakeholders that have suffered large 
financial losses due to the financial crisis in Cyprus.   
  
  During the period of the study, the four banks included in the sample were 
considered to be strong organisations and nobody expected that they would end up 
having such serious troubles. For this reason, more than 50% of the banks‟ shares were 
held by individuals, who trusted that their investment would be safe. And it is for this 
reason that shareholders were not active. In order to avoid similar mistakes in the 
future, shareholders should be more active. In addition, they should use their power and 
appoint more independent directors on bank boards. The results of this study provide 
evidence that, as the proportion of outsiders that sit on the board increases, insiders are 
more challenged and controlled and the quality of earnings is improved. The 
significance of independence is also supported by the fact that, when the CEO is also 




that board members remain unaffected by the influence of the CEO. Therefore, if it is 
difficult for individual shareholders to monitor the actions of executive directors and 
senior management, they could protect their investments by appointing non-executive 
and independent directors, with adequate knowledge, skills and experience,  
 
 The evidence also indicates the extreme importance of market discipline from 
depositors as well. Given that banks secure most of their funding from deposits, this 
provides lenders with a bargaining power to determine whether the transaction takes 
place i.e. whether the deposit will be made. More scrutiny on behalf of depositors could 
have forced banks to be more conservatism; people have now become more cautious, 
but it is too late. However, most of the depositors are not in a position to analyse banks‟ 
financial statements. Thus, when they made their deposit decisions, they did so 
because banks “advertised” their adequate capital base in order to signal their 
soundness. This also proves the responsibility that the Central Bank has to seriously 
scrutinize whether banks artificially boost their capital positions through earnings 
management, and inform depositors accordingly.   
 
8.4 Limitations of the Study 
  One limitation of this empirical study may be the small sample size. However, 
according to the Central Bank, the total loans of the sample banks comprise 49% of 
total bank loans and the total deposits of the sample banks represent 54% of total bank 
deposits. Hence, the results may be generalised for the Cyprus banking sector, but they 




Cyprus may not apply to other countries (statistical generalization) it is possible to make 
an analytic generalisation. Generalisation is analytic where a previously developed 
theory can be used as a template against which to compare the results (Yin 2003, p.32). 
Consistent with this argument, this study has produced results that are similar to 
empirical evidence found in the literature.   
 
  Another limitation may arise from how accurately the regressions estimate the 
discretionary components of real securities gains and losses, loan loss provisions and 
accruals.  
  
 Finally, one more drawback may be that other corporate governance variables 
have not been used to detect the effect on earnings management such as audit 
committee characteristics, audit quality and block ownership (a proxy for more 
shareholder engagement).  
 
8.5 Implications for Future Research 
 Future research can be extended by considering how the audit committee 
characteristics (i.e. independence, activity, expertise), the quality of the audit and block 
ownership can help mitigate the occurrence of earnings management in Cyprus banks. 
The regressions included in this study may also be estimated as of 2012 and onwards 
in order to see whether the financial crisis has had an effect on the behaviour of bank 
boards and regulators. In addition, since financial distress has been the result of 




corporate governance variables and risk weighted assets, which are disclosed in the 
financial statements of banks.    
 
 Furthermore, this empirical study contributes to the general knowledge on banks‟ 
earnings management, which can prove to be useful to other academicians. Future 
research on banks and earnings management can be extended by considering both 
incentives and disincentives for earnings management. In addition, instead of using 
industry specific items to measure banks‟ earnings management (i.e. discretionary 
securities gains and losses and discretionary loan loss provisions), future research can 
include discretionary accruals, which capture earnings management in a more 
comprehensive manner.  Finally, similar studies to this empirical research can be 
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